NTC TRENDS COMPENDIUM

No. 97-17 **SEP 97**



3QFY96 through 2QFY97

A Collection of Trends, with Techniques and Procedures that Work!

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350

National Training Center (NTC)
TRENDS COMPENDIUM
3QFY96 through 2QFY97

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NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
TRENDS COMPENDIUM
3QFY96 through 2QFY97

NTC Trends Compendium is a compilation of repeated NTC trends, both positive and negative, along with their associated techniques and procedures, taken from CALL's *CTC Trends* for NTC. It covers 2 ½ years (ten quarters) of NTC trends (1-2QFY95, 3-4QFY95, 1-2QFY96, 3-4QFY96, and 1-2QFY97).

NTC Trends Compendium contains positive and negative trends that appear *more than once* in all *CTC Trends* for NTC during the period covered. These trends and recommended techniques are a compilation of quarterly *NTC observer/controller-derived observations*, and are not based on CALL statistical studies or analysis.

Trends and associated techniques are listed by Battlefield Operating System (BOS), and are grouped into sections, as shown:

Section A - Trends Frequency Matrix (1QFY95-2QFY97)
Section P - Positive Performance Trends and Techniques
Section N - Needs Emphasis Trends and Techniques

SECTION A: Section A is a trends frequency matrix chart. The trends are grouped according to common subject-matter within their respective BOS. The matrix shows the number of times per quarter an observer/controller (O/C) documented a trend or observation on that particular subject-matter.

EXAMPLE: (from page A-1)

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE	1-2QTR FY95	3-4QTR FY95	1-2QTR FY96	3-4QTR FY96	1-2QTR FY97
Needs Emphasis					
1. R&S plan development	X^6	X^2	X^4	X^2	X^4

In this example, *Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan development* is "Negative Trend 1" under TA.5 Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS). This means it was reported more times in the last ten quarters (18 times--6 in 1-2QFY95; 2 in 3-4QFY95; 4 in 1-2QFY96; 2 in 3-4QFY96; and 4 in 1-2QFY97) than any other TA.5 negative trend, and is therefore listed first, with the other Intelligence trends listed below it in the order of number of times they were reported, highest to lowest. The chart shows at a glance what long-term performance trends have been reported by O/Cs, and how many times in each 2-quarter period the O/Cs reported those trends. NOTE: Battlefield Operating System (BOS) codes, i.e., "TA.5 Intelligence", are based on TRADOC Pam 11-9, *Blueprint of the Battlefield*. "TA" refers to the tactical level of war. The number "5" is the Intelligence BOS number.

SECTION P: Section P contains **"positive performance" trends** as they were published in *CTC Trends* for NTC during the last ten quarters. The recommended **techniques** are presented in summary format at the end of each subject category.

SECTION N: Section N contains the **"needs improvement" trends** and associated techniques as they were published in *CTC Trends* for NTC during the last four quarters. Again, the recommended **techniques** are presented in summary format at the end of each subject category.

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NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
TRENDS FREQUENCY MATRIX
1QFY95 through 2QFY97

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE	1-2QTR FY95	3-4QTR FY95	1-2QTR FY96	3-4QTR FY96	1-2QTR FY97
Positive Performance					
1. S2 terrain analysis	X	X	X		X
2. Use of TERRA BASE program	X		X		
3. Understanding the IPB process	X		X		
Needs Emphasis					
1. R&S Plan development	X^6	X^2	X^4	X^2	X^4
2. The IPB process and application	X^5	X^2	X^2	X^3	X^3
3. Threat evaluation and ECOA development	X^3	X^2	X^2		
4. S2 SITEMP development	X^2	X	X^2	X	
5. S2 analysis and reporting	X	X	X	X	X
6. Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) Operations			X^2		X
7. Terrain analysis	X^2				X
8. S2 section organization	X			X	X
9. Event template / event matrix	X				X

TA.1 MANEUVER	1-2QTR FY95	3-4QTR FY95	1-2QTR FY96	3-4QTR FY96	1-2QTR FY97
Positive Performance					
1. Use of GPS	X^2				
Needs Emphasis					
1. Direct fire planning and execution	X^2		X^3	X^5	X
2. Movement formations and techniques	X^4	X^2	X	X	X^2
3. Use of dismounted infantry	X^3	X^2	X^2		X
4. Actions on contact	X	X	X^2	X	X
5. Graphic control measures			X	X	X
6. Boresighting	X			X	
7. Aviation integration into scheme of maneuver	X			X	
8. Actions on the objective		X		X	

TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT	1-2QTR FY95	3-4QTR FY95	1-2QTR FY96	3-4QTR FY96	1-2QTR FY97
Needs Emphasis					
1. Jump TOC operations	X	X[2]	X	X	
2. Triggers versus target location	X[2]	X		X	X
3. Close Air Support (CAS)	X[2]	X			
4. Call for fires			X	X	
5. Clearance of fires	X				X
6. Use of Grnd/Veh Laser Locator Designator				X	X

TA.3 AIR DEFENSE	1-2QTR FY95	3-4QTR FY95	1-2QTR FY96	3-4QTR FY96	1-2QTR FY97
Needs Emphasis					
1. Early warning dissemination and reaction	X[2]	X	X[2]	X[3]	X[2]

TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY	1-2QTR FY95	3-4QTR FY95	1-2QTR FY96	3-4QTR FY96	1-2QTR FY97
Needs Emphasis					
1. Force protection	X	X	X[2]	X[7]	X[5]
2. Obstacles coordination and integration	X[4]	X	X	X[4]	
3. Use of chemical detection equipment	X[3]		X	X[2]	X[2]
4. Breaching operations	X[2]	X	X	X	X
5. Counterreconnaissance operations	X	X		X[2]	X
6. Reaction to chemical attack	X	X	X		X
7. Decontaminated unit operations		X	X	X	X
8. Smoke missions		X	X	X	X
9. Security operations			X		X

TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	1-2QTR FY95	3-4QTR FY95	1-2QTR FY96	3-4QTR FY96	1-2QTR FY97
Positive Performance					
1. Unit Ministry Team (UMT)/religious support	X[2]	X	X		
2. MICLIC maintenance and operation	X	X			
Needs Emphasis					
1. Supply management	X[5]	X[2]	X[3]	X[2]	X[8]
2. Logistics estimates/CSS planning & integration	X[5]	X[3]	X[4]	X[2]	X[2]
3. Materiel readiness	X[3]	X[4]	X[3]	X[2]	X[4]
4. Medical support planning and execution	X[3]	X	X[2]	X[3]	X[3]
5. Religious support / UMT deficiencies	X	X	X[4]	X[2]	X[3]
6. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)	X[5]	X	X[2]	X	

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL	1-2QTR FY95	3-4QTR FY95	1-2QTR FY96	3-4QTR FY96	1-2QTR FY97
Positive Performance					
1. Command posts locations and operations	X[2]	X	X		
2. Engineer Bn OPORDS and CSS integration	X[2]	X			
3. Forward Support Battalion TOC operations	X	X	X		
4. Risk assessment	X[2]			X	
5. Adherence to the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule	X	X			
6. Communications center node jumps	X	X			
7. FA Battalion technical rehearsals		X	X		
Needs Emphasis					
1. Battle tracking and predictive analysis	X[3]	X[2]	X[2]	X[6]	X[7]
2. Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)	X[3]	X[2]	X	X[8]	X[4]
3. Course of Action development and wargaming	X[4]	X[5]	X[3]	X[2]	X[4]
4. Troop leading and discipline	X[4]	X[3]	X	X[6]	X[4]
5. Task Force Rehearsals	X[3]	X[2]	X[5]	X[4]	X[3]
6. Communication and signal operations	X[3]	X[3]	X[3]	X	
7. Employ tactical C^2W		X[4]	X[2]	X[4]	
8. OPORD and FRAGO preparation	X[2]	X	X[2]	X[4]	
9. Development and use of tactical SOPs		X	X	X[3]	X[2]
10. Battle staff mission analysis	X	X	X	X[2]	X
11. Timelines and time management	X[2]			X[2]	X
12. Enemy COA development	X	X	X	X	X
13. Employment and integration of a reserve	X	X	X	X	
14. Parallel planning		X[2]	X	X	
15. Decision-point development				X	X[3]
16. Planning for deep operations	X		X		
17. Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2)	X			X	
18. Planning for COLT operations				X	X

SECTION P - POSITIVE PERFORMANCE

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE

TA.5 Positive Trend 1: **S2 terrain analysis**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	1	0	1

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 1-1: S2s identify mobility corridors and avenues of approach into the Area of Operations and Area of Interest, and then identify enemy decision points; this information is integrated into an event template. What must be improved is the use of these products in the overall task force planning process.

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 1-2: Task force S2s are better articulating how terrain will impact the threat's available courses of action (COAs).

1-2QFY96

SUCCESS 1-3: *(Repeat of Success 1-2)* Task force S2s now better articulate how the terrain will impact on the threat's available courses of action (COAs) and assist the commander and staff in determining friendly COAs that exploit opportunities the terrain provides.

1-2QFY97

SUCCESS 1-4: *(Repeat of Success 1-2 and 1-3)* TF S2s now better articulate *how the terrain will impact on the threat's available courses of action (COAs) and assist the commander and staff in determining friendly COAs that exploit opportunities the terrain provides.*

TECHNIQUES

1. More accurate Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) result in more accurate depictions of enemy avenues of approach into sectors/zones.
2. Improved identification of:
   - enemy kill sacks
   - potential friendly engagement areas
   - defensible terrain
   - specific potential system and equipment locations
3. Better use of TERRA BASE products, and 1:24000 scale maps.
4. Improved coordination with supporting elements, such as engineers.

TA.5 Positive Trend 2: **Use of TERRA BASE program**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	1	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 2-1: The TERRA BASE program allows S2s to fully template the effects of terrain on communications and direct fire.

1-2QFY96

SUCCESS 2-2: Units successfully use the TERRA BASE / TOPOSKIMMER terrain visualization software to improve their detailed terrain analysis; these products are being included in operations orders (OPORDS).

TECHNIQUES

1. Use the program at Home Station to develop and sustain proficiency.
2. Prior to rotation, units should develop a standard reference file of terrain analysis products:
   - friendly and enemy maneuver
   - line of sight for retransmission (RETRANS)
   - analysis of enemy battle positions

TA.5 Positive Trend 3: **Understanding the IPB process**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	1	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 3-1: S2s know and understand the IPB process. They are familiar with the logical flow of templates, i.e., doctrinal to situational, and the uses of each. S2s generally do well at templating enemy positions, however, many have difficulty discussing and portraying the enemy's end state.

1-2QFY96

SUCCESS 3-2: Most S2s know the IPB process and understand the products and information needed at the various steps of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

TECHNIQUES

Continue training S2s in the IPB process for continued familiarity with the logical flow of templates, i.e., doctrinal to situational, and the uses of each.

TA.1 MANEUVER

TA.1 Positive Trend 1: **Use of GPS**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97	1-2QFY95
	2	0	0	0		0

SUCCESS 1-1: Maneuver units have improved land navigation with the use of GPS and map reading techniques.

SUCCESS 1-2: Field Artillery batteries are using the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) with the backup computer systems (BUCS) as a hasty method to determine position and azimuth orientation data to meet the accurate unit location condition for accurate predicted fires (APF).

TECHNIQUES

1. The precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) is capable of determining position on the ground to within 10 meters +/- circular probable error for horizontal distances and 10 meters probable error for vertical distances.
2. Units then use backup computer systems (BUCS) with either the FC Revision 1 (REV1) or the survey REV 1 chip to conduct a hasty astro sighting to establish a *secondary means of directional control* independent of any other station.

RESULT: this method provides an accuracy of 2 mils +/-.
NOTE: while this technique meets the accurate unit location requirement for accurate predicted fires (APF), units using this method will not be on common survey extended from an SCP.

TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

TA.7 Positive Trend 1: **Unit Ministry Team (UMT)/religious support**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	1	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 1-1: Brigade unit ministry teams arrive understanding the basic elements of the orders process; how to extract needed information from the necessary documents; how to analyze the information to determine where and how to deploy available religious support assets on the battlefield.

SUCCESS 1-2: Unit ministry teams are effectively conducting "before engagement" ministry during the onward movement phase of brigade operations in a successful effort to "Nurture the Living," as stated in FM 16-1.

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 1-3:

1. Unit ministry teams (UMT) provide "real world" ministry to soldiers, i.e., pastoral care on the battlefield to counter the trauma of combat conditions.
2. UMTs are correctly assessing the specific religious needs of their units. Some use religious preference profiles, which will highlight the requirements of minority faith groups. This ensures their needs, particularly during high holy days, are met.
3. UMT individual readiness continues to improve as chaplains' physical fitness and common soldier skill proficiency improves.

1-2QFY96

SUCCESS 1-4: Chaplains and chaplain assistants are much better prepared to provide comprehensive religious support to their units than they were two years ago.

TECHNIQUES

1. Battalion level chaplains are motivated to learn and willing to be a part of the team. This is a major step forward and should be an area the branch aggressively strives to attain.

2. Select aggressive brigade chaplains and NCOs who *want* to be prepared to perform their wartime mission. Put the *best* NCOs in brigade level spots and make it reflect in their NCOERs that they are in the position because they *are* the best.

3. Improved understanding of the basic elements of the orders process is the direct result of supervisory chaplains aggressively using AARs and "lessons learned" from other brigades to create positive change.

4. Train-ups should incorporate lessons learned from previous rotations.

5. Continue to emphasize chaplains' physical fitness and common soldier skill proficiency to improve individual readiness.

6. Brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) are including their slice element UMTs in the training. This facilitates comprehensive support throughout the brigade's area of responsibility.

7. Continue to place emphasis on training "go to war" skills.

8. Conduct "before engagement" ministry during the onward movement phase of brigade operations following the "Nurture the Living" techniques described in FM 16-1.

9. The use of religious preference profiles highlight the requirements of minority faith groups. This ensures their needs, particularly during high holy days, are met.

10. A majority of UMTs have been issued radios. Some UMTs deploy equipped with SINCGARS, which works even better.

TA.7 Positive Trend 2: **MICLIC maintenance and operation**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	0	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 2-1: MICLIC maintenance is improving.

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 2-2:

1. Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) is completed to standard and leaders are putting more emphasis on maintaining the system.

2. Units are meeting the Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) requirement, allowing one rocket and practice charge to be fired per system.

TECHNIQUES

Improved MICLIC maintenance and operation is the result of operators *using* the Technical Manual (TM) and being more familiar with the system, and leaders putting more emphasis on proper maintenance and operation.

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

TA.4 Positive Trend 1: **Command posts locations and operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	1	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 1-1: Generally command post locations are adequately planned and executed, and their movements included in the wargame process. There is also substantial improvement in the work division between the TOC, TAC, and command group during the battle.
SUCCESS 1-2: Brigade S1s and S4s successfully integrate their respective sections into the battle operations at rear command post (RCP). Units actively seek information by monitoring the brigade command net, A/L net and by dropping down and monitoring TF nets. Units are tracking both friendly and enemy combat elements. However, there is still some difficulty tracking CSS elements because of a lack of dissemination of CSS overlays to the rear CP from brigade elements.

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 1-3: Selection of command post locations has improved with respect to ability to maintain communications.

1. TAC operations have improved in battle tracking and in supplemental FM and MSE communications supporting its forward position on the battlefield.
2. Brigade HHC commanders select better locations based upon ability to communicate with subordinate task forces and battalion CPs.
3. Substantial improvements in work division among TOC, TAC, and command group during battle.
4. CP movements included during wargaming process

1-2QFY96

SUCCESS 1-4: *(Repeat of Success 1-2)* Brigade S1 and S4 successfully integrate their respective sections into battle operations at the rear command post (RCP).

TECHNIQUES

1. Plan and execute command post locations, and include movements in the wargame process.
2. Focus on appropriate division of work between the TOC, TAC and command group during the battle.
3. Actively monitor brigade command net, administration/logistics net, and TF nets.
4. Track friendly and enemy combat forces.
5. Integrate NCOs and enlisted members into rear command post (RCP) operations fully
   - monitor radios and track battle
   - officers analyze information and make CSS recommendations to Main CP and FSB TOC.
6. Improve tracking of CSS units.
7. CSS units, submit graphic overlays to RCP with both current and proposed locations of CSS assets.

TA.4 Positive Trend 2: **Engineer Battalion OPORDS and CSS integration**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	0	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 2-1: OPORDS have sufficient detail to synchronize engineer operations across the brigade sector.

SUCCESS 2-2: The Engineer battalion OPORD CSS annex provides more detail and critical information for line companies. This is the result of better integration of the S1s and S4s in the planning process. This assists commander's COA decisions by providing clearer information about personnel and logistical supportability.

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 2-3: *(Repeat of Success 2-2)* Engineer battalions are improving the integration of S1 and S4 staff officers into the planning process.

RESULTS:

1. CSS annex to Engineer battalion OPORD provides more detail and critical information for line companies.
2. CSS annex is often the sole source of information to line companies because they do not receive brigade or TF orders.
3. Commander receives clearer picture of his ability to support a particular COA based upon CSS.

TECHNIQUES

1. Continue integrating the S1 and S4 in the Engineer battalion planning process.
2. Provide clear, concise detail on CSS in company operations orders (OPORDs), even at the expense of redundancy with brigade/TF OPORD.
3. FRAGO any changes to companies *immediately*.

TA.4 Positive Trend 3: **Forward Support Battalion TOC operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	1	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 3-1: The level of detail in Forward Support Battalion (FSB) battle tracking is improving, particularly in the use of graphic control measures for both enemy and friendly elements.

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 3-2: FSB TOC operations and battle tracking have improved due to increased level of detail in battle tracking and use of battle graphics.

RESULT: FSB TOC's function better as the information nerve center for the brigade support area (BSA).

1-2QFY96

SUCCESS 3-3: *(Repeat of Success 3-1 and 3-2)* FSB showed consistent improvement in its ability to function as the information "nerve center" for the brigade support area (BSA)

1. Improvement in the level of detail of FSB TOC battle tracking
2. Improvement in FSB's ability to see the enemy and use of battle graphics.

TECHNIQUES

FSBs continue to train TOC and BSA alternate TOC operations with emphasis on battle tracking.

TA.4 Positive Trend 4: **Risk assessment**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	0	0	1	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 4-1: Units are conducting assessments for safety, fratricide prevention and tactical risk during planning and preparation. While assessment of risk is improving, units must do better developing risk-reduction control measures and then communicating both risks and control measures to subordinate elements.

SUCCESS 4-2: *(Repeat of Success 4-1)* Units increasingly apply risk assessment during the planning and preparation of combat operations encompassing safety, fratricide prevention and tactical risk. Units need to improve in the development of risk reduction/control measures and communicating both risks and controls to subordinate elements.

3-4QFY96

SUCCESS 4-3: Task force commanders are conducting more detailed risk assessments with control measures emphasized. Though units still show some weaknesses on implementing these controls, they are beginning to think and discuss options and controls.

TECHNIQUES

1. Units should continue conducting assessments for safety, fratricide prevention and tactical risk during planning and preparation.
2. Stress the steps of risk management and force protection issues at all levels.

NOTE: Units need to improve in the development of risk reduction/control measures and communicating both risks and controls to subordinate elements.

TA.4 Positive Trend 5: **Adherence to the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	0	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 5-1: Engineer companies are proactive in seeking information from the task force (TF) staff. The engineers then issue orders and task organize engineer assets quickly.

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 5-2: Company/team commanders are making a good effort to meet the 1/3 - 2/3 planning time frame. This is providing the platoon more time for their own planning and critical preparation for upcoming missions.

TECHNIQUES

1. Engineer companies.

- After the task force (TF) COA decision brief, engineers have sufficient information to issue orders to engineer platoons task-organized to maneuver company/teams. This early task organization assists platoon leaders participation in the company/team planning process, orders issue and rehearsals.

- After the TF operations order (OPORD) is issued, the *engineer commander* then develops his refined IPB, scheme of maneuver/fires, and company CSS plan; he *then issues his* OPORD.

NOTE: Engineer commanders still need to improve the level of detail in scheme of maneuver/fires and actions on contact.

2. Company/team commanders.

- Issue all OPORDs either early in the morning or late at night.
- Use warning orders (WARNOs) to help increase the amount of time the platoons have to prepare.
- Get out as much information as early as possible instead of waiting for full-blown OPORDs.

TA.4 Positive Trend 6: **Communications center node jumps**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	0	0	0

1-2QFY95

SUCCESS 6-1: Brigade S3s and signal officers are planning and executing node center, RAU and relay team moves during brigade maneuver.

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 6-2: *(Repeat of Success 6-1)* The brigade S3 and signal officer are adequately planning and executing node center, RAU, and relay team moves.

1. System controllers have consistently planned for and successfully executed multiple node center jumps.
2. Signal battalion S3s, by coordinating with brigade signal officers, continue to successfully plan and execute RAU and relay team movements well in advance.

RESULT: Signal support to brigade scheme of maneuver is successful.

TECHNIQUES

1. Rotational signal units should plan and execute three node jumps during their rotation.
2. Signal battalion S3 and brigade signal officer should continue coordination to allow early integration of RAU and relay team movements in the brigade planning process.

TA.4 Positive Trend 7: **FA Battalion technical rehearsals**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	1	1	0	0

3-4QFY95

SUCCESS 7-1: Field artillery battalions are formalizing the technical rehearsal process in unit SOPs.

RESULTS:

1. It prepares the battalion for upcoming mission in the areas of
   - scheme of fires
   - ammunition to fire
   - fire support coordination measures in effect
   - special requirements
2. It exposes ammunition and position discrepancies early and
   - allows correction
   - gives battalion current status of firing platoons

1-2QFY96

SUCCESS 7-2: Improvements have been made by units in the conduct of the field artillery technical rehearsal.

TECHNIQUES

1. Continue to refine the rehearsal process by formalizing it in unit SOPs.
2. Implement technical rehearsals into Home Station training.
3. Arrive at rehearsal with FSCOORD-approved rehearsal checklist. The checklist generally has all the required tasks identified to meet the minimum requirements for a successful rehearsal.

SECTION N - NEEDS EMPHASIS

TA.5 INTELLIGENCE

TA.5 Negative Trend 1: **Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan development**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	6	2	4	2	4

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: The majority of S2s develop R&S plans without integrating other staff elements.

RESULT: R&S plans partially cover Named Areas of Interest (NAI), but more importantly, the R&S plan is not synchronized with other elements to ensure complete BOS integration.

PROBLEM 1-2: Task force commanders and S3s "delegate" the responsibility for planning, integrating and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S2.

RESULT: Failed reconnaissance effort, which hampers the staff's ability to determine threat weakness/strength and then exploit threat weakness.

PROBLEM 1-3:

1. Task force commanders are not giving guidance to scout platoon leaders until after they issue the TF OPORD, but they expect the scout platoon to LD prior to the task force.
2. The task force S2/S3 does not have the R&S plan complete until after the TF OPORD.

PROBLEM 1-4: *(Repeat of Problem 1-1)* The majority of S2s develop the R&S plan without integrating the other staff elements. This process is not driven by the XO or the S3 in support of the overall plan development

RESULT: The R&S plan is partially focused on coverage of NAIs, and not synchronized with other BOS elements

PROBLEM 1-5:

1. S2s experience difficulties in developing and using the R&S plan. Brigade S2s rarely receive subordinate unit's R&S plans, which results in poor identification of intelligence gaps.
2. S2s rarely adjust priority intelligence requirements (PIR) during the recon effort or during the main battle.

PROBLEM 1-6:

1. S2s will use the Situation Template (SITEMP) in developing NAIs, but usually fail to consider the exact composition and disposition of the enemy's counterrecon threat.
2. Collection plans consistently lack enough detail to identify the expected time and type of enemy activity at particular NAIs for the tasked asset.
3. S2s have become the sole staff agency responsible for R&S planning. Rarely is there adequate coordination between the S2 and the S3 to integrate the R&S plan with the maneuver plan.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-7: *(Repeat of Problems 1-1 and 1-5)*

1. Lack of staff integration in development and execution of R&S plan.
2. S2s not receiving subordinate element R&S plans.
3. PIRs not adjusted throughout the reconnaissance effort.
4. NAIs not updated and disseminated to subordinate elements.

PROBLEM 1-8: *(Repeat of Problem 1-2)* Too many units at task force level delegate the entire responsibility for planning, integrating and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S2.

RESULT: Too often, a failed reconnaissance effort. The staff is unable to determine threat weaknesses and strengths. This hinders the development of courses of action that avoid threat strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-9:

1. Too little staff integration into the R&S planning process.
2. R & S plans too general, failing to focus on *gaps in intelligence holdings.*
3. Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) is often too general to focus the R&S planning .
4. The scout platoon leader rarely knows the 1 or 2 items the *commander absolutely needs to know* in order to achieve success.

RESULTS:

1. The scout platoon deploys over-tasked, with multiple objectives of supposed equal importance.
2. Scouts fail to accomplish their mission.

PROBLEM 1-10: *(Repeat of Problems 1-2 and 1-8)* Too many units at TF level "delegate" the *entire* responsibility for planning, integrating, and supervising the reconnaissance effort to the S2.

RESULTS: Reconnaissance effort fails.

1. The staff cannot determine threat weaknesses and strengths.
2. Courses of action do not avoid threat strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.

PROBLEM 1-11:

1. Units do not prepare R&S plans until after the TDMP is complete, *losing 24-36 hours due to delays in planning between brigade and battalion*.
2. Units use R & S matrices as the executing document. This document does not address:
   - penetration/infiltration of enemy security forces.
   - CSS
   - Command and control (C2) (especially long range comms).
   - terrain management
   - fratricide avoidance
   - clearance of fires.
3. R&S plans do not have enough operational flexibility:
   - insufficient planning in depth
   - lack of provisions for redirecting recon assets
   - no plan to reconstitute destroyed assets.
4. Plans do not state missions in terms of task, purpose, objectives, and intent.
5. Commanders do not receive back briefs or use other methods to ensure reconnaissance intent is understood.

RESULT: Reconnaissance plans are often late and lack sufficient detail to support execution; therefore they often fail.

PROBLEM 1-12: While task force scouts usually succeed in observing tasked Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), there are too many instances where there was no plan to reposition the scouts *if the TF scheme of maneuver changes*.

RESULT: Scouts are not in position to complete a key portion of their mission.

<u>3-4QFY96</u>

PROBLEM 1-13: R&S operations routinely fail. It has become an afterthought, and "S2 business", rather than the brigade's initial main effort.

1. No one is put in charge of the R&S effort, to track it, adjust it when necessary and ensure that it answers the commander's PIR.
2. R&S efforts are usually reduced to a matrix in the intel annex (which only the S2s read). The matrix addresses NAIs covering all known or templated enemy locations, but does not adequately address task and purpose for each mission or recon element.
3. R&S operations are often not rehearsed.

RESULTS:

1. The brigade often does not know whether or not task forces are able to execute their assigned missions under the plan.
2. If adjustments are necessary, the S2 does not have the tasking authority to redirect recon assets, and S2s usually have to request that subordinate elements change their plans.

PROBLEM 1-14: *(Repeat of Problems 1-2, 1-8, and 1-10)* Task force commanders S3s often neglect their recon planning, synchronizing and supervising responsibilities by delegating the recon effort to the S2.

RESULTS:

1. Reconnaissance effort fails.
2. Staff is unable to determine threat weaknesses and strengths
3. No synchronized plan to avoid those strengths and exploit threat weaknesses.
4. The commander, who is ultimately responsible for the supervision of the entire process, usually has as little grasp of the requirements for successful R&S planning as the S3.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 1-15: *(Repeat of Problem 1-13)*

1. Reconnaissance operations routinely fail.
2. It has become an afterthought, and "S2 business", rather than the brigade's initial main effort.
3. No one is truly in charge of the effort, tracks it, adjusts it when necessary, and ensures that it answers the Commander's PIR.
4. R&S operations are often not rehearsed.
5. In some instances, the brigade does not know whether the task forces are able to execute their assigned missions under the plan.

RESULTS:

1. R&S efforts are usually reduced to a matrix in the Intelligence Annex (which only the S2s read).
2. The matrix addresses NAIs covering all known or templated enemy locations, but does not adequately address task and purpose for each mission or recon element.
3. If mission adjustments are necessary, the S2 does not have the tasking authority to redirect recon assets and usually must request subordinate elements to change their plans.

PROBLEM 1-16:

1. Task force and squadron S2s, S3s, and commanders continue to inadequately plan and supervise R&S operations.
2. Task force staffs do not convey an appreciation for technical abilities of R&S assets, required force protection (CS) or sustainment (CSS) operations.

RESULTS:

1. R&S assets are overtasked by superimposing repetitive and redundant collection requirements.
2. Failure to coordinate R&S efforts with staff to include adjacent and higher headquarters often leads to the loss of lives and poorly executed or unsuccessful plans.

PROBLEM 1-17:

1. The Task Force S2s are often the only ones developing the R&S effort.

2. The Scouts usually leave for a mission with only an execution matrix, minus the details needed for fire integration or CASEVAC. At times they even leave without an enemy SITEMP and with weak, non-prioritized PIRs which are not linked to NAIs.

RESULTS:

1. Plan is developed late.

2. Orders produced are not integrated products with input from each of the staff elements, and are therefore incomplete.

3. R&S products generated lack critical pieces of information.

4. Scouts prepare for mission without details necessary for success. Because the details are incomplete time used to prepare for mission is wasted and troop leading procedures suffer.

PROBLEM 1-18:

1. SITEMPS are often not available during the R&S planning.

2. TFs are not able to distinguish between when infiltration is possible and when penetration is necessary to achieve the recon objective.

3. A lack of understanding of planning factors for recon.

RESULTS:

1. Scouts selecting or being given routes through enemy security zone positions.

2. The only method of infiltration that provides a reasonable probability of success is dismounted. Dismounted operations are very limited in their scope and sustain ability.

3. TFs repeatedly underestimate the enemies commitment to counterrecon resulting in unrealistic expectations for recon effort.

4. Another consideration is the ability of these scouts to target engineer assets and harass the enemy with indirect fires.

TECHNIQUES

1. *Brigade must take the major responsibility for reconnaissance operations* and must plan and manage all aspects of a reconnaissance mission.

2. Appoint a chief of R&S at brigade level. Give the chief of R&S a small, part-time planning staff, and the equipment and authority to task and receive reports from all elements of the brigade for R&S missions.

3. Refer to FM 34-2-1 for an explanation of each staff officers' role in the integration of IPB products, including the R&S plan. Development and use of event templates and a decision support template will drive the R&S effort designed to focus NAI observation.

4. Train at Home Station to integrate the reconnaissance effort IAW the following command and staff responsibilities:

TF commander: while ultimately responsible for the entire process, the coordination and staff integration as best executed by the S2 in conjunction with the S3. The TF Commander, working with his S2, must *focus his PIR.;* the focused PIR should determine subsequent R&S plan development.

S2:

- identification of collection requirements derived from the IPB process.
- identification of reconnaissance and surveillance assets available.
- integration of R&S assets into a collection plan that matches *collection requirements* against *collector capabilities*, and is focused on threat course of action determination.

S3:

- tasking assets to support the collection.
- synchronizing the reconnaissance plan with combat multipliers, i.e., engineers, retrans, fire support, CSS, etc.
- ensure the R&S plan is as *well integrated, synchronized, and supported* as the operations plan.

5. The XO or S3 should *drive* the R&S plan development, in conjunction with the S2.

6. Mission analysis products must be part of the R&S planning in order to determine the required composition of the recon force.

7. S3s must assume an active role in R&S planning in order to synchronize the effort and to allow the S2 time to analyze reconnaissance results. This then allows the S2 to subsequently redirect, as necessary, collection assets.

8. If task force S2s are on the blame line for planning and supervising R&S, then it is essential they receive the necessary CS and CSS support and authority required for success. Task force commanders and S3s must recognize their role in R&S planning and supervision. This will allow TF and squadron S2s time to analyze recon data and recommend redirection of collection efforts.

9. Have the scout platoon leader accompany the TF commander to the brigade OPORD. After the OPORD, the commander gives guidance to his scout platoon leader. The TF staff then places a priority on completing the R&S plan before the TF OPORD. This would give the TF scouts time to plan their mission.

10. Establish scouting reposition triggers so they can be in place to support branches and sequels of the base plan. This implies at least a map rehearsal for these contingencies.

11. Other staff elements must be involved in the *detailed* planning of R&S to provide sufficient support, tactically and logistically, for the scout platoon.

12. Develop the plan similarly to an OPORD; this will help foster staff integration. When approached as an *order*, staff integration becomes more likely because of the procedures inherent in the orders development process.

- Plan reconnaissance as a combat operation, using the five paragraph orders format; include method(s) for penetrating the enemy's security forces and CSS and C2 for the recon effort.

- Make *prioritization* of R&S effort a joint process among Commander/S3/S2 during planning. Commander should identify 1-2 PIRs for success.

- Use the R&S matrix only for internal command post (CP) planning of R&S operations.

- Include the same level of detail control measures for reconnaissance operations as are afforded any other combat operation.

13. Issue the *reconnaissance "order" immediately after the brigade commander has issued his planning guidance*; use fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to provide information or modify the reconnaissance order afterwards.

14. Availability and positioning of mortars and artillery must be a consideration in targeting enemy engineer and artillery assets.

TA.5 Negative Trend 2: **The IPB process and application**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	5	2	2	3	3

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: Field Artillery (FA) battalion S2s routinely spend the first several days of a rotation trying to put together IPB templates to support the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) because this type of training and preparation was not done at Home Station prior to deployment.

RESULT: FA battalion S2s are generally unable to synchronize their conduct of IPB with the FA order timeline. This causes S2 products either to be omitted during the orders process, or not integrated at the proper time in the process.

PROBLEM 2-2: S2s possess an acceptable conceptual understanding of the IPB process, but there is a breakdown that appears to be rooted in the application of IPB, including what products must be produced, by whom, when, and to what standard. Staff integration of IPB products at task force/squadron level is poor.

PROBLEM 2-3: Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) products and analysis, specifically enemy engineer capabilities and terrain analysis, are not integrated with the S2 products. Task force commanders are not receiving the complete enemy picture.

PROBLEM 2-4: Commanders and staffs fail to conduct a complete IPB. They do not follow processes outlined in FM 34-130. In many cases they do not develop a full understanding of the enemy or weather or terrain. Seldom do intelligence personnel accurately develop the enemy's most likely or most dangerous courses of action.

PROBLEM 2-5: IPB at company/team level is either not done, or not done to the level of detail necessary. Company/team commanders are not templating down to the individual vehicle, or dismounted fighting position. When vehicles are templated, the potential dismounted threat is often ignored.

RESULT: If a plan to kill the enemy is developed, it does not include killing the enemy dismounts. This costs the unit the combat power destroyed by enemy hand-held anti-tank weapons.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-6:

1. Company/team commanders do not analyze terrain for:
   - intervisibility lines
   - dead space
   - choke points

2. Company/team commanders fail to consider the enemy's:
   - use of terrain
   - weapon system emplacements and their effect on friendly maneuver.

RESULTS:

1. Offensive mission: BLUFOR elements consistently maneuver into enemy engagement areas.

2. Defensive missions: BLUFOR elements establish a defense with too much dead space not covered by observation and indirect fire and/or obstacles to channel to enemy into a friendly engagement area.

PROBLEM 2-7: *(Repeat of Problem 2-2)*

1. While the Intelligence School and Center teaches Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) *concepts* well, the *specific application* of the IPB process, what products must be produced by whom, when, and to what standard are not clearly articulated anywhere except the Combat Training Centers.

2. The staff planning process at task force/squadron level, and *specific IPB integration*, is generally not understood or articulated to the S2 by the commander, executive officer (XO) or the S3.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-8: TF S2s frequently do not understand the application of the IPB process, resultant products, and their integration into the TF planning process.

1. IPB process is not clearly articulated:
   - products required
   - who produces IPB products
   - when products prepared
   - to what standard are IPB products prepared
2. Staff planning process and specific IPB integration at TF level:
   - generally not understood
   - not articulated to S2 by commander, XO, or S3
3. Doctrinal literature more representative of *process* rather than *technique*.
   - no good example of integrated situational template product with degree of resolution to focus planning at TF level

RESULTS:

1. S2s and S2 section personnel first exposed to IPB *process and integration* at Home Station, or during their initial CTC rotation.

2. No clear doctrine or training on integration of IPB at TF level.

PROBLEM 2-9:

1. During Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), S2s continue to omit detail needed to focus course of action (COA) development and their commander's estimate.
2. S2s experience some difficulty in portraying the enemy throughout the Area of Operations (AO).
3. For light infantry operations, the enemy threat during infiltration and/or airborne/air assault operations is frequently not adequately explained or templated.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-10: Task force level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) efforts are not producing usable information for task force staffs and company/team commanders.

1. The results of task force level IPB are not properly focused on information that subordinate commanders need and will use in fighting the enemy.
2. The IPB is overly process-oriented rather than being geared to providing information that will help in the destruction of the enemy force.

PROBLEM 2-11: Air defense staff officers (ADOs) have a tendency to wait until the brigade receives the formal order from Division before their staff estimate process begins. They rarely begin the process with the receipt of the first Warning Order.

RESULTS:

1. The brigade ADO rarely develops the aerial portion to the IPB prior to mission analysis.
2. The ADO rarely coordinates with the S2 to add the third dimension analysis to the maneuver IPB prior to COA development.

PROBLEM 2-12: Task force and squadron S2s frequently do not understand the application of the IPB process, resultant products, and their integration into the planning process

1. The specific application of the IPB process (i.e. what products result from the process) is not clearly articulated in MIOBC/OAC and 96B MOS instruction.
2. Instructional exercises tend to focus on brigade and higher echelons.
3. The staff planning process and specific IPB product integration at task force level is
   - generally not understood
   - not articulated to the S2 by the commander, executive officer (XO) or S3.
4. The IPB process and example applications in current field manuals (FMs 34-130, 34-3, 71-123, 34-2-1) are generally vague, nonspecific and representative of concept process rather than technique.
5. The appendices in FM 34-130 are adequate to illustrate these concepts, but currently there is no good example of a well-integrated (i.e. inclusive of all battlefield operating systems) SITEMP product with the degree of resolution required to focus the task force planning process.
6. Currently, S2s and S2 section personnel are first exposed to process application and integration at the CTCs.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-13: A lack of integration in the air portion of the IPB creates a situation where the TF commander gives the Air Defense Officers (ADOs) very general guidance that does not focus on defeating the threat.

RESULTS:

1. Task Force Commander cannot prioritize ADA coverage against threat and balance with his own intent for maneuver on the battlefield.
2. This poor air IPB denied the TF and Company commanders a real appreciation of the enemy air threat and capabilities.
3. TF placement of ADA assets to protect the force at critical points on the battlefield is seriously hampered.

PROBLEM 2-14: Task force and squadron S2s have a poor appreciation for the application of IPB in relation to either "deliberate planning" or "abbreviated planning" processes.

1. MIOBC, MIOAC, and 96B MOS POIs remain unable to cross boundaries from some form of analytical thinking process to predictive analysis in support of the TF's plan or "decisive point".
2. Task force commanders continually fail to provide guidance for the focus of IPB to include commander's decisive point (s).
3. S2s continually fail to correlate "seeing the terrain", "seeing the enemy", and "see themselves" either verbally or graphically (battlefield vision).
4. Task force operational systems remain unsupportive and nonintegrated within the IPB process.

PROBLEM 2-15: S2s routinely show enemy movement, not enemy maneuver plans. The enemy, as we do, uses a methodical system of maneuver to fix a part of our defense to keep it out of the fight, while suppressing, breaching, and penetrating another part. S2s often do not do an adequate job in explaining and illustrating how the enemy maneuvers.

EXAMPLE: When the enemy attacks, the S2 shows how the enemy will move its units in, for example, advance guard formation. The S2 does not show how this dynamic force will fix, breach, and penetrate defensive battle positions.

TECHNIQUES

1. Doctrinal references: FM 34-130, FM 34-80, FM 34-3, FM 34-2-1, FM 17-95/96, and FM 71-123.

2. Use every Home Station training opportunity to integrate S2s into the Military Decision Making Process. Train at Home Station to develop SITEMPS that will facilitate the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), including the staff integration between the S2 section, the S3 section and all other relevant staff elements at TF/Squadron level.

3. Task force S2 sections must review Home Station training in relation to:

- Battle tracking--enemy situational awareness over a extended period under a continuously changing environment.
- Analytical thinking process and predictive analysis--recognizing and understanding indicators and the task and purpose of battlefield shapers.
- Parallel planning--restructuring internal assets to support current battles while planning future battles.

4. Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-12, *Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning,* CALL Newsletter 95-7, *Tactical Operations Center (TOC),* and CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 2d Quarter, FY 96, "Battalion S2s: Back to the Basics" for additional techniques and procedures relevant to staff integration.

5. FM 34-130 appendices give an adequate illustration of IPB concepts. These procedures must be followed, and incorporated into unit standing operating procedures (SOP). Incorporate in the SOP specific timelines for the orders process, including products and time limits associated with their completion.

6. Use training exercises without troops (TEWTs) as an effective means of training terrain analysis, and using the results of the analysis to more effectively plan offensive and defensive operations.

7. Develop usable guidelines for task force S2s that focus them on obtaining and refining information which will have a direct impact on fighting the enemy.

8. Refine IPB manuals to concentrate less on the process and more on the information required to fight combined arms teams.

9. Using the task force SITEMP, terrain analysis, weather data, intelligence annex, PIRs, etc., the commander further breaks down the *terrain and the enemy* to determine their collective effects on the company/team mission. This analysis should result in the determination of intervisibility lines, dead space and choke points, etc. These direct the building of viable engagement areas for defensive operations, or help determine the best axis of advance to follow for an offensive mission.

10. Since S2s are not schooled in maneuver, they should ask S3 battle captains for help or read 71 series FMs to become familiar with maneuver. Use "snapshot" sketches that show enemy maneuvering in the close fight at critical places on the battlefield.

11. Integrating engineer companies into the task force's training plan will increase engineer participation in task force battle staff training. The engineer company XO should be integrated into the maneuver task force battle staff.

12. Company/team commanders should learn more about threat dismounted infantry tactics, and incorporate this into company/team IPB. The concept of operations/scheme of maneuver must include plans to defeat both the mounted and dismounted threat.

13. Integrate MPs into the reconnaissance & surveillance (R&S) plan for the rear area, so they can focus their reconnaissance effort. The MPs must also be informed of any threat to the rear area.

14. TF S2 and ADO must work closely together to refine/conduct the air IPB and ensure its integration into the SITEMP. Use Home Station training to integrate the ADO into all aspects of planning and the Military Decision Making Process. The ADO's development of the aerial portion of the IPB must begin immediately following receipt of the Division's Warning Order. The aerial IPB results in a predictive analysis of when and where the Brigade will most likely see enemy air.

15. Training institutions must ensure placement of the best and brightest intelligence officers by allowing field observer controllers the opportunity to directly influence these officers' warfighting skills at MIOBC and MIAOBC.

16. Implement a program that sends serving observer/controllers (O/Cs) to Ft Huachuca to observe training and, if possible, give an overview of what we are seeing at the CTCs. The CTCs should conduct VTCs between Ft Huachuca and task force S2 trainers.

TA.5 Negative Trend 3: **Threat evaluation and ECOA development**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	2	2	0	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Brigade S2s rarely deploy to the NTC with complete threat models, particularly missing the description of tactics and options, as well as the identification of High Value Targets (HVT).

PROBLEM 3-2: SITEMPs produced by brigade S2s are rarely complete; seldom will they produce an event template with a matrix.

RESULT: With no enemy event template, or one that is incomplete, the wargaming process is severely hampered.

PROBLEM 3-3: The delegation of the task of threat evaluation within the S2 section needs improvement.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 3-4: S2s rarely deploy with threat models. Instead they deploy with *situational templates* tailored to missions they believe they will execute.

RESULT: S2s are generally not able to successfully participate as an active enemy during course of action wargaming. The lack of valid threat models also hinders the S2's ability to conduct *predictive analysis*.

PROBLEM 3-5: Too many brigade and battalion/task force S2s are not referencing threat doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques and procedures when trying to determine threat capabilities and actions.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 3-6:

1. Too often, S2s give perfunctory attention to the effects of terrain and weather on *enemy COAs*. The enemy's use of terrain to build engagement areas and the impact on friendly maneuver is rarely found in development of friendly COAs.
2. S2s do not incorporate terrain from the *enemy's perspective* when developing the situation template. Similar trends exist in the analysis of weather impact on smoke, air assault, and enemy chemical use.

RESULTS: Key terrain or weather from an *enemy's* perspective is often not addressed in wargaming.

PROBLEM 3-7: S2s and battle staffs often design enemy COAs (ECOAs) that are scripts, reflecting "smart books" or checklist solutions, not dangerous, dynamic, unified plans.

1. ECOAs do not regularly reflect how the enemy would see friendly forces and COAs.
2. ECOAs do not reflect possible enemy COAs to different friendly COAs, i.e., enemy defense COAs if friendly unit attacks abreast versus in column or in one sector versus another.

RESULT: ECOAs are not multiple or unique.

TECHNIQUES

1. Doctrinal reference: FM 34-130.

2. Use section personnel designated in the unit TSOP for the threat evaluation task. Train at Home Station their ability to complete the identification of threat weapon system capabilities and employment norms. These analysts must also be knowledgeable about threat doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment. The key is to have the appropriate information available to the rest of the staff prior to mission analysis.

3. S2s should develop valid threat models, using Steps 1 - 3 of the IPB process, *prior to deployment*. S2s must deploy with threat models that include high-value targets (HVTs), doctrinal templates, and descriptions of tactics and options. If the threat is well-known, then a doctrinal template and historical data will initially suffice. If the threat is new or less well-known, the S2 may have to develop and update the threat model as information becomes available.

4. An *enemy* event template will greatly assist in determining *when* the enemy will be entering our battle space. Event templates should portray *all enemy options*, and concentrate on the differences. This helps to identify which COA the enemy will adopt. Develop an *enemy* event template, *on a separate overlay*, that depicts the following:

- Time Phase Lines (TPL)
- Named Areas of Interest (NAI)
- Avenues of Approach (AA)
- *decision points*

5. In addition to referencing doctrinal publications for current threat doctrine and TTP, S2s should also develop a critical events list. This list is actually a flow chart providing a narrative description of enemy tactics and operations for each enemy course of action.

6. ECOAs should be well-grounded in military theory and science, not focused on one or two enemy fighting styles or particular national doctrines.

7. For enemy COA analysis, be able to answer the following questions:

- Who? - which element
- What? - type of operation
- When? - time the action will begin
- Where? - the sectors, zones, axis of advance; avenues of approach, objectives
- How? - the method the enemy will use to employ his assets, i.e., main effort, effort, scheme of maneuver, fires, and support
- Why? - the objective or end state the enemy expects to achieve

8. S2s/analysts should array options open to friendly units and fight each friendly option from the enemy's point of view.

9. Commanders must require detailed analysis of the impact of weather and terrain on friendly and enemy operations and incorporate them into wargaming COA.

10. Continue to highlight the importance and goals of weather and terrain analysis into new manuals and circulars.

TA.5 Negative Trend 4: **S2 Situation Template (SITEMP) development**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	2	1	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 4-1:

1. S2s are not routinely depicting the enemy's most dangerous course of action (COA). Very few S2s develop multiple enemy COAs or threat models that would assist the staff in visualizing how the enemy will fight and what he will look like as he enters our potential engagement areas.
2. S2s SITEMPs do not graphically portray all the enemy's combat multipliers.
3. During wargaming, the staff does not conduct a thorough action-reaction-counter-reaction drill of the fight based on a good SITEMP or threat model

RESULTS:

1. Without an accurate depiction of the threat in an engagement area, commanders have a more difficult time calculating the necessary number and type of weapon systems to employ to achieve the commander's intent in that engagement area.
2. Task forces develop COAs and wargame them without a clear understanding of how the enemy will fight.
3. Maneuver plans do not get synchronized with fire support or engineers, etc., to take advantage of enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities; we hamper our ability to gain and maintain the initiative.

PROBLEM 4-2: *(Repeat of Problem 4-1)* In an effort to shorten the deliberate planning process, S2s are not developing multiple enemy courses of action (COA). The S2 shortens enemy COA development by failing to depict the enemy's most dangerous COAs or threat models that would assist the staff in engagement areas (EA).

RESULT: The task force is hindered performing proper battlefield "calculus." Task forces develop inadequate SITEMPs for COA development and wargaming because detailed threat models are not developed.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-3: *(Repeat of Problems 4-1 and 4-2)*

1. Task force S2 SITEMPS lack sufficient detail to assist the commander and battle staff to visualize how the enemy will fight at the critical point.
2. S2s are not developing multiple enemy courses of action (COA), and possible enemy branch plans from the selected enemy COA.
3. S2 SITEMPs do not account for all the enemy combat multipliers.

RESULT: Task forces wargame friendly COAs without a clear understanding of how the enemy will fight. Also, failure to properly wargame friendly COAs against selected enemy COAs and branch plans hinders the task force's ability to develop viable branches and sequels to counter enemy reaction to friendly maneuver.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-4: *(Repeat of Problems 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3)* S2's situation templates (SITEMPs) frequently lack sufficient detail to assist the staff and commanders to visualize how the enemy will fight at the critical point.

1. S2s are not depicting multiple enemy COAs (ECOAs).
2. The S2 fails to depict the enemy's most dangerous COAs.
3. S2s do not prepare threat models that would assist the staff in visualizing how the enemy would fight.
4. S2s do not show the staff how the enemy would look entering potential engagement areas (EAs).

RESULTS:

1. Task forces wargame selected friendly COAs without a clear understanding of how the enemy will react to or affect those COAs.
2. Task forces cannot develop valid friendly branches and sequels which will hinder the enemy commander's decision making process.
3. The task force becomes reactive to the enemy rather than holding the initiative.

PROBLEM 4-5: Task force S2 sections frequently do not use combat information to update their situation template in a timely manner.

1. S2 sections do not have a sequential system in place to receive reports, analyze reports, and confirm or deny the situation template.
2. They do not update the situation template after the OPORD briefing.

RESULTS:

1. Units have an excellent "read" of the enemy but fail to realize this due to limited situation template refinement.
2. Units do not refine their direct fire plan or scheme of maneuver as enemy information develops.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-6: Most engineer company executive officers (XOs) do not understand how to analyze threat engineer capabilities.

RESULT: Engineer company XOs cannot template the threat engineer doctrinal/situational capabilities.

TECHNIQUES

1. S2s must, at Home Station, practice their wargaming responsibility to serve as a *thinking, uncooperative enemy.*

2. S2s should prepare enemy SITEMPs and threat models for the enemy's most dangerous and most probable COAs. FM 34-130 discusses development of a SITEMP, although the manual does not address the level of detail necessary to adequately support the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).

3. Brigade S2s should produce at least two SITEMPs which show all critical enemy BOSs for every staff planning effort. SITEMPs should depict what the enemy will look like at selected "critical points."

4. Task force S2s must develop *multiple* enemy COAs and possible branch plans.

5. S2 sections should practice IPB as a continuous process. Organize the S2 section to receive and analyze reports in a timely manner, including *implications* for the situation template.

6. Engineer company commanders must better train their XOs. Provide them with appropriate doctrinal manuals on engineer equipment, capabilities and organizations. XOs must seek out the task force S2's guidance on their input to the task force SITEMP.

TA.5 Negative Trend 5: **S2 analysis and reporting**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	1	1	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 5-1: Too often in field artillery (FA) battalions, by the time S2s report "current" information, the information is outdated. Intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREPs) are designed to show where the enemy is now and predict the impact on future operations. The failure to either use these formats, or to graphically depict these events, will result in the S2 failing to see critical enemy events and their impact on the battalion.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 5-2: *(Repeat of Problem 5-1)* Too many field artillery (FA) battalions fail to use intelligence summaries (INTSUM) and periodic intelligence reports (PERINTREP) to show where the enemy is now and to predict the impact the enemy will have on future operations.

RESULT: Most S2s fail to recognize critical enemy events and predict their impact on the battalion.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 5-3: S2s often mix *analytic products and current situation products* to the commander and staff. They routinely use *one* map overlay for both "template" and situation map. They do not routinely identify one source in brigade CP for current situation assessments.

RESULTS:

1. Prevents rapid transmission of current assessments to commander and staff.
2. Unable to provide on-call up-to-the-minute updates.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 5-4: S2 sections too often fail to use their own SITEMPs as analytical products. They routinely produce SITEMPs of varying quality and utility, but often throw them in a corner and fail to use them once the planning has stopped and execution has begun.

RESULT: Information received is not compared with the SITEMP to confirm or deny particular enemy COAs**.**

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 5-5: *(Repeat of Problem 5-4)* S2 Sections too often fail to use their own SITEMPs as analytical products. They routinely produce SITEMPs of varying quality and utility, but often throw them in a corner and fail to use them once the planning has stopped and execution has begun.

RESULT: Information received is not compared with the SITEMP to confirm or deny particular enemy COAs.

TECHNIQUES

1. Develop an Enemy Critical Events Matrix per the sample below. This matrix synchronizes enemy events with critical fire support tasks (CFSTs), priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and force protection measures.

SAMPLE ENEMY CRITICAL EVENTS MATRIX

NO	PIR/CFST/FPM	ENEMY EVENT	TARGET No./NAI	ACTIONS/REMARKS
1	FASCAM @ BDE OBSTACLE	CRPs @ NAI 3 (TRIGGER FASCAM)	AG 0002 NAI 3	ALERT FSCOORD/S3/FDO INTSUM NO. 1
2	WILL THE ENEMY USE CHEMICALS IN TF BPs?	PHASE 3 CHEMICAL STRIKE ON BP EAGLE	NAI 4	PHASE 1 FIRE SPOTREP NO. 1 ALERT FSCOORD/S3/FDO
3	MASS BN ON LEAD MRB (1ST ECH)	LEAD MRB @ PL DOOM (10 MIN FROM TGT) VIC 44 EAST	AX 0001	ALERT FSCOORD/S3/FDO INTSUM NO. 2
4	WHERE IS THE ENEMY AT RESERVE?	AT RESERVE SETS FIRING LINE @ 42 EAST	NAI 5	ALERT FSCOORD/S3 SPOTREP NO. 2
5	MASS BN ON LEAD MRB (2D ECH)	LEAD MRB (2D ENCH) @ PL DOOM (10 MIN FROM TGT) VIC 44 EAST	AX 0001	ALERT FSCOORD/S3/FDO INTSUM NO. 3
6	WHEN WILL THE BATTERIES BE IN JEOPARDY?	MRP OR GREATER PENETRATION OF BP EAGLE	TF FPF AJ 0010	ALERT FSCOORD/S3/ BATTERIES SPOTREP NO. 3 (30 MIN WARNING)

How to fill in the chart:

1) List in chronological order the enemy event that corresponds to the PIR/CFST/FPM. Assign a number to each row.

2) Fill in appropriate target number where applicable.

3) In the action/remarks column, write the appropriate action, report, etc.

4) *On the overlay*, place a circled number 15 to 20 minutes prior to where your event template indicates the enemy event will take place.

When the battle tracking of enemy actions triggers events in a location you anticipated, execute the appropriate action/report. This matrix will focus on those critical enemy events battery commanders, the S3, and FSCOORD need to be aware of in making critical decisions. This allows you to produce *predictive* analysis rather than *reactive* analysis.

2. Provide *separate work areas* for current and analytical work. Use Analysis Control Team (ACT) for analytic product(s) and S2 section for current assessments. Specifically task one person or element to maintain the current situation.

3. S2 sections should post and use their SITEMPs for reporting enemy COAs. Ensure that the SITEMP or other analytic product is not confused with “hard” intel received by using two maps: one analytical map, and one for posting only “hard data”.

TA.5 Negative Trend 6: **Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	0	2	0	1

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 6-1: GSR teams tend to have a low level of proficiency in several areas:

- ability to call for fire
- NBC skills (unmasking procedures and M256 kit use)
- battlefield survival (security and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM))
- range cards for the radar and crew-served weapons

PROBLEM 6-2: When GSR leadership is not involved with task force S2s and scout platoon leaders, the GSRs are rarely effective.

RESULT: Lack of GSR team involvement means:

- GSR teams are given missions too late to complete troop leading procedures (TLPs)
- GSR teams are not incorporated into R&S plans
- lost intelligence due to lack of established reporting procedures

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 6-3:

1. Task force S2s do not have a clear understanding of how to utilize GSR teams at the TF level and below.
2. They are not including GSR teams in the TF OPORD or R&S plan.
3. When they give a mission to GSR teams, there is no clear task and purpose.
4. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures continue to be a problem between the TF and GSR teams.

TECHNIQUES

1. Establish habitual relationships at Home Station so that GSR teams become familiar with the supported unit's SOPs and become integrated as a member of the bigger team.

2. Develop training scenarios at Home Station to train the TF S2s on how to utilize GSR teams.

3. Do not re-task-organize after every mission to ensure GSRs are always on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). GSR teams that are shuffled around do not have time to conduct TLPs, to rest, and refit.

4. Make it the GSR Platoon Leader's and PSG's responsibility to ensure that their teams are included in OPORDs at all levels.

5. GSR Platoon Leaders and PSGs should have more input in mission planning.

6. Team leaders should have input in the development of the R&S plan, to be sure that the team can accomplish the mission.

7. The TF S2 must make sure that the task and purpose is clear and understood by the team before deployment.

8. Train at all levels to develop effective CASEVAC plans.

9. *Train* the following skills at *Home Station*:
   - ability to call for fire
   - NBC skills (unmasking procedures and M256 kit use)
   - battlefield survival (security and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM))
   - range cards for the radar and crew-served weapons

TA.5 Negative Trend 7: **Terrain analysis**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	0	0	0	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 7-1:

1. Enemy avenues of approach depicted into friendly sectors do not identify potential engagement areas, fire sacks, defensible terrain and specific system or equipment positions.
2. Terrain analysis fails to identify where maneuver forces are most vulnerable to enemy observation and fires.
3. Terrain analysis is not considered by the S2 or the S3 when developing threat and friendly COAs
4. S3s develop friendly COAs without considering terrain's impact of weapon system effects and/or enemy COAs.
5. There is little staff integration between the S2 and the supporting engineer.

RESULTS:

1. Vital information derived from terrain analysis is not incorporated into the decision making process.
2. Staff develops COAs and wargame them without an adequate knowledge of how the enemy will use terrain to his advantage and a terrain based concept of the employment of mobility and counter-mobility assets.

2QFY95

PROBLEM 7-2: S2s rarely use the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) developed at Home Station to assist terrain analysis.

RESULT: S2s do not effectively conduct detailed analysis, nor do they provide a clear and concise picture to the commander about the potential effects of terrain on the maneuver plan.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 7-3: The Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE), rather than the S2, often briefs terrain analysis during the mission analysis and OPORD briefs.

TECHNIQUES

1. S2s should incorporate in the IPB process sufficient time and analytical methods to produce a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) in a timely fashion.

2. S2s should work closely with engineers and using TERRA BASE, if available, conduct detailed terrain analysis that *meets the commander's needs*. The terrain analysis should identify the following, as a minimum:

- enemy avenues of approach
- intervisibility lines
- potential engagement areas
- enemy fire sacks
- weapon system firing lines
- potential lines of communication

3. Task force engineers, working with the S2, can provide additional detailed terrain based information.

- restrictive terrain analysis (go/no-go)
- line of sight/intervisibility lines
- geological analysis (from division/corps) for soil conditions; hydrology; off limits or no dig/restricted dig limitations.

4. The ABE should continue to assist the S2 in terrain analysis, however the S2 should brief the terrain and its *significance*.

TA.5 Negative Trend 8: **S2 section organization**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	0	1	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 8-1: S2 shops too often are not organized to delegate task completion. S2s produce all IPB products themselves. Most staff sections are not organized to divide the labor necessary to produce products in a timely manner.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 8-2: S2 sections do not work efficiently, or as a team, particularly when they transition from planning to current operations.

1. S2 sections often operate on a 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Based on the time available and the work required to be done, this is a waste of precious personnel resources.
2. The shift schedule reinforces an "I'm not on shift" attitude, and tends to inhibit teamwork, setting up a "we/they" relationship between the two shifts.
3. Most S2 sections set up an internal plans section (which is a good idea), but fail to fully brief the plan to the rest of the section working current operations.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 8-3: *(Repeat of Problem 8-2)* S2 Sections do not work efficiently, or as a team, particularly when they transition from planning to current operations.

1. S2 Sections often operate on a 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Based on the time available and the work required to be done, this is a waste of precious personnel resources.
2. The shift schedule reinforces the "I'm not on shift" attitude, and tends to inhibit teamwork, setting up a "we/they" relationship between the two shifts.
3. Most S2 sections set up an internal plans section (which is a good idea), but fail to fully brief the plan to the rest of the section working current operations.

TECHNIQUES

1. Establish specific responsibilities for each member of the section in the production of S2 "products". Make full use of NCOs and soldiers assigned; minimize their assignment to additional duties during those periods when their specialized skills are needed to quickly develop the necessary products. Train each section member at Home Station to perform their assigned tasks, and cross-train them to do each others' job.
2. Phase soldiers into work schedules, rather than have massive turnover twice a day. Rigorously enforce quality shift change briefings.
3. Hold regular "huddles", in which the entire section, together with the ACT, is brought together to share the current enemy situation, and the status of recon operations.
4. Avoid the 12 on, 12 off shift schedule. Soldiers should get at least six hours of sleep and time for personal hygiene and meals; they do not need (and we cannot afford) 12 hours out of the fight.
5. At the completion of each step of the planning process, and at a minimum when the OPORD is complete, the S2 planners should brief the entire section on the next mission.

TA.5 Negative Trend 9: **Event template / event matrix**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	0	0	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 9-1: S2s experience difficulties developing and using an event template and matrix. There are particular problems identifying critical enemy events and then integrating them into an event template and matrix.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 9-2:

1. S2s do not understand the use of event templates or event matrix and their importance to the planning process.
2. Enemy decision points and NAIs are not clearly defined to planners or commander.

RESULTS:

1. The friendly COAs developed in the planning process and essential to success are seriously flawed.
2. All the products necessary for a thorough planning process are not available.

TECHNIQUES

1. See FM 34-130, page 3-54, figure 3-2-11 for a good example of an event matrix. S2s need to familiarize themselves with FM 34-130.

2. The intelligence section should develop a separate overlay showing NAIs, TAIs and Time-Phased Lines (TPLs) to correctly produce an event template. Time phase lines NAIs and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.

3. Associated with the event template is an event matrix, which ties timing, locations, critical enemy events, and NAIs together (see sample enemy event matrix in techniques for TA.5 Negative Trend 5, above). TPLs should be 15 minutes apart instead of the typical interval of one hour. S2s should develop these products to allow the staff to build a decision-support template. They should also use the event template to track the enemy in zone and focus reconnaissance and surveillance on the NAIs where critical events are anticipated.

TA.1 MANEUVER

TA.1 Negative Trend 1: **Direct fire planning and execution**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	0	3	5	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: Crew gunnery skills determine the outcome of most NTC live-fire battles, *rather than unit fire plans*. Range cards, platoon sector sketches, and company fire plans *are not linked.*

RESULT: Commanders cannot focus, shift, or mass company fires with sufficient control.

PROBLEM 1-2: Company/teams are still not developing offensive direct fire plans. Company/team commanders do not plan how to kill the enemy. Typically, platoons are told to occupy an attack by fire position, orient on a specific platoon, and kill it. Commanders fail to divide enemy vehicles among the platoons; platoons are not given adequate task and purpose.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-3: Company/teams generally lack understanding of the fundamentals of direct fire planning.

RESULTS:

1. Company/teams tend to develop a scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to find, fix, mass and distribute fires to kill the enemy.
2. There is often insufficient graphic control measure to allow the company/team to mass their fires from their SBF/ABF or to cover the depth of the zone to allow for flexibility and contingency planning.
3. Engagements are normally *individual vehicle* versus platoon or company/teams.

PROBLEM 1-4: Battalions routinely fail to achieve lethality in direct fires from the support by fire position, during the breach and during the assault of the objective.

1. Units *lack understanding of procedures* governing
   - distribution
   - mass focus
   - shifting of fires
2. There is *seldom an effective plan or SOP*, understood at the crew level, by which leaders control fires.
3. Leaders fail to adequately address actions on the objective in their orders and rehearsals.

PROBLEM 1-5: Both heavy and light infantry companies/teams have experienced difficulty in direct fire planning in offensive or defensive operations.

1. Heavy infantry:
   - unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs) or objectives without target overkill
   - distributing and shifting of fires not explained
2. Light infantry:
   - company level planning rarely includes the following essential control measures: target reference points (TRPs); maximum engagement lines; direct (and indirect) fire triggers; engagement criteria.
   - commanders do not adjust these control measures to the terrain.

RESULTS:

1. Target overkill in engagement areas (EAs) or objectives.
2. Weapons positioning precludes massing fires and mutual support from adjacent companies/platoons.

<u>3-4QFY96</u>

PROBLEM 1-6:

1. Leaders do not execute a surveillance plan to support direct fire execution and actions on contact.
2. The imperative of gaining visual contact early through effective recon and surveillance does not seem to be understood.
3. Tactical units usually move before looking.

RESULTS:

1. Soldiers, crews, squads, sections, platoons and teams too often fail to gain *visual contact* with the enemy before gaining *physical contact* after the enemy has opened fire.
2. Units learn of the presence of enemy forces only after having sustained losses.

PROBLEM 1-7: *(Repeat of Problem 1-3)* Company/teams generally lack understanding of the fundamentals of direct fire planning.

RESULTS:

1. Company/teams tend to develop a scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to find, fix, mass, and distribute fires to kill the enemy.
2. There is often insufficient graphic control measure to allow the company/team to mass their fires or to cover the depth of the zone to allow for flexibility and contingency planning.
3. Engagements are normally *individual vehicle* versus platoon or company/teams.

PROBLEM 1-8: Too many units are not preparing weapon system range cards and sector sketches to standard, if at all.

RESULT: Without range cards and sector sketches, the unit loses fire discipline, integration and effectiveness.

PROBLEM 1-9: *(Repeat of Problem 1-5)* Infantry teams have difficulty in direct fire planning and execution in both offensive and defensive operations.

1. Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs).
2. Unable to focus, distribute and shift fires in manners that are understood by the soldiers that are to execute the plan.
3. During preparations for defensive operations, teams have difficulty siting obstacles so that they exploit terrain conditions and the effects of direct fire weapons.

PROBLEM 1-10: Inadequate fire control within the company/team direct fire plan results in ineffective placement and synchronization of fires on the enemy.

1. Company/team direct fire planning continues to be in a state of disarray.
2. Company/teams are not achieving effective, overwhelming fires on enemy formations in either defensive or offensive operations.

RESULT: Company/teams are not surviving long enough to assist in establishing the conditions for higher unit success.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 1-11: *(Repeat of Problem 1-5 and 1-9)* Infantry teams have difficulty in direct fire planning and execution in both offensive and defensive operations.

1. Unable to mass fires in engagement areas (EAs).
2. Unable to focus, distribute and shift fires in manners that are understood by the soldiers that are to execute the plan.
3. During preparations for defensive operations, teams have difficulty siting obstacles so that they exploit terrain conditions and the effects of direct fire weapons.

TECHNIQUES

1. Home Station training must include the principals of direct fire planning and must be understood down to platoon level. Include direct fire planning in the task force OPD/NCOPD program. Reference guides include *Armor Magazine* article, "Direct Fire Planning", Nov 93 and Jan 94; FM 23-1, FM 7-7j, FM 17-12-1-1, FM 17-15. FM 17-12-1 and FM 23-1 provide clear discussions on the target acquisition process.

2. FM 17-98 provides a superb discussion of how target acquisition supports the tactical requirements of actions on contact.

3. Obtain and use *Infantry School student handout on direct fire planning, SH 7-45*.

4. At Home Station, in training for defensive operations, practice the steps necessary to build an engagement area so that adequate weapon systems are available to execute the direct fire plan and achieve the desired results. For offensive operations, practice direct fire planning appropriate to the mission, i.e., actions on contact for a movement to contact and the fire and maneuver inherent in a deliberate attack.

5. Company level intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) must clearly identify where the enemy will come as result of the terrain and friendly action, and the best places to place effective fires on his formations.

6. Detailed direct fire planning must be done for offensive operations. Start planning with actions onthe objective, and then conduct detailed "backward planning" of the balance of the operations. The direct fire planning must be done in conjunction with the scheme of maneuver, and with the plan for supporting fires. This level of detail company/team synchronization must be practiced at Home Station prior to deployment.

7. Commanders must become more responsible in siting and supervising the integration of combat multipliers into the direct fire plan.

8. Develop, as a priority of work, rehearsing the direct fire plan during the preparation phase to help ensure the validity of the plan. Immediately start engagement area (EA) development on receipt of the task force warning order (WARNO).

9. Units must better manage their time in order to accomplish all the work required prior to mission execution.

10. Company/team commanders should *personally* site or approve each vehicle fighting position to insure an integrated fire plan.

11. Subordinate leaders at platoon level should link squad/section fire plans, then link platoon fire plans - all in an effort to integrate the company/team plan in accordance with the commander's guidance. Platoon and section sergeants must ensure range cards and sector sketches are completed to standard IAW the applicable FM for the weapon system.

12. Incorporate direct fire planning into:
- Armor and Infantry basic and advanced course instruction
- CSC tactics programs of instruction (POI)

13. Address direct fire planning in other sources and forums.

14. Stress direct fire planning as a focus point for NTC Operations Group trend reversal efforts.

15. Develop a TRADOC Direct Fire Planning FM in the short term.

16. Emphasize direct fire planning, including "Tactical Exercise Without Troops" (TEWT), at the Infantry School.

17. Include in future editions of FM 17-12-1 and FM 71-1, discussions on offensive surveillance planning and how it links to our existing doctrine about target acquisition, direct fire planning, formations, movement techniques and decision making.

TA.1 Negative Trend 2: **Movement formations and techniques**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	4	2	1	1	2

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: Units are failing to situationally adjust both their movement formation and movement technique.
EXAMPLE: Many units make contact while using the *traveling technique.*
RESULT: Making contact while using the traveling technique unnecessarily increases the vulnerability of the unit, and makes actions on contact more difficult to effectively execute.

PROBLEM 2-2: Aviation units too often use *formation flying techniques* instead of *movement techniques* to occupy battle positions (BP) and attack by fire positions. Formation flying is appropriate for flying a properly planned route up to the release point (RP). From the RP into the BP or attack by fire position, units must use *movement techniques* to increase survivability. Formation flying from the RP to the BP *increases the likelihood of the unit being spotted or being unable to deal with an unplanned situation in the BP*.

PROBLEM 2-3: Mechanized smoke platoons do not execute movement formation and techniques based on METT-T. In most cases the smoke platoon conducts little or no maneuver training with the mechanized units at Home Station.
RESULT: The smoke platoon is not trained to maneuver at the pace or using the techniques of the mech infantry.

PROBLEM 2-4: Units fight piecemeal, unable to mass on the OPFOR. On contact with the lead OPFOR element, BLUFOR habitually does not fix or maneuver. A major contributor to this task force problem is the task force's inability to control the march formation. Most units spread out from the assembly area into columns 7 to 10 kms from the advance guard company to the trail element. This lack of mutual support allows the OPFOR to mass individual BLUFOR companies resulting in eventual task force destruction. A lack of detailed rehearsal of actions on contact contributes to this lack of mass.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-5: Task forces and company/teams do not use *movement formations* in conjunction with movement techniques. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use *while they are moving*.
RESULT: Too many elements make contact while using the traveling technique, often in a column formation.

PROBLEM 2-6: *(Repeat of Problem 2-3)* Mechanized smoke platoons do not generally execute movement formations and techniques based on METT-T. Smoke platoons lack the necessary training and rehearsal with the maneuver element they support.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-7: *(Repeat of Problem 2-5)* Task forces and company/teams do not use *movement formations* in conjunction with movement techniques. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use *while they are moving*.

RESULT: Too many elements make contact while using the traveling technique, often in a column formation.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-8: Engineers do not understand how to maneuver and employ weapons systems as a unit or as part of a larger maneuver element.

1. The engineer force does not understand mounted or dismounted movement formations and the characteristics associated with each, e.g.:
   - When one movement formation is used rather than another.
   - What the advantages and disadvantages are of the various techniques.
2. Engineers do not plan for the employment of engineer company direct fire weapons systems as part of the actions on contact plan. Engineer companies have historically left the direct fire fight to the maneuver elements and taken a mobility/countermobility/survivability only posture during mission planning, preparation and execution.
3. By not utilizing their own organic weapons systems (M2, MK-19, etc...) the engineer force has not fully taken advantage of all available assets to protect themselves and complete the mission.
4. Engineers do not plan for the direct fire fight because they do not understand it's importance, nor have they made it a priority training requirement.
5. Engineers do not understand the elements of calling for fire. Engineers do not plan for the use of observed fires or understand the importance of posting the fire support overlay on their maps. Engineers normally look at observed fires as a maneuver issue that bears no relevance to the mobility/survivability BOS.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-9: *(Repeat of Problem 2-8)* Combat Engineer Companies do not understand how to maneuver and employ weapons systems as a unit or as part of a larger maneuver element.

1. Although engineer companies possess a significant amount of fire power, they seldom establish fire control measures for M2's, MK19's, AT4's or attached M1A1 tanks (plow or roller tanks).
2. Engineer units lack understanding of mounted or dismounted movement formations both at company and platoon level, and do little, if any, actions on contact planning during OPORD development.
3. Engineer Company Commanders are not sufficiently competent to assume the duty as Breach Force Commander, if the supported maneuver commander task organizes Engineers to that role.

PROBLEM 2-10: *(Repeat of Problems 2-5 and 2-7)*

1. Task forces and company/teams do not use *movement formations* in conjunction with movement techniques.

2. Units only discuss the movement formation they will use *while they are moving.*

RESULT: Too many elements make contact while using the traveling technique, often in a column formation.

TECHNIQUES

1. FMs 7-7, 71-2 and 71-1 are clear on how to use movement formations and techniques. Units need to *train* and *use* the tactics and techniques discussed in these FMs.

2. At Home Station, focus on platoon and company battle drills. Task forces should focus on control of the *task force formation*, and maneuver of the depth companies in order to destroy the enemy. Detailed task force rehearsals and refinement of the task force SOP will improve actions on contact and the subsequent close fight.

3. *Integrate smoke platoons into Home Station maneuver training* with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) prior to deployment so the smoke platoons can gain the necessary maneuver proficiency to effectively work with the elements they support. DO NOT just use smoke platoons to provide battlefield effects during Home Station training.

4. Plan movement formations in conjunction with movement techniques. Transition to more secure movement techniques as the likelihood of enemy contact increases. Leader control of formations and the selection and execution of appropriate movement techniques should be the start point for maneuver training.

5. Actions on contact must be drilled repetitively to insure that reaction is swift and sure.

6. To improve the ability to mass combat power during movement to contact, wargame *all* combat multipliers. The process must include all of the enemy and friendly critical events so that there are no major unforeseen actions necessary. This best results from starting the planning process at the decisive point and planning backwards to the initial friendly disposition.

7. Units must rehearse a movement to contact, including the transition from traveling to traveling overwatch, or to bounding overwatch as the situation dictates. Rehearsing actions on contact can be done using “walk-thru” drills until all personnel are ready to execute a more sophisticated type of rehearsal.

8. For movement through air, use appropriate movement techniques, i.e., traveling, traveling overwatch, or bounding overwatch, from the RP into a BP or attack by fire position rather than formation flying techniques.

9. Before planning any combat mission, engineer leaders at all levels must understand
   - the complexity of movement formations (FM 5-71-2, App E)
   - the integration of maneuver and direct fire weapons systems (FM 71-123, Chap 3 & 4)
   - the elements of calling for observed fires (FM 6-30, Chapter 4)

10. Leaders should incorporate force protection training into every training event.

11. Leaders should ensure there is some company collective maneuver training planned and executed each quarter.

TA.1 Negative Trend 3: **Use of dismounted infantry**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	2	2	0	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Mech/Armor task forces do not effectively use dismounted infantry.

1. Dismounted infantry is not integrated with the scheme of maneuver.
2. Dismounted infantry is not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
3. Units are not specifying a clear task and purpose for dismounts; when they dismount they are unprepared to accomplish the mission.
4. Routinely dismounted infantry leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons) behind because they are not sure of the tactical situation and unsure of their mission.
5. Most mechanized infantry employed as dismounts are unfamiliar with dismounted drills from FM 7-7.

RESULTS:

1. Mech/Armor task force employment of mechanized infantry is dismounts contributes little to mission success.
2. Dismounts too often do not use appropriate movement formations or techniques.
3. Dismounted operations are not conducted as a BFV-dismount team, which hinders mission success.

PROBLEM 3-2: Scout sections are not conducting dismounted observation posts (OPs) to standard.

1. The selection of OP sites are not well thought out; generally placed on top of significant terrain features.
2. No consideration is given to OP sites which have good fields of observation and make use of terrain.
3. Routes from vehicle locations and the OP often provide no cover or concealment.
4. Discipline of the scouts occupying the OP is poor.
5. The observers often do not have the proper equipment, situational briefing, or graphics on their maps.
6. The scouts usually do not identify or conduct a reconnaissance of their alternate OP sites.

RESULTS:

1. OP sites often compromised, and targeted.
2. Lack of equipment hinders mission success.
3. Without a situational brief or graphics, it is difficult for scouts to understand what they are looking for and what they may see.
4. If the original OP is compromised, the mission is jeopardized if no alternate is immediately available.

PROBLEM 3-3: The lack of employment of dismounted infantry during offensive operations is a continuing long-term trend.

1. Dismounted infantry actions are seldom planned at task force or company/team level.
2. Mounted-dismounted coordination is not planned or rehearsed.
3. Dismounted squads rarely conduct anything more than very generalized rehearsals.
4. When called upon to dismount, *dismount leaders and soldiers are generally unprepared*.
5. Soldiers dismount with minimal orientation or guidance about the tactical situation.
6. Dismounts are often unequipped to accomplish their mission; they dismount without radios, maps, AT weapons, and other mission essential equipment.
7. Mounted-dismounted coordination *during mission execution* is ineffective; dismounted squads therefore operate independent of the mounted force.

RESULT: The dismounted element is either committed without support against superior enemy forces and destroyed, or becomes largely irrelevant and unable to influence the fight.

<u>3-4QFY95</u>

PROBLEM 3-4: *(Repeat of Problem 3-1)*

1. Task forces do not effectively use dismounted infantry.
2. I soldiers are often not integrated with the scheme of maneuver.
3. Because of a lack of clear *task and purpose,* too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission:
   - they leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons)
   - they are unfamiliar with the tactical situation
   - they are unsure of what they are supposed to accomplish
5. Most infantry squads are *untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill* as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

PROBLEM 3-5: Company/teams are not planning for the use of dismounted infantry in the attack. Because of improper enemy analysis, commanders do not anticipate the enemy use of dug-in infantry in MRC positions.

RESULTS:

1. Positions for vehicles providing fire support to the infantry are *not planned*.
2. Dismount and pick-up points for the infantry are *not planned*.
3. *No rehearsal* is conducted.
4. If the infantry dismount, it becomes *an uncoordinated reaction* with a higher possibility of fratricide.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 3-6: *(Repeat of Problems 3-1 and 3-4)*

1. Task forces do not effectively use dismounted infantry.
2. Infantry soldiers are often not integrated with the scheme of maneuver.
3. Because of a lack of clear *task and purpose,* too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission:
   - they leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons)
   - they are unfamiliar with the tactical situation
   - they are unsure of what they are supposed to accomplish
5. Most infantry squads are *untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill* as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

PROBLEM 3-7: Units do not plan for dismounted operations on the objective. Dismounts typically ride in the back of vehicles and contribute to the operation by exercising the casualty evacuation plan.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 3-8: *(Repeat of Problems 3-1, 3-4 and 3-6)*

1. Task forces do not effectively use their dismounted infantry.
2. Infantry soldiers are often not integrated into the scheme of maneuver.
3. Because of a lack of clear *task and purpose,* too often infantry soldiers are not used in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).
4. When soldiers do dismount from the Bradley, they are too often unprepared to accomplish their mission.
   - they leave essential equipment (radios, AT weapons, etc.) behind
   - they are unfamiliar with the tactical situation
   - they are unsure of what they are to accomplish
5. Most infantry squads are *untrained and are unfamiliar with infantry drill,* as specified in FM 7-7; they often fail to use even a movement formation or technique.

TECHNIQUES

1. Units must develop training plans that emphasize the tasks and purpose associated with dismounted operations. At Home Station, dismounted drills should routinely be trained in conjunction with BFV crews, not as a separate unit.

- Use the techniques discussed in FM 7-7.
- Dismounts must be briefed on their mission for each operation.
- The appropriate dismounted drills must be rehearsed.
- Based on mission requirements, the pre-combat inspection (PCI) *prior to rehearsal* should ensure that dismounts will employ the proper equipment.

2. At Home Station, train scouts in selecting, occupying and improving dismounted observation posts (OP) sites. Enforce standards for OP occupation; squad and section sergeants must supervise. Set up OP bags, with the proper equipment, as outlined in FM 17-98. Ensure that unit SOPs designate procedures and standards for OP occupation.

3. Commanders should do a *detailed enemy analysis* to determine the possibility of enemy infantry in the objective. Commanders should then *plan and rehearse* for the possibility of dismounting the infantry to eliminate the enemy threat. The commander determines if, when, and where infantry dismounts based on his analysis of the factors of METT-T and the degree of risk he is willing to accept (FM 71-2, pg 3-37).

4. Consider dismounted elements during the *planning process*; base dismounted employment on the IPB, specifically terrain and enemy analysis. Commanders should then provide *specific guidance* to platoon and dismount squad leaders, which can be incorporated into *their* troop leading procedures. Commanders should conduct *specific* dismounted rehearsals, PCCs and PCIs for the mission. Mounted-dismounted coordination, as appropriate, should also be rehearsed to the maximum extent possible.

TA.1 Negative Trend 4: **Actions on contact**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	2	1	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 4-1: Company/teams rarely execute effective actions on contact. Reaction to enemy contact too often consists of *halting in place* and attempting to return fire, often at targets *beyond maximum effective ranges*.

RESULT: Units are quickly rendered combat ineffective.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-2: Platoons and companies need improvement in planning and executing actions on contact. During the planning process, specific actions on contact are neglected. Subsequently these actions are not discussed during mission briefs or rehearsed.

RESULT: Units fail to take proper actions on contact and suffer avoidable casualties and jeopardize mission success.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-3: *(Repeat of Problem 4-1)* Units do not plan for or rehearse actions on contact before crossing the LD. No execution of effective actions on contact to enemy combat multipliers. Reaction to enemy contact often consists of *halting in place* and attempting to return fire, often at targets *beyond maximum effective ranges*.

RESULTS:

1. Units end up driving into enemy kill sacks.
2. Units are often destroyed in platoon or company "sets".

PROBLEM 4-4:

1. Commanders do not visualize how the enemy will use combat multipliers to *shape the battlefield to his advantage*.
2. Companies/teams do not rehearse actions on contact prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).
3. Actions on contact often consist of *halting and returning fire*
   - at targets beyond range
   - without maneuvering
4. Units do not train for *simultaneous forms of combat* with the enemy.

RESULT: Company/teams:

- rarely execute effective actions to enemy combat multipliers on contact
- do not achieve fire superiority against the enemy
- fight on the enemy's terms rather than on their own terms

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-5: *(Repeat of Problem 4-1 and 4-3)* Company/teams rarely execute effective actions on contact.

1. Commanders do not visualize how the enemy will use his combat multipliers to shape the battlefield or attrit the force.
2. Company/teams do not rehearse actions on contact for each operation prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).
3. Reaction to enemy contact often consist of *halting in place* and attempting to return fire, *often at targets beyond maximum effective ranges*.
4. Commanders do not plan for simultaneous forms of contact.
5. Many leaders at team and platoon level do not understand or plan for actions on contact.
6. Because actions on contact planning is nonexistent, target acquisition is not organized or purposely linked to direct fire planning.

RESULTS:

1. Units *react* to enemy tactical initiatives and complicate leaders' efforts to accomplish their assigned tasks.
2. Very often units are forced off of their base plans prematurely as they gain physical contact with enemy security forces.
3. The unit is quickly rendered combat ineffective at little cost to the enemy.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 4-6: *(Repeat of Problem 4-1, 4-3, and 4-5)* Units often do not plan for or rehearse actions on contact.

1. No execution of effective actions on contact to enemy combat multipliers.
2. Reaction to enemy contact often consists of *halting in place and attempting to return fire,* often at targets beyond maximum effect ranges.

RESULTS:

1. Units end up driving into enemy kill sacks.
2. Units are often destroyed in platoon or company “sets.”

TECHNIQUES

1. FM 17-98 and FM 17-97 have excellent discussions about actions on contact. These discussions should be modified and incorporated into FM 17- 15, FM 7-7J and FM 71-1. The definition of contact as out lined in the latest version of FM 17-15 should be universally applied to all platoon, company, troop, task force and squadron doctrine.

2. There are at least seven forms of enemy contact:
   - visual
   - direct fire
   - indirect fire
   - close air support
   - electronic/jamming
   - NBC
   - obstacles

Units must plan for the possibility of any or all of these forms of contact throughout the depth of the battlefield and at potentially critical points in the battle. Commanders must be able to "see themselves" at critical points in the battle, and anticipate when and where the enemy will employ various forms of contact.

3. Actions on contact are battle drills that *should* constitute the bulk of a company or platoon level scheme of maneuver. Become familiar with the different *types of contact*, as detailed in FM 17-15, *Tank Platoon*. List battle drills in reaction to each of the forms of contact. Incorporate the battle drills into the unit SOPs to facilitate subsequent simplification of the orders process and preparation for mission execution.

4. Develop and practice the various battle drills at Home Station. Establish a base of fire, and, depending upon the terrain, move aggressively to covered and concealed positions. Establish fire superiority *before* attempting to maneuver on the enemy. Platoon leaders and company commanders *must develop the situation*, select a course of action, or at least recommend a course of action to the task force commander. Vehicle commanders must learn to be effective killers and survivors, while reporting correctly and succinctly to their higher headquarters.

5. Learn how the enemy will employ his combat multipliers to shape the battlefield in his favor. Develop SOPs for reactions to contact, including multiple forms of contact, with enemy forces and their use of combat multipliers. Rehearse actions on contact, to include multiple forms of contact, during Home Station training.

TA.1 Negative Trend 5: **Graphic control measures**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	0	1	1	1

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 5-1: The organization of the battlefield, or battlefield geometry, often lacks sufficient detail to organize the combined effects of a brigade formation.

1. Graphic control measures selected are *not facilitating the control* necessary for tactical execution.
2. Many leaders and staff planners are not fluent in the use of graphic control measures to enhance control.
3. There is an overriding desire to allow subordinate units flexibility in execution.
4. The lack of graphic control measures does not allow subordinate units to fight in relation to one another and they *rarely achieve mass*.
5. When control measures *are* used, many units are not abiding by the doctrinal definition or intent of the graphic and choose to ignore them.
6. The framework of the battlefield is not understood or enforced.
7. Use of check points, contact points, coordinating points, boundaries are often *inappropriate* because of a lack of understanding.
8. Graphic control measures, once applied to the operations overlay, are specified tactical tasks. The units do not understand or follow them.
9. Currently, commanders at all levels *are allowed to invent or reinvent their own terms* and graphics that are often inconsistent with doctrine. The ultimate goal is the *flexibility of the combat formation*, not individual commanders.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 5-2: Brigade schemes of maneuver lack sufficient graphic control measures to provide flexibility during execution.

1. The brigade planning process often fails to provide required graphic control measures for specified tasks (e.g., passage of lines, movement routes/axes, air corridors).
2. Control measures for the shift from the deep fight to the close fight are often not well defined.
3. Reserves, when designated, are often provided the brigade base plan graphics with unclear control measures for commitment. Reserves almost always do not have consolidated graphics.
4. Graphic control measures beyond the objective are often omitted, prohibiting forces to quickly transition.
5. Control measures to protect the force and coordinate the flow of forces from the front to rear are often omitted or done “push-to-talk” during execution.
6. Units designate checkpoints throughout the area of operation, but rarely use them to assist in controlling the force.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 5-3: *(Repeat of Problem 5-2)* Brigade and task force (TF) schemes of maneuver often lack sufficient graphic control measures and detail for coordinating and integrating maneuver to mass firepower.

1. Brigade and TF plans for actions on contact, actions on the objective, and expanding the units battlespace beyond its initial objective are routinely not developed.
2. The planning process often fails to address required graphic control measures for specified tasks (e.g. passage of lines, direct fire control measures, movement routes/axes, air corridors).
3. Control measures for the shift from the deep fight to the close fight are not well defined.
4. Graphic control measures beyond the objective are often omitted, prohibiting forces to quickly transition.
5. Control measures to protect the force and coordinate the flow of forces from the front to rear are often omitted or done "push -to- talk" during execution.
6. Units designate checkpoints throughout the area of operation, but rarely use them to assist in controlling the force.
7. Brigade SOPs are often not used or are so cumbersome that they play little part in providing the details and control measures required for certain specified tasks in the planning process.
8. Brigade course of action (COA) development and wargaming often stops at the objective; they do little to no "action on the objective" development to assist, or define the fight to ensure the commander's intent is met.
9. The detailed planning required to transition forces or commit follow-on forces through and beyond the objective is not well rehearsed or synchronized.

TECHNIQUES

1. Use FM-101-5-1 as *the prescriptive doctrinal manual* for ensuring clarity of our tactical orders through a *common* language and a *common* set of operational graphics.
2. Brigade staffs must address all specified tasks and develop the graphic control measures for each task.
3. Staffs should look at implied tasks and plan the control measures necessary to commit follow-on forces.
4. Control measures should be in sufficient detail to meet the commander's intent. They must provide subordinate commanders the tools necessary to protect the force and transition to the close fight and expand the battlespace through and beyond the objective.
5. Review of doctrinal terms and graphics control measures by staffs during Home Station training will provide a clear understanding of their meaning and how they affect each BOS. They must provide subordinate commanders the tools necessary to protect the force, transition to the close fight
6. Units must develop SOPs that facilitate unit actions and be disciplined in using them.

TA.1 Negative Trend 6: **Boresighting**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	0	1	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 6-1: MILES boresight and zero during assembly area procedures are routinely conducted, but not to standard. The subsequent inability of BLUFOR to hit with MILES is not necessarily inidicative of their gunnery skills, but more likely indicative of a lack of understanding of the MILES system.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 6-2: (CSM trend) Maneuver units often fail to boresight their weapon systems before moving to a tactical position.

RESULT: Firepower is worthless; entire company team destroyed by OPFOR in 11 minutes.

TECHNIQUES

1. Make MILES gunnery a priority during pre-rotation training. In addition to appilcable TMs, refer to CALL Handbook 94-5, *The Multiple-Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) Combat Review*. This reference will assist crew members with techniques and procedures relevant to all aspects of MILES borseight and gunnery.
2. Success against OPFOR depends on correct boresight. Confirm boresight *daily*.

TA.1 Negative Trend 7: **Aviation integration into scheme of maneuver**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	0	1	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 7-1: Most of the time, aviation units do not obtain obstacles and fire plans from the ground brigade.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 7-2: Aviation units properly manage their fighter management programs but fail to integrate aviation planning with supported maneuver units. Aviation fighting assets are a critical part of force protection designed to ensure both units and individuals can maximize their combat potential. Units too often fail to integrate aviation assets into their scheme of maneuver for critical periods which require massing of all combat power.

TECHNIQUES

1. Aviation units can optimize their air routes and engagement area planning by using obstacles and fire plans developed by the ground task force.
2. Units must identify critical events in the battle and integrate aviation planning, to ensure aviation is available to augment their scheme of maneuver.
3. Include examples of integrating aviation planning cycles with supported unit's decision making process in FM-101-5 and other applicable FMs.

TA.1 Negative Trend 8: **Actions on the objective**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	1	0	1	0

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 8-1: Company/team commanders are not sufficiently planning actions *on the objective*. The major emphasis of company/team commander planning goes into the *move* from the assembly area *to* the final objective.

RESULT: *Confusion on the objective*. Plans for employment of direct fire, when and where to dismount infantry, and how to clear the objective are not sufficient.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 8-2: Task forces continue to show a weakness in actions on the objective. Units rarely *plan* or *rehearse* actions on the objective.

RESULT: Units lose all cohesion and are unable to mass against a defending enemy and/or Combined Arms Reserve.

TECHNIQUES

1. Use *reverse planning from actions on the objective* as described in FM 71-2, pg 2-23. Reverse planning from actions on the objective is an excellent method for enhancing synchronization of the attack. It serves to clarify the commander's intent and to prevent over-emphasis on movement.

2. Units must continue planning through the *assault*.

3. *Rehearse* actions on the objective.

TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT

TA.2 Negative Trend 1: **Jump TOC operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	2	1	1	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: Regardless of whether TACFIRE moves with the Jump TOC or TOC main body, once the shelter or FDO releases control of battalion fires, *the Jump FDC or controlling platoon FDC does not have the required information to control and mass fires.*

RESULT: The piecemealing of artillery with reduced effects on targets, and delays in the delivery of fires.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-2: *(Repeat of Problem 1-1)* There is a significant degradation in the field artillery battalion's ability to provide timely, massed fires when the battalion conducts Jump TOC operations during combat operations.

1. Once the FDC or the FDO releases control of battalion fires, the Jump FDC or the controlling platoon FDC do not have the required information or precise procedures to control and mass fires.
2. The problems controlling and massing fires occurs whether the battalion FDC moves with the Jump TOC or the TOC main body.
3. The FDC does not have the personnel or equipment to maintain *both* a fully digital and manual back-up system.

RESULTS:

1. Artillery is *piecemealed*.
2. Reduced effects on targets.
3. Delays in the delivery of fires.

PROBLEM 1-3: TOCs are still ill-prepared to conduct jump operations.

1. There are no standard packages or procedures on J-TOC operations and hand-off between the main TOC and J-TOC.
2. There are no formal procedures nor supplies to support jump TOC operations**.**

RESULT: The intelligence, battle tracking, reporting, and tactical fire control efforts all suffer.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-4: Most artillery units do not plan in detail to control fires while the field artillery (FA) battalion TOC moves.

1. Efforts to use the single station IFSAS-equipped vehicle as the jump TOC (J-TOC) hamper efficient fires due to poor information transfer.
2. Some units transferring to mutually supporting units (MSU) simply tell the other unit to take over their guns and then relinquish control, without also transferring information.

RESULTS:

1. Significant degradation in *FA battalion's ability to provide timely, massed fires* when battalion performs J-TOC operations during combat operations.
2. The transition between MSU is often awkward and causes animosity between the two units.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-5: TOCs are either reluctant to move or move too often during the course of a battle.

1. There is often little or no deliberate planning for when and how the TOC moves to maintain its ability to coordinate and synchronize operations during execution.

2. Split section TOC operations are not very well understood or executed in most TOCs.

RESULT: The TOC is often on the move or out of contact during critical points in the battle.

TECHNIQUES

1. If the battalion selects, or is forced, to use Jump TOC FDC, the availability of the below listed tools will facilitate the successful Jump FDC take-over of operations.

NOTE: even with these tools available, the Jump FDC operation must be carefully planned and prepared. *The Jump TOC operation must be trained at Home Station prior to deployment.*

- Tools to have on hand:

- *Current written fire order standard*: established prior to the operation and disseminated to the platoon FDCs, this establishes and streamlines voice order procedures.

- *Written attack guidance:* establishes the volume of fire necessary to achieve the desired effects on a target.

- *High Payoff Target List*: this helps determine the order in which targets are attacked. The HPTL is critical when several fire missions are requested at once, or fire missions start to get backed up.

- *Current ammunition count*: The Jump FDC must know the ammunition count by battery or platoon, particularly for ammunition critical to a given mission. EXAMPLE: for defensive operations it is more critical to track DPICM, RAP, FASCAM, Copperhead, red bag and white bag powders. For offensive operations: DPICM HE, smoke, red bag and white bag. For night operations: add illumination.

- *Written/Printed Target List*: This includes refined targets and known point, if established.

- *Current SITMAP*: the FA battalion S3 should have a *back-up* map for jump operations. The map should have all maneuver graphics and targets posted. Prior to executing a jump operation, the map should be updated with firing unit location, fire support coordination measures, FLOT, and observer locations. A range protractor should be available to add and update range limitations.

- *Fire Support Execution Matrix:* The FDO is often required to develop his own matrix based on the addition of the task forces scheme of fires. If the battalion passes control to a platoon FDC, that element must have the same or similar tool, as well as an understanding of the overall scheme of fires.

- *TC 6-40*: This is the *most important manual for use in the Jump FDC*: for computation of smoke and FASCAM data. Although the platoon FDC could require a platoon FDC to determine this data, it may not always be possible or desirable.

NOTE: The Jump FDC can only control battalion fires *for a limited period of time.* The longer the Jump FDC is required to control fires, the more tools will be needed to perform the mission.

2. For the transfer of gun control, develop a checklist of steps and information that must be transferred to the new controlling element. Establish a *clear end state for transfer of control*.

3. In the MSU technique, the subordinate unit must use the *same checklist as the transferring unit.*

4. Establish TTPs for each of the critical functions of the J-TOC:
   - intelligence hand-off
   - battle tracking
   - analyzing combat information (maneuver/radar acquisition)
   - producing combat intel and reporting
5. Resource the J-TOC:
   - map board with map which mirrors that of TOC
   - S2 charts similar to those in TOC S2 Main
   - event/situation templates on map board
   - create J-TOC log/folder with copies of last INTSUM and RAG/DAG locations
   - J-TOC with radio nets which mirror those in TOC
   - box with required office supplies.
6. Develop J-TOC battle drills:
   - duties and responsibilities
   - information exchange and update procedures with TOC
   - pre-command checks (PCCs) of vehicles and equipment
   - procedures for transfer of control and/or command.

7. TOCs must consistently rehearse split TOC operations to ensure the ability to function fully while displacing on the battlefield. TOC moves should be rehearsed until each person knows his function and can execute in the least amount of time possible.

8. TOCs must thoroughly plan, based on METT-T, when to move during a battle to ensure they can maintain contact and control at all critical junctures.

9. Unit SOPs must include procedures for split TOC operations which ensure all BOS remain covered and synchronization/coordination between sections is maintained.

10. TOC operations manuals, or sections in FMs, must include TTP for moving TOCs, and planning TTP that will assist leaders in developing viable movement plans.

TA.2 Negative Trend 2: **Triggers versus target location**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	0	1	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: During defensive operations, task forces emplace triggers for targets that do not work because the time/distance factors are incorrect.

PROBLEM 2-2: *(Repeat of Problems 2-1)* During defensive operations, the primary observer for each target orders the firing of each target as the enemy crosses the trigger. However, this distance does not correspond to the enemy's movement rate plus time of flight.

RESULT: The enemy is not engaged by indirect fire when crossing the target area.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-3: Personnel do not understand the various techniques for establishing triggers, and the advantages of each.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-4: Fire support officers (FSOs) do not clearly define task and purpose for targets.

1. Task force FSOs usually do not adequately define what the task and purpose is for each task force target.
2. During the wargame, the FSO does not require the S3 to clearly state the intent for each target.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-5: *(Repeat of Problem 2-4)* Fire support officers (FSOs) do not clearly define task and purpose for targets.

1. Task force FSOs usually do not adequately define what the task and purpose is for each task force target.
2. During the wargame, the FSO does not require the S3 to clearly state the intent for each target.

TECHNIQUES

1. This technique is for use by ground maneuver leaders to see if triggers are in the "ballpark."
(NOTE: Certain factors can impact the effectiveness of the following technique. The examples used assume having priority of fires, and that when the call is made to fire the target, the guns are not displacing, or engaged in firing counter-battery, etc. This technique is solely designed as a check for ground maneuver leaders and fire supporters to use during planning and preparation for combat operations.)

Given: 1) a target (fixed ground location) 2) a rate of enemy movement 3) fixed gun locations

Problem: Determine a point on the ground, or trigger, that when reached by the enemy formation, triggers the observer to initiate the call to fire the target which will result in the round impacting on the enemy formation *when it is in the target area*.

Solution:

First, you must solve for *time*. You want the *time* it takes the enemy to move from the trigger to the target area to equal the time it takes for Time of Flight (TOF) of the rounds plus the mission processing time, or transmission time (TT).

Next, you must convert that *time* to *distance*, so you can establish a point on the ground to serve as your **trigger**.

Step 1: TOF + TT = T1, where TOF is *time of flight* (a fixed time), and TT is *transmission time* (a time with a slight variable). Express T1 as a % of 60 minutes, i.e., 9 minutes = .15 hours.

Step 2: D (*distance*) = T1 x R, where T1 = TOF + TT, and R = expected enemy *rate* of movement.

Example: assume TOF + TT = 9 min. or .15 hours, and R = 20 kmph.

D = .15 x 20

D = 3 km

Therefore, your **trigger** would be a *distance* of 3 km from the target area.

What if there is no point on the ground 3 km from the target that is easily or reliably identifiable by an observer? It is preferable to use an easily identifiable natural terrain feature.

Problem: Given a trigger 3 km from the target area, and a natural terrain feature an additional 2 km from the trigger, how can you use the natural terrain feature as the trigger?

Solution: Now you calculate T2, or the *time* it would take the enemy to move from the natural terrain feature to you previously calculated trigger.

Example: T2 = D/R

T2 = 2km/20kmph

T2 = .10 hour

T2 = 6 minutes

Therefore, when the enemy formation gets to the natural terrain feature, you clock *6 minutes*. At that point the enemy has reached your **trigger**, and now the observer makes the call to fire the target.

2. For standard day/night triggers, develop a *trigger kit* that has a variety of triggers for various conditions:

- mix sand and diesel fuel in an empty 5 gallon anti-freeze can for use as long-range thermal trigger (5 km +)
- mount 3 x 3 foot reverse polarity paper on plywood for a medium-range thermal trigger (inside 5 km)
- use infrared chemlights inside cut-open soda cans for short-range night trigger (not more than 3 km)

3. Task force FSOs must emphasize the importance of assigning each target a defined task and purpose. If the maneuver commander/S3 cannot provide this, the target is probably not valid and usually not executable. Consider other factors during the planning process, to include:

- observers
- artillery we expect available to service a target
- what maneuver event will trigger the firing of this target

TA.2 Negative Trend 3: **Close Air Support (CAS)**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	0	0	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Too many brigade schemes of fire support do not reflect CAS. Several problems hinder brigade efforts to employ CAS:

1. Multiple target grids generated from a variety of sources.
2. Ineffective airspace management.
3. Lack of Suppression, Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), both lethal and non-lethal.
4. Lack of qualified controllers at the right place at the right time.

PROBLEM 3-2: Those units who made coordination between the ALO and the FSO/FSCOORD have much better suppression enemy air defense (SEAD) results than those units who put SEAD low in the target priority list. SEAD is of greatest importance when the enemy is dug in; SEAD of least importance when the enemy is on the offensive.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 3-3: Although CAS planning has improved, it is still not regularly synchronized with other fire support assets or with the scheme of maneuver.

1. CAS generally is not directed in planning
   - against the commander's high payoff targets
   - at the critical time(s) and place(s) for the commander's concept
2. Despite adequate plans for controlling CAS, it is not well synchronized in execution with A2C2 and SEAD.

RESULTS:

1. While CAS contributes significantly to destruction of enemy weapons systems, it does not deliver as much to success of the brigade's mission as it might.
2. CAS lacks focus in execution.

TECHNIQUES

1. FSOs must plan and coordinate target marking and Suppression, Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) fires. They must assign primary and alternate responsibility for final control of CAS, target marking, and SEAD timing. Involve the ALO in the planning process as part of the targeting team.
2. Wargame ADAs, SEAD and the placement of USAF Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers (ETACs), in addition to CAS employment against specific targets. Then, ensure the scheme of fire support incorporates these events.
3. Include CAS into the brigade rehearsal to help coordinate all fire support assets.
4. Establish Air Liaison Officer (ALO) and FSO/FSCOORD coordination. Not having to coordinate SEAD for a moving target lets the air come in quicker and hit the target before it gets any further. Integrate the ALO into planning process and targeting teams to ensure:
   - CAS is planned against appropriate targets at appropriate times
   - the ALO understands plans to incorporate SEAD and A2C2 measures
   - the attack is synchronized with all FS systems

5. Include ALO in FS rehearsal to ensure he understands task, purpose, and plan for CAS.

6. Rehearse Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) within brigade TOC so key decision makers understand how and where CAS will support the scheme of fires.

7. FSOs must disseminate CAS call signs, frequencies, aircraft type, weapons load, Initial Point (IP) location, and IP to target time to all observers.

8. Use CAS Target Box (CTB) cards to assist in rapidly employing CAS.

EXAMPLE:

CTB cards are 5"x8" cards containing information vital to a CAS mission against a specific target at a specific location.

Note: In this example, the staff developed this 5"x8" card for engagement of the northern MRB in EA Red. If the northern MRB (our High Priority Target (HPT)) showed up in EA Green instead, a CTB card would have been developed for that enemy COA also.

CTB CARD

1. TARGET GRID: NK465153 (EA RED)
2. TARGET DESCRIPTION: NORTHERN MRB
3. IP: ZULU
4. TIME FROM IP TO TGT: 3 MIN 5 SEC
5. SEAD TGT: NK430149
6. VOLUME: DS BN 1 RD DPICM
7. ACA: BRENDA
8. CONTROL: RAVEN 18 (NK439178)
   ALT: RAVEN 14 (KN513135)
9. INCRESS: NORTH WALL
10. EGRESS: SOUTH WALL TO 50 GRID
11. EFFECTS: DESTROY 5 BMPs

Develop CTB cards during the wargame process to cover all CAS contingencies. Make a separate card for each CAS mission directed against each enemy course of action. The staff may have to develop 8"x10" CTB cards to address the contingencies for any given mission. Early development of the CTB cards will prevent the staff from trying to do the same process during mission execution. Issue copies of the CTB cards to all fire support elements and the artillery battalion staff.

9. Position USAF Enlisted Tactical Air Controllers (ETACs) forward to exercise final control of the CAS. Routinely let the brigade ALO in the TOC, or the task force ALO traveling with the task force FSO, exercise final control. The person with final control **must have eyes on the target**.

a. In using ETACs forward for final control, the TF commander and brigade staff must plan adequately for the ETAC or ALO to be capable of maneuvering to a suitable location to control CAS. Issues include ETAC/ALO mobility, communications, and force protection/risk analysis. Maneuver and communications issues must be worked out and trained at Home Station. ETAC/ALO planning considerations and operational considerations for both maneuver and communication need to be included in brigade SOPs.

b. The highest risk mission for the ETAC is forward with the scouts/COLTs. *Train* the ETACs to be integrated with the COLTs. An additional benefit to this relationship is the ETACs ability to send intelligence data on long-range VHF radios if FM communication with the COLTs fails.

TA.2 Negative Trend 4: **Call for fires**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	0	1	1	0

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-1: Scouts appear weak at directing indirect fire.

1. Lack of knowledge of role in TF scheme of fires.
2. Do not understand call for fire.

RESULTS:

1. Indirect fires not employed by scouts.
2. Scouts do not support TF scheme of fires well.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-2: (CSM trend) Leaders often do not know how to call for fire.

1. They do not know *who* to call.
2. They do not know what radio net or frequency to use.
3. They do not know how to describe the *target* or its location.

TECHNIQUES

1. Train scouts in call for fire at Home Station.

2. Train scouts on their role(s) in TF scheme of fires and how to fulfill it.

3. NCOs must be informed about how to call for fire. Develop SOP at Home Station and practice call for fire drills during Home Station training.

4. Include leaders in the decision-making process to familiarize them with the fire support plan.

TA.2 Negative Trend 5: **Clearance of fires**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	0	0	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 5-1: Attack helicopter battalion (AHB) S3s and FSOs are not developing clearance of fire plans to clear indirect fires within the battalion once the companies leave planned air routes or maneuver beyond planned BPs and attack-by-fire positions.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 5-2:

1. The brigade and TF plan does not provide clear graphical control measures to facilitate clearance.
2. No standardized procedures existed for positively clearing fires across the brigade.

RESULTS:

1. The Task Force frequently experienced indirect fire fratricides and indirect fires danger close.
2. The TF suffered excessive delay in mission processing times.

TECHNIQUES

1. FSOs must develop and rehearse clearance of fires plans and develop graphic control measures to deconflict indirect fires and/or provide rapid clearance of indirect fires.
2. Improve clearance of fire procedures by using maneuver graphical control measures and Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs).
3. Practice procedures to ensure responsive fires without endangering or killing friendly elements.

TA.2 Negative Trend 6: **Use of Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designator (G/VLLD)**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	0	0	1	1

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 6-1:

1. COLTs are not using their G/VLLDs to obtain refined target locations to obtain first round fire for effect.
2. When they are not given a specified mission to lase, teams usually opt to leave their G/VLLDs at the brigade main.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 6-2: *(Repeat of Problem 6-1)*

1. COLTs are not deploying forward of the line of departure with a complete (including night sight) G/VLLD system.
2. COLTs are not using their G/VLLDs to obtain refined target locations to obtain first round fire for effect data.
3. When they are not given a specified mission to lase, teams usually opt to leave their G/VLLDs behind at the brigade main.

TECHNIQUES

COLTs should always carry the G/VLLD, regardless of their assigned task. Based on the COLT's mission to either provide terminal guidance for precision munitions, recon/surveillance, or as a primary observer for a specified target, the observer must be cable of lasing to refine the target location. The best tool currently available for both day and night is the G/VLLD.

TA.3 AIR DEFENSE

TA.3 Negative Trend 1: **Early warning dissemination and reaction**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	2	3	2

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: In too many cases early warning was not pushed through the task force/squadron via the command net. Instead, the O/I net was used.

RESULT: Untimely early warning and sporadic AAFADs.

PROBLEM 1-2: Units incorrectly use the air defense warning system to control the level of readiness of ADA fire units. Either all ADA fire units are at the highest level of alert or they are at the lowest. Individual fire units must specify their own readiness level during those periods when the level is not specified from higher. Too often the readiness level is too high for the situation.

RESULT: Fire units lower their readiness levels based on *fatigue*, not the air threat.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-3: While air defense units arrive with a plan to disseminate early warning, there are too many instances where supported maneuver elements fail to sufficiently disseminate the warnings. These dissemination problems most often result from a failure to exercise the procedure during Home Station training; the air defense early warning plan works for the air defense battalion, but breakdowns occur within the supported maneuver elements.

RESULT: Too many instances where maneuver company teams have insufficient warning to execute the appropriate air attack drill.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-4: Air defense units give evidence of not understanding local air defense warnings (LADWs). They base their states of readiness *on the air defense warning (ADW) of the overall area of operations* rather than on what it is in their sector.

RESULTS:

1. AD teams search and scan for non-existent threats.
2. AD fire units get left behind by the protected unit.
3. AD protection is not adequate to the threat to the supported unit.

PROBLEM 1-5: Task forces generally do not understand the early warning system. Understanding of various air attack warnings is limited, specifically local air defense warnings (LADWs). Warnings are usually *not tied to*, nor do they *trigger* any specified air attack drill.

RESULTS:

1. Confusion at the company/team level to what the actual threat is.
2. Overall *poor reaction* to directed early warning.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-6: *(Repeat of Problem 1-2)* ADA units do not routinely *use* or *understand* states of alert (SOAs). Units incorrectly use the air defense warning system to control the level of readiness of ADA fire units. Either all ADA fire units are at the highest state of alert or they are at the lowest. If at the highest alert, fire units individually lower their readiness not based on the air threat but because of *fatigue*.

PROBLEM 1-7: Too many brigades still perceive that directed early warning (received on the FM DEW net) is for air defense forces only.

1. Majority of brigades have effective air attack early warning dissemination procedures, but lack drills associated with the early warning/change in ADW/WCS.
2. Some units still do not use local air defense (LADWs) IAW current FMs.
3. There is never enough air defense to cover every critical asset in a BCT's sector. Therefore, CAFADs must be employed to enhance the air defense coverage.

PROBLEM 1-8: BSFV platoons have inadequate SOPs for receiving early warning information. Some platoon SOPs for communication plans direct that no BSFV platoon elements monitor the Division Early Warning (DEW) net. Instead, platoons monitor the ADA battery command net which is tasked to monitor and retransmit all early warning information. This system is inadequate because:

- the ADA battery cannot always maintain communications with all subordinate elements due to terrain/distance
- lack of redundancy

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-9:

1. Directed early warning is not being rebroadcast in a timely manner to soldier/crew levels.
2. This warning should be transmitted in a language for all soldiers to understand.

RESULTS:

1. At TF level there is normally a breakdown because there is no ADA representative in the TF TOC during the battle (the ADO fights from his BSFV).
2. The TF normally reacts poorly to air attack.

PROBLEM 1-10: *(Repeat of Problem 1-8)* BSFV platoons have inadequate SOPs for receiving early warning information. Some platoon SOPs for communication plans direct that no BSFV platoon elements monitor the Division Early Warning (DEW) net. Instead, platoons monitor the ADA battery command net which is tasked to monitor and retransmit all early warning information. This system is inadequate because:

- the ADA battery cannot always maintain communications with all subordinate elements due to terrain/distance
- lack of redundancy

TECHNIQUES

1. Use the *command net* for dissemination of early warning, stressed by key leaders. BSFV platoon communications plans should have at least one squad per section monitor the DEW net. The ADA platoon leader and the platoon sergeant/squad leader should monitor the battery net (FM 44-43, Chapter 2).

2. The early warning system must be *fully understood and practiced* by all elements within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Procedures for air defense elements and maneuver/support elements must be clearly defined within unit SOPs and then practiced during training exercises. Warning plans must have necessary redundancy and establish clear and effective *triggers* based on different threats.

3. Units should practice air attack drills at all echelons (particularly platoon and company/ team) as part of routine training. Air defenders should take the lead on teaching current air defense doctrine so maneuver units can "help themselves" when under air attack.

4. ADA units need to learn to use SOAs linked to the IPB and air defense warning system to strike a balance between readiness and sustained operations. Develop SOPs and SOAs that reflect the required level of readiness based on IPB and air defense warning system.

5. Incorporate explanation and discussion of local air defense warnings (LADWs) in Home Station training.

- Directed early warning defines the local air defense warning (LADW) and states whether the aircraft is friendly, hostile or unknown, a cardinal direction, and if known the most likely affected asset within the force.
- Directed early warning is designated to alert a particular unit, units or area of the battlefield of an immediate or possible threat. It is passed over unit command net or nets designated by the unit as flash precedents traffic.

6. *Reaction to early warnings* should be incorporated into Home Station training events. Unit SOPs should clearly identify *air attack drills* for Tactical Assembly Areas (TAAs), offensive and defensive operations. The trigger to implement these drills should be based on local air defense warnings (Snowman, Look Out, Dynamite) which more accurately identify the threat to the task force.

7. *Do <u>not</u> use the air defense warning system to control the level of readiness* of ADA fire units. Develop a readiness status operating procedure that balances readiness requirements, based on IPB and the air defense warning system, and the requirements to conduct sustained operations.

TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY/NBC

TA.6 Negative Trend 1: **Force protection**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	2	7	5

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: Firing battery defense is generally not understood or executed to standard.

1. Battery commanders frequently fail to ask the proper questions of the S2 during the field artillery support plan brief regarding expected enemy threat and the effects of terrain on operations in their proposed position areas.
2. Firing batteries are often not to standard in basic battery defense skills. Many range cards are inaccurate, reflecting a lack of key leader understanding of how to derive howitzer left and right limits IAW FM 6-50.
3. Lack of PCIs result in numerous range card errors going unnoticed.
4. Target reference points and range markers are not used or understood.
5. Procedures for "Killer Junior" are often misunderstood.
6. Seldom do units conduct a battery battle drill for controlling direct fires.
7. Most defense diagrams do not consider all the fire power available to the platoons.
8. Platoon defense diagrams completion time ranges from 1 hour up to 12 hours; some platoons never complete them. RESULT: incomplete battery defense plans.
9. Poor weapons maintenance in headquarters platoons and FDCs.
10. Rehearsals of tank killer teams and reaction forces are often planned, bet generally not executed due to problems with prioritizing preparations for the battle and time management by battery commanders and platoon leaders.
11. Direct fire plans are almost never rehearsed.
12. Positions are usually not hardened; wire not buried IAW battery SOP; collimators not lowered or sandbagged; OPs without protection.
13. Alternate positions are always mentioned, but rarely prepared. RESULT: batteries learn first-hand the difficulties of an unprepared hasty displacement to an alternate position.
14. Supplementary positions are rarely planned or are indicated on the defense diagram with little understanding on the gun line of how they will be executed.
15. Sedom are there plans for executing small arms for air defense (SAFAD), although the enemy air threat is generally high.

PALADIN Specific problems:

1. Firing batteries rely solely on survivability moves when planning battery defense.
2. There is little or no platoon or battery control of survivability moves; sections execute. RESULT: pairs in adjacent PAs, moving IAW battalion survivability criteria, frequently occupy positions extremely close to each other, as they move within their PAs.
3. Paladin battery commanders rely on a technique of battery fallback positions as their primary means of defense.
4. Platoon leaders and PSGs usually do not drive the fallback routes during preparation in order to time specific triggers for falling back. RESULT: batteries get overrun.
5. Units do not properly position howitzer pairs and then establish sectors of fire. RESULT: reduced ability to mass direct fires and defend.
6. Paladin leaders do not use FAASVs in overwatch positions during deliberate defense.
7. Batteries do not usually employ LP/OPs. RESULT: platoons deprived of early warning.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-2: In defensive operations, mortar platoons get very little or no engineer support/resources from their higher command to dig mortar positions which will increase survivability.

RESULT: not only is mortar platoon survivability jeopardized, the mortar platoons also then neglect other aspects about security and survivability preparation.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-3: Artillery batteries continue to show demonstrated weaknesses in the area of defensive planning and execution.

1. Too often units fail to prepare to defend themselves *even when adequate time is available*.
2. Junior leaders and section chiefs lack basic defensive skills such as
   - use of Killer Junior
   - use of TRPs
   - range card preparation
   - construction of fighting positions
   - placement of observation points

PROBLEM 1-4: CSS units consistently have difficulty planning and providing for their own defense. Development and execution of coherent base cluster defense plans, to include fire support and ADA planning/ coordination and executing alternate Tactical Operations Center (TOC) operations continues to be difficult for CSS units.

1. Base cluster defenses often are founded on poor quality fighting positions, an absence of sector sketches, and *weak coordination* between supporting elements.
2. Reconnaissance and surveillance planning is improving but the execution of these plans remains a problem.
3. Fire support, mobility/survivability and air defense planning and execution is *not coordinated or complete*.
4. Alternate TOC operations are either not conducted or are not fully prepared to function as the primary TOC.
5. Hasty displacement planning and execution needs improvement.
6. Other areas needing improvement are:
   - planning of preparation and execution triggers
   - site selection based on current Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
   - development of lists of priority equipment to be saved
   - development of routes, reporting posts and priority of movement

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-5:

1. Signal company site *defense plans/measures are often inadequate* to defend against a Level II ground threat.
2. MSE units deploy in various sized elements ranging from 2 man retrans teams to 30 man node centers. These elements are frequently *not trained* or proficient in basic site defense measures. This leaves them vulnerable to destruction by hostile elements.
3. Commanders tend to place emphasis upon the installation, operation and maintenance of signal systems and tend to *disregard* the requirement to establish and improve site defense measures.

PROBLEM 1-6:

1. Assembly area security is the first "fight" to be concerned with. However, force protection for aviation assembly areas continually needs improvement, specifically:
   - passive air defense measures
   - R & S planning/execution
   - fire support planning/execution
   - obstacle emplacement
   - actions on contact
   - individual soldier skills
2. Aviation units either anticipate attached units to aid in security (i.e. Avenger Team or MP Squad) or consider themselves positioned too far in the division's rear sector to plan threat contingencies.

PROBLEM 1-7: Aviation units seldom develop a good assembly area security plan capable of successfully repelling a level I threat.

1. Aviation assembly areas (AAs) are usually widespread with no pre-planned occupation plan to ensure aviation personnel and equipment are protected from the enemy.
2. Fighting positions built to standard, overlapping fields of fire, correct emplacement of crew served weapons, etc., are not planned for or emplaced before occupation of the assembly area.
3. Seldom is one person made responsible for the AA security; it is usually a collection of individual efforts in hopes of securing the AA.

PROBLEM 1-8: BSFV squads often construct inadequate fighting positions. They often construct overhead cover by building an outer ring of sandbags 18" deep and fill the interior with a minimum of 18" of loose sand and dirt. This does not provide adequate protection to survive a 152mm artillery round at 50 feet since loose dirt is not as protective as layers of dirt in sandbags.

PROBLEM 1-9: The medical company is seldom given a clear task and purpose for their defense and the defense of the BSA.

1. Medical companies often dig a number of hasty fighting positions in a 360 degree circle around the company area, but have no ability to concentrate fires and no understanding of the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach.
2. Medical companies deploy without enough Class IV barrier supplies.

PROBLEM 1-10: Preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions is substandard.

1. Maneuver unit leaders tend to place responsibility for proper preparation of their fighting positions on the engineers.
2. Dismounts exhibit weakness in basic battlefield survivability/site praparation skills.

PROBLEM 1-11: Firing batteries lack coordinated defense plans.

1. Basic defensive skills in the firing batteries are either disregarded or poorly planned and executed.
2. Battery commanders fail to conduct IPB of their positions, and with the battalion S2, identify and disseminate the most likely threat to their batteries.
3. LP/OPs are usually in poor locations to provide early warning and soldiers are not well briefed or equipped to perform the mission to standard.
4. Often, batteries do not coordinate with adjacent units; when they do coordinate it is often incomplete.
5. Range cards are either inaccurate or not completed at all.
6. Maintenance of crew served weapons is often neglected and causes weapons to malfunction at critical times during battles.
7. Usually, sectors of fire are prescribed by the section chief, not by the platoon leader or platoon sergeant.
8. Leaders too often fail to explain target reference points (TRPs).
9. Little thought is put into establishing battery indirect fire targets and the computation of data for self illumination.
10. Rehearsals of reaction forces and tank killer junior are planned but generally not conducted due to poor time management.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-12: Units that identify contaminated areas are continuing to have problems keeping follow-on forces out of the contamination.

1. Units will usually put out the NBC-1 Report over O/I net even though most tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) say to put it out over command nets.
2. M93 FOX vehicles that conduct NBC recon will mark the contaminated area, but the markers used by FOX crews are often not seen, and other vehicles run right over them.
3. Units coming into the contamination have the NBC-1 Report plotted on their maps, but their situational awareness is so poor, they do not realize where they are.

RESULT: Follow-on forces continue to pile into the contamination, violating the principal of contamination avoidance.

PROBLEM 1-13:

1. Electronic Warfare teams are too often not taking the appropriate actions to ensure their system's survivability.
2. They are failing to pull security during site reconnaissance and occupation.
3. They are not locating their OP/LPS where they have good 360 degree visibility of the area around their system.
4. They fail to ensure that they have a communications link (either a TA-312 or PRC-119) between the OP/LP and the system hut.
5. They do not employ an M8 chemical agent detector and alarm, or they employ the M8 in the wrong location.
6. They are not using camouflage netting to conceal their Electronic Warfare systems.
7. They are not cleaning or maintaining their individual and crew served weapons to ensure that they are prepared to defend themselves, if required.

PROBLEM 1-14: *(Repeat of Problem 1-9)* The medical company is seldom given a clear task and purpose for their defense and the defense of the BSA.

1. Medical companies often dig a number of hasty fighting positions in a 360 degree circle around the company area, but have no ability to concentrate fires and no understanding of the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach.
2. Medical companies deploy without enough Class IV barrier supplies.

PROBLEM 1-15: *(Repeat of Problem 1-8)* BSFV squads often construct inadequate fighting positions. They often construct overhead cover by building an outer ring of sandbags 18" deep and fill the interior with a minimum of 18" of loose sand and dirt. This does not provide adequate protection to survive a 152mm artillery round at 50 feet since loose dirt is not as protective as layers of dirt in sandbags.

PROBLEM 1-16: Logistics units experience difficulty in balancing their CSS missions with defensive operations.

1. Most logistics leaders do not understand how to conduct a defense by squad, an essential building block to a cohesive defensive plan, and one of the Army's FY97 Common Task Testing (CTT) requirements.
   - During the past two quarters, out of 70 logistics NCOs questioned 65% did not know how to conduct a squad defense.
   - Most of these NCOs stated they did not take common task tests.
2. Forward Support Battalions' (FSBs) defenses have no depth to them and are not actively supervised by the officers or NCOs at battalion and company level.
3. Soldiers lack needed competency to succeed in defending the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

RESULTS:

1. Ad-hoc defensive operations leading to unorganized chaos on the battlefield during an attack.
2. Soldiers cause numerous fratricide incidents to one another.
3. The OPFOR reaches its end state either observing or destroying the BSA.

TECHNIQUES

1. Firing batteries need to focus more effort on defensive planning and execution at all levels during Home Station training.

a. A unit defensive checklist is an outstanding base when planning a defense of a position, but METT-T considerations must be used to prioritize and focus the tasks to the situation.

b. The battery commander must work with the S2 and his 1SG to decide how he can best defend his unit's position.

- The battery commander and first sergeant must then establish a defensive priority of work to focus the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants.

- If the defensive checklist is developed using a priority of work sequence, it will suffice for either a hasty or deliberate defense.

c. Range cards for all of the platoon's weapons systems must be prepared IAW the appropriate FM or ST.

d. Survivability/fighting positions must be constructed where and when METT-T dictates. These positions must be built to standard IAW FM 5-103.

e. The platoon leadership must establish sectors of fire for all weapons and TRPs and disseminate them to the lowest levels.

f. LP/OPs must be placed on the enemy's most likely avenue of approach and where a trigger point can be seen to give the battery time to prepare for a direct fire engagement.

- They must have the necessary equipment to perform their mission.

- Leaders must brief the soldiers manning these positions and ensure that they understand their mission:

-- what they are looking for
-- where they look for it
-- what they do when they see it

g. FDCs should always be prepared to fire adjacent self defense targets as well as their own.

h. Self illumination data must be computed for each position and sent to the howitzer or howitzers that are designated to fire the illumination.

2. Defense preparation should be a battle drill designed to establish a basic defense capability as rapidly as possible.

a. Assign sectors of fire already determined by an advance party gunnery sergeant.

b. Establish a couple of hasty target reference points for the battery.

c. Complete range cards and defense diagrams approximately 1 hour after the platoon is ready to fire.

d. Include a quick rehearsal if time permits.

e. Once hasty defense preparations are established, continue improvements based on METT-T.

3. Battalions should establish battery defensive lanes to assist and set the conditions for commanders to train their units to standard. Consider *consolidation of instruction at battalion level* to identify the standards to key leaders in batteries. Battalions should acquire and maintain a supply of Class IV to assist leaders in their instruction of fighting position construction techniques. Use OPDs and NCOPDs to teach TTPs on battery defense.

4. Mortar platoons must proactively establish sectors of fire, survivability positions and OPs. Emplace crew-served weapons along likely enemy avenues of approach. Coordinate with adjacent elements, when applicable. The mortar platoon leader must learn to compete for the limited engineer support assets to enhance survivability positions; the platoon must be able to prepare their own survivability positions under the assumption they will not receive engineer support.

5. Leaders at all levels must understand that the destruction of signal assets due to inadequate defensive measures degrades area communications for an unacceptable reason. Command emphasis must be applied to site defense training within signal units. Specific areas usually found to be weak include:

- positioning of observation posts
- command and control of perimeter and quick reaction forces
- positioning of M60 machine guns
- site defense drills/rehearsals

6. Aviation units need to train at Home Station to be self-sufficient within their own area. Continue to emphasize the importance of assembly area operations and focus more Home Station training to perfect skills.

a. Develop and rehearse detailed battalion SOPs for assembly area (AA) operations and security.

b. Realistic expectations for defending against the enemy should be planned for and developed to standard.

c. Common soldier tasks must be taught at Home Station and practiced until all soldiers know and can achieve them to standard. Units must identify the person responsible for developing and executing the AA security plan and hold him responsible for AA security.

7. BSFV squads should use interlocking layers of sandbags at least 18" deep. The sandbags increase the density and the stability of overhead cover.

a. Leaders are responsible for proper preparation of vehicle and individual fighting positions, not the engineer units.

b. Units must be trained and proficient in site preparation and survivability skills. This should be done at Home Station.

8. The medical company commander obtains from the S2/S3 the most likely and most dangerous enemy avenues of approach. Fighting positions are prepared based on this information to enable massing of the fires he has available.

a. Develop a standard survivability position for each soldier assigned in the vicinity of their work area. This will ensure each soldier has a protected position in the event of indirect fires.

b. Determine the total Class IV requirement for the company and establish load plans.

9. In contaminated areas, use available assets to assist in the control of the site.

a. Use MPs as traffic control posts (TCPs) to ensure vehicles do not enter the contamination.

b. Make the FOX vehicle the last to go to decon and assist the MPs to keep vehicles out. Everyone recognizes a FOX and knows what it does. This should be an indicator for any unsuspecting vehicles/soldiers.

c. Ensure the NBC reports go out on the right nets as stated in the unit TACSOP.

d. Use other visual signals to aid in the identification of the contamination such as purple smoke. The FOX crews can carry the smoke and use it when vehicles approach.

10. Electronic Warfare (EW) team NCOs must supervise their subordinates and enforce the standards in their unit's SOPs.

a. Electronic Warfare team leaders and platoon sergeants should conduct thorough pre-combat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs) to ensure that teams have all the necessary equipment on hand and in a serviceable condition.

- use a checklist that includes such items as communications gear, M8 alarm, batteries for all equipment, camouflage netting, and weapons cleaning supplies.

- continuously supervise teams to ensure they are taking all appropriate security measures.

- use a site occupation and security checklist.

b. Teams should include the above security measures in their crew drills, and they must drill these survivability skills at home station in FTXs and during routine crew drills.

11. Home Station training must *fully* integrate and exercise all aspects of base defense operations.

a. All officers and NCOs should be required to take CTT and exhibit the basic fundamental soldier skills required of a leader.

b. The S3 should set up a training program at Home Station that produces quality OPs, access control points, and a quick-reaction force. These soldiers need to understand all actions on contact and battle drills of the Battalion.

TA.6 Negative Trend 2: **Obstacles coordination and integration**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	4	1	1	4	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: Supporting engineers typically site in tactical obstacles without prior coordination with the company/team commanders responsible for covering the obstacles with fires. Tactical obstacles are sited/emplaced before engagement area reconnaissance is completed and the commander decides how and where he wants to kill the enemy.

RESULTS:

1. Tactical obstacles are rarely depicted on sector sketches or platoon/company fire plans.
2. Obstacle effects are not integrated into the company/team fires, which negatively impacts on triggers, for example.

PROBLEM 2-2: The engineer battalion TOCs do not properly coordinate, track and report the status of obstacles in a timely and complete manner.

RESULT: Significant differences between what was planned and the actual status.

PROBLEM 2-3: *(Repeat of Problem 2-1)* Company/team commanders are not siting tactical obstacles together with their supporting engineers to ensure obstacle effects meet the TF commander's intent, and are integrated with direct and indirect fires.

1. Engineer platoons typically site in tactical obstacles without prior coordination with the company/teams responsible for covering obstacles with fires. This problem is fueled by the brigade/battalion desire for a quick transition to the defense and early emplacement of obstacles.
2. Tactical obstacles are emplaced prior to TF engagement area recon and company/team fire plan development.

PROBLEM 2-4: Obstacles are not being used to attack enemy maneuver, and rarely multiply the effects and capabilities of firepower.

1. Too often the obstacle plan is developed in a vacuum, as are the other portions of the plan.
2. If obstacles are even considered during wargaming, the obstacles are assumed to be “in place” as the wargame begins. Units are not adjusting obstacle plans based on wargaming results.
3. Most units do not take terrain into account when planning obstacles. EXAMPLE: Drinkwater Lake offers two main avenues of approach, one north and one south of the lake. The south approach is most often listed as a battalion-sized avenue. A proper terrain recon, or even a map recon, would show this avenue shrinks to a platoon or smaller and the southeast tip of the lake. How3ver, units still choose to defend on top of the choke point where they cannot maximize the terrain available.
4. Maneuver teams do not understand what turn, fix, block, and disrupt mean in terms of their direct fire plan. Each of these obstacle intents should tell the commander something about how to plan his direct fires. Thus, even when obstacles are integrated at TF level, the intent is being missed at lower levels.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-5: *(Repeat of Problem 2-4)* Obstacles do not attack enemy maneuver and rarely multiply the effects and capabilities of firepower.

1. Obstacle plans are developed in a vacuum.
   - units fail to adjust obstacle plans to take into account wargaming results
   - units rarely take into account terrain in their obstacle plan
2. Units are unable to relate obstacle result terms (i.e., turn, fix, block, disrupt) to their direct fire plan.

RESULTS:

1. War gaming at TF level rarely helps synchronize various portions of the obstacle plan.
2. Even if obstacles were integrated at TF level, the intent is not achieved at lower levels.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-6: Minefield Records (DA Form 1355) are *not*:

- completed to standard
- completed in a timely manner
- forwarded to higher headquarters as required

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-7: Obstacles are not being planned nor emplaced to attack enemy maneuver, and frequently do not enhance the effects and capabilities of friendly firepower.

1. Task forces have weak knowledge of FM 90-7, the doctrinal reference for obstacle integration.
2. There is a lack of understanding of mobility corridors/avenues of approach and their fundamental relationship to the target, location, and effect of tactical obstacles.
3. The SITEMP is prepared with little to no engineer involvement.
4. A Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) is seldom produced, even though it is vital to obstacle planning. The MCOO helps ensure that the obstacles planned will effect the enemy avenues of approach and maneuver corridors.
5. All leaders do not understand how obstacles and fires are integrated to achieve obstacle effect:
   - There is confusion over what a turn, block, fix or disrupt obstacle means in terms of the direct fire plan at the company team level.
   - Each of these obstacle intents should assist the commander in planning his direct fires. This enables the commander to maximize the effectiveness of fires, while exploiting the weaknesses that the obstacles have created for the enemy.

RESULTS:

1. Without this information and the scheme of friendly maneuver, the engineer cannot plan what part of the enemy formation to attack and what obstacles can best achieve this intent.
2. The result of this thought process *not* happening at task force level is that company team commanders do not know how the obstacles for which they are responsible support the overall scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEM 2-8:

1. Emplacing engineer and company/team commanders often fail to understand the intent of the obstacle group to achieve synchronization of obstacle effects and fires.
2. Engineer and company/team commanders seldom plan sufficient time for the siting effort.
3. Too often, the engineer company commander begins the tentative siting process with no integration of the engineer platoon leaders.
4. The location of control measures are not made clear to the engineer platoon leader, and the engineers do not understand the company/team commander's intent.
5. Few, if any, engineer companies have SOPs that outline the steps required and define who is responsible for the obstacle siting and refinement process.
6. The engineer platoon leader has little understanding of the ranges and limitations of key weapon systems at the task force level.

RESULT: Individual fighting positions are weak.

PROBLEM 2-9: *(Repeat of Problem 2-6)* Minefield records, DA Form 1355, are incomplete and are not forwarded to higher headquarters as required.

RESULT: Increased risk of fratricide incidents.

PROBLEM 2-10: Engineer units have difficulty planning and executing effective situational obstacles in support of maneuver - particularly the use and synchronization of FASCAM resources.

1. Engineer staff officers are not incorporating FASCAM planning considerations into their Engineer Battlefield Analysis (EBA).
2. Basic staff coordination and synchronization of tasks required for FASCAM obstacles have rarely been implemented effectively.

RESULTS:

1. Obstacle emplacement is poorly synchronized with maneuver.
2. Execution becomes time, rather than event driven.
3. Ineffective countermobility efforts.

TECHNIQUES

1. Home Station training should include battle drills to ensure obstacles are synchronized with maneuver and fires; emplaced obstacles should not dictate the maneuver plan, but support the maneuver plan.

2. See FM 20-32, Chapter 4, *Mini Rehearsals*, for a good example of a battle drill that company/teams with their supporting engineers can conduct near motor pool facilities at a very low cost. This type exercise can be a one day event that trains and proofs battle drills walked through first in garrison. As proficiency is gained, then incorporate the drills as "full up" operations during field training exercises.

3. Obstacle plan management, from initial materiel estimate to completion should include:

- Obstacle plan development to meet the brigade commander's intent and scheme of maneuver (to include brigade directed obstacles and brigade developed obstacle belts).
- Obstacle materiels estimate.
- Initial obstacle and survivability timeline; constraints based on METT-T and anticipated delays/disruptions due to historically based equipment, personnel and materiel non-availability.
- Coordination with the S4 (Bde/TF/Engr) for the early movement of obstacle materiels to expedite the transition to the defense and the establishment of the Class IV and V point.
- Engineer technical representative at the Class IV and V point to ensure materiels are packaged and issued by priority.
- Timely submission of obstacle plans (groups and directed obstacles) from the TF engineers.
- Submission of obstacle and survivability status reports IAW TSOP on an established schedule.
- Enforcement of the reports submission schedule by the engineer battalion XO and ABE section, using the engineer company net if required. Stress the negative results caused by delayed status reporting.
- Brief the engineer battalion commander and the brigade commander at established time intervals throughout the defensive preparation.
- Visits to the unit emplacing obstacles by engineer battalion leaders and staff members.
- Recommendations for reallocation and/or reprioritization of assets and efforts.

4. Maneuver commanders should become familiar with FM 90-7, *Combined Arms Obstacle Integration*. This manual is an excellent doctrinal reference as to the purpose of each obstacle, its intended effect, and how obstacles should be integrated into the commander's direct fire plan.

5. Engineer commanders should conduct OPD classes for their habitually associated maneuver units on how to effectively plan and site obstacles they are responsible for and what key information engineers are looking for when they show up to emplace obstacles.

6. Each combined arms exercise (CPX, MAPEX, TEWT, BSS) that is conducted should incorporate a rock drill that focuses on the siting of obstacles with the company team commanders and the engineer platoon leaders being the key players.

7. Increase use of DA Form 1355 at Home Station Training, to include NCODP and OPD classes on contents, preparation and submittal requirements.

8. Develop SOPs in synchronization with the maneuver commander on how to develop an engagement area. Place ranges of all key weapons systems as outlined in FM 90-7. This should include both live and training ranges of systems.

9. Task force staffs must integrate all elements of the BOS during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and identify all specified, implied, and essential tasks regarding FASCAM. The unit must develop an SOP for transmitting SCATMINWARN report and follow-up reports of execution and self-destruct times. The planning process must identify target/obstacle triggers based on enemy events. The plan must clearly:

- associate enemy events with NAIs, decision points
- have a corresponding reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan with assigned primary and alternate observers to trigger execution.

TA.6 Negative Trend 3: **Use of chemical detection equipment**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	0	1	2	2

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Units fail to perform pre-combat checks on M8A1 alarms prior to deployment. Many units fail to properly employ the alarms:

- alarms not connected to the battery
- alarms *not positioned upwind*
- alarms not connected to the M42
- omission of other critical steps

Many units simply fail to emplace the alarm at all.

RESULT: Too many units receive no warning about enemy employment of chemical agents.

PROBLEM 3-2: Units consistently fail to properly utilize the M-9 paper on MOPP suits and vehicles IAW FM 3-4, *NBC Protection*. Units often attempt to simulate M-9 paper with green tape, rather than conduct realistic training. Leaders fail to conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections to correct M-9 paper deficiencies.

PROBLEM 3-3: *(Repeat of Problem 3-1)*

1. Units fail to perform PCCs of M8A1 alarms prior to deployment, and therefore arrive with some unserviceable equipment.
2. Units fail to properly employ the alarms:
   - not connected to the battery
   - not positioned upwind
   - not connected to the M42
3. Many units fail to use the chemical agent alarm.
4. Many units are not complying with the annual wipe tests requirement.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 3-4: Too many units do not deploy their M8A1s IAW their TACSOP for FM 3-4.

1. Units do not identify threat level.
2. Units are afraid that the alarms may be damaged by vehicles.
3. Units *do not have adequate supply of WD-1 wire*.
4. Units tend to have *battery shortages*.
5. Units often place M8A1 inside the unit's perimeter, and not IAW TM 3-6665-12-12.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 3-5: Units do not use the M256 kit or M9 chemical paper correctly.

RESULT: Failure to use all available detection techniques can cause false readings, unnecessary casualties and the spread of contamination.

PROBLEM 3-6: *(Repeat of Problem 3-4)* Too many units do not deploy their M8A1s IAW their tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP) or FM 3-4.

1. Alarms are often placed inside the unit's perimeter and not IAW correct procedure.
2. Units are afraid that the alarms may be damaged by vehicles running over them.
3. Units are afraid someone might steal the alarm if placed outside the perimeter.
4. The medical company, which has one of three authorized M8A1 alarms, often does not place the alarm IAW the latest down-wind message. When in place,

- power source is not hooked up
- no wire is run to the alarm

RESULT: No warning of the presence of nerve agents or determination of the type agent that is present in the area.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 3-7: M8A1 alarms are seldom employed to standard.

1. Soldiers who are signed for and responsible for the M8A1 alarm are often not proficient in its employment, maintenance, and operation.

- They are not placed upwind.
- They are not place at the proper distance that would provide the unit early warning of chemical attack.
- They do not put them out at all; they are more concerned about someone driving over it than providing early warning.
- They do not know *how* to put the alarm into operation.
- They do not deploy with enough batteries, maintenance kits, or wire to run the alarm.

2. Units often deploy to the training area with up to 25% of the alarms *deadlined*.

PROBLEM 3-8:

1. The medical company has one of three authorized M8A1 Alarms but they do not often place it out in accordance with the latest down wind message.
2. When the alarm is placed properly, the power source is usually not hooked up and wire is not run to the alarm.

RESULTS:

1. During a chemical attack, the M8A1 Alarm does not go off warning company soldiers of the presence of nerve agents.
2. determination of the type of agent that is present in the company area is delayed.

TECHNIQUES

1. Units must make the effort during Home Station training to properly employ M8A1 chemical agent alarms during their field training IAW TM 3-6665-12-12, and to maintain the equipment in serviceable condition.

2. Refer to GTA 3-5-14 and chapter 3 of FM 3-3.

3. Develop standard operating procedures for marking M8A1s to prevent loss of an alarm.
Maintain proper stockage of deployable supplies (*to include batteries*) IAW higher guidance, and ensure that supplies are rotated.

4. *Justify additional WD-1 wire* for M8A1s using the unit MTOE and TM 3-6665-12-12 as references.

5. "Green tape" cannot be a substitute for M9 chemical paper. M256 kits detect only *vapor*, M9 papers detect *liquid contamination*. Routinely incorporate NBC training into every possible Home Station training event. Proper wearing of gloves must be stressed.

6. Develop a training plan for M8A1 operators. Require units to certify their operators by attending a course that is given by the battalion chemical NCO.
- Once certified, operators will be issued a training certificate.
- The certification program will be part of the inspection program.

7. For those units that do have certification programs in place and do not train NBC on a frequent basis, develop a sustainment training program. This program should be quarterly and also added to the inspection program.

TA.6 Negative Trend 4: **Breaching operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	1	1	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 4-1: Maneuver task forces demonstrate a lack of understanding about the requirement differences between *in-stride* and *deliberate* breaching operations. Task force staffs do not provide company/teams with adequate support and/or planning in the areas of:

1. Breach rehearsal sites
2. Indirect fire planning
3. Company/team task and purpose
4. Task organization of breaching assets
5. "Reverse" planning to wargame the type of breach necessary
6. Determine assault force size/composition
7. Number of breach lanes required
8. Support force size/composition needed *to achieve mass*
9. *Task force level mounted breach rehearsals*

RESULT: Company/team commanders do not know what conditions and triggers must be developed to achieve the synchronization necessary to accomplish the breach.

PROBLEM 4-2: Despite some indications of improvement, task forces fail to properly plan for and rehearse deliberate breaches. Specific problems:

1. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction (SOSRs) are not addressed in detail during the planning process.
2. Wargaming for the breach operations lacks sufficient detail.
3. Most units do not talk through the events setting conditions for a successful breach because they use the "box" technique, causing them to miss the events leading up to the breach.
4. Breach rehearsals are lacking at all levels of the combined arms team. Task force "rock drills" typically gloss over all details of the actual breach.
5. Rehearsals are often planned for, but rarely executed at task force level.
6. Units fail to plan for assault breaches.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-3: *(Repeat of Problem 4-2)*

1. Task forces fail to properly plan for and rehearse deliberate breaches.
2. Suppression, obscuration, security and reduction (SOSRs) are not addressed in sufficient detail during the planning process.
3. Wargaming for the breach operations is not sufficiently detailed.
3. Criteria is not established for what determines when conditions are *set*, and when to commit the breach force.
4. Breach rehearsals lack sufficient detail at all levels. EXAMPLES: 1) task force *rock drills* typically gloss over all details of the actual breach 2) mounted rehearsals are often planned, but *rarely executed*.
5. Rehearsals are often planned for, but rarely executed at task force level.
6. Units fail to plan for assault breaches.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-4: Fundamentals of breaching operations are *not understood or implemented* at the task force level.

1. Task force Combined Arms Team members do not generally understand or apply *breach tenants*:

- intelligence
- synchronization
- mass
- organization (support, breach and assault forces)
- fundamentals (suppress, obscure, secure and reduce)

or *characteristics of the offense*:

- surprise
- concentration
- speed

- flexibility
- audacity

2. Task forces and brigades often attempt to reduce without attaining appropriate level of suppression and obscuration of the enemy.

RESULT: Security of the obstacle breach site is not accomplished by either fire or force prior to the committal of the breach force with its local security element.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-5: Combined arms breaching operations are poorly planned, rehearsed, and executed.

1. Planning for task force in-stride or deliberate breaching is not done to the level of detail required for successful execution.
2. Breach rehearsals at the task force level are generally only wargames.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 4-6:

1. The breach tenets (intel, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass and synchronization) are overlooked during mission analysis and COA development.
2. There is a misunderstanding of the application of the "breach tenets" at the TF level.
3. Generally units do not reverse plan actions on the objective. There is no specified, clearly defined end state of what the TF should look like on the objective.

RESULTS:

1. The Task Force failed to synchronize breaching operations as part of the overall scheme of maneuver.
2. Recent trends Actions on the objective determine the point of penetration and the size/type of the assault force. The location of the point of penetration and the size/type of the assault force then determines the point of breach, number of lanes required and the size/type of security force (near and far side).
3. The ability of the enemy's infantry to interfere with the breach determines whether the breaching site is to be secured by fires or by force. Lane requirements and the type of obstacle then drive the allocation of mobility assets.
4. The enemy's fires at the obstacle determines the amount of suppression/size of the support force.

TECHNIQUES

1. Home Station training should begin with NCOPD/OPD instruction to ensure all personnel involved have *the same basic understanding of breach operations, definitions and doctrine*.

- Training for task force leaders must focus on how to synchronize the elements conducting a deliberate breach.
- Train company/team lanes to reinforce company level tasks and responsibilities.
- Conduct battalion/task force breach training; whenever a company/team is breaching, *the breach is a task force level operation*.
- Breaching should be incorporated into every field training exercise.

2. Task force planners and leaders must understand and train IAW FM 90-13-1, *Combined Arms Breaching Operations*, and FM 100-5, *Operations*, in relation to offensive breaching operations.

3. Commanders and staffs need to become familiar with FM 5-71-2 and FM 5-71-3 for developing plans on combined arms breaching to ensure all five tenants of breaching have been planned adequately. The commander's intent merits special consideration during breach planning. Reverse planning drives the maneuver formation to ensure that forces are in the correct relative positions to accomplish their breaching roles and actions on the objective.

4. The tenets of breaching *(intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breach organization, mass and synchronization*) must be considered in all breaching operations and *wargamed as part of the planning process*.

5. The TF main effort must be clear and must be supported by the SOEO (scheme of engineer operations). The engineer must understand the scheme of maneuver and must plan to shift engineer forces and equipment consistent with the commander's main effort. This shifting of forces is critical in successive breach operations. The engineer planner ensures that the SOEO serves as a combat multiplier and not just a force provider.

6. The most effective tool available to the commander is the rehearsal. TF rehearsals focus on synchronizing the maneuver of support, breach, and assault forces to achieve the SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure and reduce) breaching fundamentals and highlight key events that must be coordinated during breach execution. A deliberate breach implies sufficient intelligence to construct a good model at a rehearsal site where all elements involved can rehearse until they meet the standard necessary for successful execution. Combat power must be focused at a defined point of penetration with detailed synchronization of all battlefield operating systems.

TA.6 Negative Trend 5: **Counterreconnaissance operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	0	2	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 5-1: Commanders rarely develop a complete counter-recon plan that integrates all available TF assets.

1. The commander responsible for counter-rrecon rarely establishes a solid command relationship with the combat multipliers OPCON or attached.
2. Too often a lack of urgency and visibility given to the counter-recon mission has a direct negative impact on the counter-recon force.
3. Engagement area development is the exception, rather than the rule.
4. Commanders fail to identify who, what, where and when to kill the enemy.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 5-2:

1. Too often task forces do not produce a fire support plan in support of counter-reconnaissance operations.
2. In instances where a plan is produced, there is insufficient coordination for the assets necessary to accomplish the mission.
3. In too many instances, task force FSO fail to get/receive adequate guidance from the task force commander and the FSCOORD.
4. S2s are too often not consulted about tactics and techniques the enemy uses in their regimental reconnaissance missions.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 5-3:

1. Too often, there is no effort made to search out and destroy enemy recon forces. Security operations at the brigade level tend to be limited to a permeable screen at the FEBA. The usual brigade security effort is one counterrecon company per task force, which lines up along a phase line and does nothing more. The brigade seldom takes other actions to search for and destroy recon forces operating throughout the depth of our AO.
2. Counterrecon forces are given other missions which detract from their ability to perform the security mission.
3. As the overall plan is developed, security operations are an afterthought, once the base plan is developed.

PROBLEM 5-4: Military Police are *not effectively employed* in the counterreconnaissance role for the brigade rear area.

1. Military Police have responsibility for security in the brigade rear area and are constantly patrolling in order to detect and neutralize enemy elements. However, this patrolling has not been integrated and synchronized with a brigade counterrecon effort.
2. MP platoon leaders and S2s are not tying enemy infiltration/exfiltration routes to MP patrol plans.
3. Rear area named areas of interest (NAIs) receive very little emphasis. RESULT: The platoon leader develops patrol plans without the benefit of expert intelligence analysis.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 5-5: *(Repeat of Problem 5-3)*

1. Too often, there is no effort made to search out and destroy enemy recon forces. Security operations at the brigade level tend to be limited to a permeable screen at the FEBA. The usual brigade security effort is one counterrecon company per task force, which lines up along a phase line and does nothing more. The brigade seldom takes other actions to search for and destroy recon forces operating throughout the depth of our AO.

2. Counterrecon forces are given other missions which detract from their ability to perform the security mission.

3. As the overall plan is developed, security operations are an afterthought, once the base plan is developed.

TECHNIQUES

1. The FSO must plan the counterreconnaissance battle with the S2. Plans do not need to be elaborate:

- coordinate the assets, ie. Mortars or artillery.
- obtain the commander's guidance for counterreconnaissance fires.
- task sufficient elements to execute the fight.
- give observers the authority to refine planned targets *in conjunction with* the counterreconnaissance force commander.

2. The TF commander, S3, and S2 should be able to articulate the conduct of the counter-recon effort, and how it will be synchronized and fought by the counter-recon commander. The key is for the counter-recon commander to meet *sector secure times* with enough combat power to meet his task and purpose.

3. Commit a force capable of finding and destroying the enemy recon forces throughout the depth of the area of operations (AO). This may need to be a total combined arms force, integrating "lookers" other than just the thermal sights of M1s and M2s. Give the counterrecon force *no other mission*.

4. Plan security operations early and with the same amount of attention and support given to any other combat operation.

5. Military Police platoon leaders must make rear area counterreconnaissance functions a critical consideration for brigade reconnaissance planners. Constantly gather data about terrain and road networks which are essential for proper analysis of enemy reconnaissance efforts in the rear area. Tie terrain and road networks information into enemy priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and the location of friendly units on the battlefield to establish an economical patrol plan for the MPs which will put them where the enemy is most likely to be.

TA.6 Negative Trend 6: **Reaction to chemical attack**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	1	0	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 6-1: Soldiers often fail to properly react to chemical attack. Soldiers fail to properly assume the appropriate MOPP level IAW FM 21-1-1-SMCT and as specified in unit SOP. Soldiers fail to put on boots, gloves and often fail to have the MOPP gear *immediately available*, IAW FM 3-4 or as specified in the unit SOP or the OPORD.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 6-2: Units react slowly to possible chemical attacks or contaminated areas. Soldiers rely too much on M256 kits; they do not use M8/M9 paper when they should.

RESULT: The failure to use all available detection techniques can cause false readings, unnecessary casualties and the spread of contamination.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 6-3: When units encounter persistent or non-persistent agents on the battlefield they do not have a plan to react. Maneuver units have stalled along their axis of advance for *over 45 minutes* while trying to confirm if the chemical agent is either persistent or non-persistent.

RESULT: Loss of momentum, and *loss of entire company teams* to enemy artillery and to chemical casualties.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 6-4:

1. Most NBC staffs arrive at NTC without an NBC TACSOP-1.
2. Task Forces arrive at NTC without standard procedures for NBC avoidance (FM 3-3), protection (FM 3-4), decontamination (FM 3-5), or defense (FM 3-100).
3. Task forces do not understand how to plan or execute NBC operations, smoke operations, or respond to chemical attacks.

RESULTS:

1. Units do not report chemical attacks in a timely manner.
2. Operational and thorough decon operations are not resourced and executed to standard.
3. Patient decon operations are inadequate due to lack of trained crews and equipment.
4. Smoke operations are not planned, prepared, and executed IAW FM 3-50.
5. M8 alarms are placed next to the defensive perimeter instead of 150 meters out for early warning.
6. Soldiers arrive without MOPP gear and do not understand the different levels of MOPP.
7. There is inadequate cross talk between the different levels of the NBC staff.
8. There are inadequate and ineffective command and control/support relationships between TF and chemical assets.

TECHNIQUES

1. Units must develop and train a TTP or SOP for reaction to chemical agents on the battlefield. Routinely incorporate NBC training into every possible Home Station training event.

2. For an offensive mission (tailored for specific units):

- prior to LD, all drivers crossing LD are in MOPP III, everyone else in MOPP II.

- at the first sign of chemical agent the drivers pull down their hatches and everyone else goes to MOPP IV.

- *the unit <u>does not slow its momentum</u>*

3. MP teams have been teamed with chemical recon vehicles to provide additional security during movement and to act as TCPs at persistent chemical sites. While making use of FOX reconnaissance vehicles, *it is very important to maintain soldier proficiency in the use of all available detection equipment*.

- the C2 is either the brigade chemo, chem recon platoon leader, or in some cases the chemical company commander

- the plan is then rehearsed *not only at the unit level but at brigade and task force rehearsals*

4. Remember that the M256 kits detect only *vapor*, while M8/M9 papers detect *liquid contamination*. *<u>Use</u> the M8/M9 papers*.

5. Once identification of chemicals is known on the battlefield, the brigade must quickly disseminate the information and ensure the information reaches the lowest level. Units must capitalize on digital information technology.

6. Produce, implement, and validate a workable NBC TACSOP at Home Station.

a. References:

-- FM 3-3 (chemical/biological contamination avoidance)
-- FM 3-4 (NBC Protection)
-- FM 3-5 (NBC decontamination)
-- FM 3-100 (NBC defense, chemical warfare, smoke and flame operations)
-- FM 3-101 (chemical staffs and units).

b. Create an NBC working environment IAW FM 3-101, page 5-3 (Chemical staff considerations). Chemical staffs at TF force level should:

-- identify the NBC threat
-- determine if current chemical force is sufficient
-- monitor the status of NBC defense equipment in the TF
-- monitor the status of NBC preparedness in the force
-- develop training plans to correct NBC defense training deficiencies
-- develop chemical support plans to support current operations
-- develop NBC defense plans to protect the force
-- monitor the NBC situation
-- monitor the status of chemical units
-- recommend changes to the plan based on the NBC situation
-- coordinate with higher headquarters for support as necessary
-- continuously update the commander on all NBC operations
-- remain technically and tactically proficient in all NBC issues as they relate to the TF mission

c. Improve cross talk between company and battalion NBC personnel. Create a program that ensures the battalion NBC staff discuss NBC issues regularly with their company counterparts.

TA.6 Negative Trend 7: **Decontaminated unit operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	1	1	1	1

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 7-1: Task forces are generally unprepared to conduct thorough decontamination operations. Contaminated elements fail to provide the personnel to augment the detailed equipment decontamination element. Contaminated elements also fail to provide the personnel and equipment necessary to conduct detailed troop decontamination.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 7-2:

1. Deliberate decontamination sites and link-up points are usually identified in plans; however, the *plan sites are rarely used*, creating link-up problems between the contaminated unit and the decon platoon.
2. Augmentation and support for decon operations is still a problem.
   - most brigade NBC staffs fail to realize their staff coordination and supervisory responsibilities for decon operations
   - units rarely task specific elements (such as Military Police, Engineer, and medical personnel and equipment) to *reinforce* decon operations
   - units do not adequately stock equipment for Detailed Troop Decon (DTD) or *plan for resupply* after the operation
   - task forces are limited in conducting decontamination operations due to *lack of water hauling capabilities*

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 7-3: Units do not know how to, nor do they have the required equipment to conduct Detailed Troop Decon (DTD).

1. Common equipment not on hand are:
   - drums of STB
   - general purpose detergent
   - immersion heaters
   - protective mask PLL
2. No one soldier is responsible for the DTD equipment.
3. The prime mover is not identified.
4. Soldiers are not trained on how to operate a DTD.
5. Orders do not address in detail requesting procedures and location on the battlefield of DTD equipment.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 7-4:

1. Task Forces (TFs) do minimal planning for Operational Decontamination.
2. Most TFs have the M17 SANATOR that enables them to conduct Operational Decon, but seldom consider its use to aid them in sustaining their combat power.
3. Communication with the M17 crew is *nonexistent,* and the crew is usually in the BSA or combat trains.
4. There is often no water plan to support the Operational Decontamination; no consideration is given whether to use available assets from the TF, or request to higher for support.
5. Selection of possible link-up points and C2 issues are *never* planned.

TECHNIQUES

1. Chemical Staffs must *plan* for Operational Decontamination. Successful decon operations depend on proper *augmentation of the decon platoon*. Remember, the chemical decontamination platoon can provide *one* individual to coordinate with the contaminated element and then supervise decon operations. Task forces must obtain and then control decontamination equipment at a central location, and then use the task force NBC officer or NCO to supervise the decon operation, in conjunction with the decon platoon leader.

2. The unit should train a decon team *in each one of its units* to be prepared to augment the decon platoon at the decon site.

3. The *brigade* assumes responsibility for augmentees and CSS coordination, to include water transport. The brigade ensures the augmentees and CSS assets link-up with the decon platoon prior to decon operations.

4. At link-up, the augmentees and CSS assets are *under the control of the decon platoon leader*.
5. Detailed, thorough decontamination operations must be trained at Home Station prior to deployment so troops are familiar with how the operations are conducted, and the time and equipment necessary, etc.

6. Have brigade identify the augmentees for DTD in the OPORD. Wherever the augmentees come from, have their NBC NCO teach them how to run the DTD *before* they are called upon to execute it.
   a. Identify in unit SOPs *responsibility for* maintaining the unit's DTD equipment and *what vehicle* it will be moved on.
   b. Identify in orders where the DTD equipment will be located to best support a thorough decon, and how they will be contacted and moved to the linkup point.

TA.6 Negative Trend 8: **Smoke missions**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	1	1	1	1

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 8-1: PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade staffs provide a *directed* smoke mission, but give execution control to the maneuver task force.

2. Too often the brigade directed smoke mission *does not compliment* the task force maneuver commander's scheme of maneuver.

RESULT: the desired effect of the smoke mission for both brigade and task force is not achieved.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 8-2: Smoke platoon leaders/sergeants, when integrated early into the planning process, develop more than one course of action to accomplish their offensive or defensive smoke mission(s). Too often, however, smoke missions are not "wargamed", and smoke assets are wasted on poor missions or a lack of valid missions.

1. Nearly all smoke missions *fail to integrate* projected and generated smoke.
2. Generated smoke is *not integrated* into the maneuver plan.
3. Typically, a smoke platoon mission is "just move along the task force and blow smoke".
4. When a valid smoke mission is planned and synchronized with the maneuver plan, forces are unable to maneuver in the smoke effectively due to their *lack of training in limited visibility*.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 8-3: Units plan smoke missions without taking into account weather conditions.

1. Units establish the visibility criteria based upon perfect weather conditions.
2. Units do not time out their movement to determine what time of day it will be when they want the smoke.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 8-4: Units develop smoke plans to obscure breach sites without synchronizing the different types of smoke.

1. The brigade chemical officer will work with the chemical company commander and smoke platoon leader and come up with a plan; the FSO will have a different plan, and rarely are smoke pots utilized.
2. No key person is identified to plan and achieve visibility criteria that is key to the commander's intent.
3. Field Artillery units often run out of smoke at the critical point in the breach operations.
4. There is no deliberate plan to tie in with the other types of smoke to increase smoke platoon survivability.
5. The brigade's allotment of smoke pots is usually left in the BSA or with a unit that will have nothing to do with the breaching operation.
6. For those units that do utilize smoke pots, the smoke pot guide is not used to determine numbers and spacing of pots to achieve the commander's intent.

RESULTS:

1. The breach is rarely obscured to the extent that it meets the commander's intent.
2. Smoke platoons that are sent too close to the breach and in direct fire range are often destroyed.

TECHNIQUES

1. Smoke missions are generally executed more successfully when the planning, coordination and execution are controlled by the *main effort task force*.

2. Make the Brigade Chemical Officer the sole proponent for smoke. Chemical Officers that have been smoke platoon leaders know more about smoke and those weather conditions that affect smoke more than anyone.

   a. Establish a targeting cell that includes the Chemical Officer, FSO, Engineer, and S2 to come up with a synchronized smoke plan.

   b. The Chemical Officer must develop a smoke annex to the brigade order and brief the plan.

   c. Designate a single smoke control officer that adjusts both mechanized and artillery smoke. This control officer will have direct communications with the brigade chemical officer and FSO.

   d. The smoke plan should be included in the brigade maneuver and FS rehearsals, with the chemical officer still the critical link.

3. Refer to FM 71-2, which clearly states over a dozen *uses* for smoke in the offense and defense.

4. References for *coordinating* smoke missions are FM 3-50, FM 3-101-2, and FM 71-2.

5. Environmental issues do not allow most units to train with smoke at Home Station. However, computer simulation programs exist to assist units in at least gaining the knowledge on how to plan and use generated smoke.

6. Division chemical staffs must develop a training program for brigade and task force chemical staffs (officers and NCOs) in the planning requirements for NBC assets, particularly smoke platoons.

7. Plan smoke missions according to time of day required. Be realistic on what a smoke platoon can do based upon weather conditions. A smoke platoon cannot make an obscuring blanket on a breach at 1200 hours. Adjust requirements for smoke based on weather. A curtain, given the appropriate number of smoke platforms, is more realistic at 1200 hours than is a blanket.

TA.6 Negative Trend 9: **Security operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	0	1	0	1

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 9-1: Security in the UMCP is not to standard and tends to be neglected due to the maintenance workload.

1. *Security is not considered a priority* in the UMCP, and therefore, the units usually have no security SOP.
2. Units that do possess an SOP usually *do not execute* them.
3. Units seldom integrate vehicles and crews into the security mission of the UMCP.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 9-2:

1. HMMWV scout platoons do not contribute significantly to security operations.
2. HMMWV scouts have very limited night viewing capability compared to M1 tanks and Bradleys and no ability to destroy anything they do observe.

RESULTS:

1. The Scouts often prevent the TF from being successful by confusing the shooters on identification of enemy vehicles especially beyond 1200 meters. The time that a potential enemy recon target is observed is often 3 to 5 minutes at most.
2. Confusion is created by similar looking vehicles, HMMWVs and BRDMs, operating in the same area.
3. Scouts behind the shooters cannot see as far as the shooters.

TECHNIQUES

1. Units must ensure that security *is* a priority, and must establish an SOP that profiles 360 degree security and proper placement and crew served weapons around the perimeter.
   a. The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) should *personally* integrate into the security SOP all vehicles and crews that are in the UMCP for maintenance.
   b. UMCP site selection should enhance the survivability and security of the UMCP.
   c. Other passive measures such as noise and light discipline must be *strictly* enforced.
   d. *Every soldier* in the UMCP should be given a hasty fighting position with assigned sectors of fire.

2. Security operations should not be given to company/teams alone.
   a. Scouts contribute more to the defense by establishing OPs behind the security force that enable the TF to track the enemy through the sector and call accurate and timely indirect fires on him while the TF is in the direct fire fight.
   b. Screening involves destruction within capabilities, this limits scouts to destruction with indirect fires which is more effective against large formations than individual vehicles.
   c. Integration of mission analysis products into R&S planning to allow battlefield calculus to determine the required composition of the recon force to include the availability and positioning of mortars and artillery.

TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

TA.7 Negative Trend 1: **Supply management**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	5	2	3	2	8

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: Field artillery units experience difficulty forecasting, managing, and resupplying FA battery ammunition because they are not working with accurate ammunition counts.

1. Battery leaders are not conducting ammunition accounting.
2. A lack of command emphasis and loose accountability at the *initial issue* contributes to units starting their rotation with poor ammunition numbers.
3. With subsequent deliveries, batteries fail to adjust their ammo status quickly.
4. Batteries then *fail to report all ammunition received* on their status board and also fail to inform battalion.
5. The accountability worsens further as units begin to cross level ammunition and manage individual rounds.

PROBLEM 1-2: Resupply operations between main support battalion (MSB), forward support battalion (FSB) and maneuver task forces lack the necessary synchronization to be effective, resulting in the FSB and the task forces having difficulty in reaching capacity from resupply operations. Resupply windows within the brigade combat team (BCT) tend to be rigid time periods versus event driven, and do not consistently support maneuver operations by *maintaining full capacity forward at the start of combat operations*.

PROBLEM 1-3: Task force S-4s experience difficulty with supply of either Class III or Class V, and sometimes both, yet the task force S-4s are not informing brigade about their problems. In come cases combat vehicles *ran out of fuel during offensive operations*; fuel was not available to top off equipment prior to LD. During a *planned tactical pause* task forces did not conduct refueling and rearming operations.

PROBLEM 1-4: Electronic warfare teams' ability to get resupplies and stay in operation are often hindered by having to drive extreme distances to a rearward trains area to get fuel, water and food. After resupply, the teams must deploy to a new site, usually farther forward.

RESULT: Increased system downtime.

PROBLEM 1-5:

1. Battery commanders often go into battle with no apparent ammo plan.

EXAMPLE: Before a day defend mission, one platoon had 127 HE rounds on hand, while another platoon in the same battery had only 35 HE rounds. One platoon had almost all the green bag propellant, while the other platoon had almost zero balance on green bag.

EXAMPLE: Another battery had an unequal distribution of calibrated white bag propellant, resulting in guns quickly expending calibrated white bag propellant and being called out of missions because of their inability to meet the conditions for accurate predicted fires.

2. While platoon leaders often know how much total ammo they have prior to a battle, the ammo is not managed at battery level.

3. Most battalion FASPS establish ammo resupply triggers, but the triggers are ineffective because the platoons could not track ammo expenditure during the battle.

4. Batteries *with* Platoon Operation Centers (POCs): POCs had an accurate count of ammo prior to battle, but the ammo count *was often never updated until sometime after the mission.*

5. Batteries *without* POCs: FDOs or platoon leaders were to track ammo, but they do not have the time to accurately do so. RESULT: Batteries run out of extended range ammunition, for example, before requesting resupply; other batteries run out of DPICM before requesting resupply.

6. Battery commanders are often unaware of the ammo they will receive until it arrives in positions. This causes a delay as the commander decides on a distribution plan.

7. In batteries where the commander delegated ammo resupply to platoon leaders, the platoon leaders often took the ammo they needed from the nearest truck available. RESULT: Ammo trucks have incomplete rounds, *making ammo management and tracking by pre-configured combat load impossible at battalion level*.

<u>3-4QFY95</u>

PROBLEM 1-6: *(Repeat of Problem 1-1)* Units are having difficulty forecasting, managing and resupplying ammunition because they are *not working with accurate ammunition counts*. Battery leaders are not actively conducting ammunition accounting, and fail to place emphasis on the importance of accurate counting. Subsequent resupply further worsens the overall accounting problems.

RESULTS:

1. Units begin their deployment into combat with inaccurate counts.

2. Inaccurate reporting and mismanagement hampers the S3, S-4, FDO and Battery Ammunition Officer (BAO) in accurately forecasting ammunition for subsequent operations.

PROBLEM 1-7: *(Repeat of Problem 1-2)* Class III resupply operations are too often not synchronized between the main support battalion (MSB), the forward support battalion (FSB) and the maneuver task forces. Resupply windows for the brigade combat team (BCT) tend to be rigid time periods rather than event driven.

RESULTS:

1. The FSB and the maneuver task forces have difficulty reaching their required capacity from resupply operations.

2. The time driven, rather than event driven resupply too often causes less than full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-8: Health service support (HSS) units are not doing a very good job managing fuel and petroleum products.

PROBLEM 1-9: *(Repeat of Problems 1-2 and 1-7)*

1. There is a lack of synchronization in Class III(B) resupply operations between the main support battalion (MSB), the forward support battalion (FSB) and maneuver task forces.
2. Resupply windows within the Brigade Combat Team IBCT) tend to be *rigid time periods versus event-driven* and do not consistently support maneuver operations by maintaining full capacity forward at the start of combat operations.
3. The forecasting of Class III(B) by the BCT through the use of LOGSTATS is poor and contributes to the lack of CLASS III(B) resupply synchronization.

RESULT: The FSB and task forces have difficulty reaching capacity from resupply operations.

PROBLEM 1-10: *(Repeat of Problem 1-3)* The task force is not able to manage or track Class III/III(P) or Class V on-hand status. Orange reports submitted to the S-4 *are not completely filled out*.

RESULT: The S-4 is forced to *guess* what Class III/III(P) and Class V supplies are on-hand.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-11: The FA battalion staff does not adequately plan, prepare and execute ammunition resupply using the "double loop" system.

1. Field artillery battalions try to execute the double loop resupply system; however, ammunition resupply consistently hampers their operations.
2. Staffs do not adequately identify anticipated ammunition requirements or resupply triggers based upon critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).
3. Ammunition platoons are forced to deliver ammunition during the night due to late or conflicting guidance.
4. Inaccurate or slow reporting of ammunition counts to the TOC/ALOC by the batteries hampers resupply planning.
5. Routinely, emergency Class V resupply is not present in the combat trains.
6. Palletized Load System (PLS) flat racks are not configured to allow commanders to empty a flat rack when conducting resupply to the FAASV. Without an empty flat rack, the ammunition platoon cannot reconfigure for follow-on missions.

PROBLEM 1-12: Management of the class IV/V supply point is poor. While most units have an adequate SOP for the management of the class IV/V point, the SOP is ignored.

RESULT: Management of mines and obstacle material is inadequate, and engineers are unable to execute their assigned tasks to standard.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 1-13: Ammunition shipments from the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) are often not documented using proper supply procedures. The shipments are processed in the same manner as issues, using a DA Form 581 instead of a Transportation Cargo Manifest Document (TCMD).

RESULT: This short-cut creates a potential void in the audit trail.

PROBLEM 1-14: Ammunition convoys moving forward from the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP) are often not clear concerning the location of the Brigade Support Area's (BSA's) Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP).

RESULT: This delays establishment of the ATP and ultimately delays receipt of ammunition by the customer.

PROBLEM 1-15:

1. An increasing number of MI companies are deploying to the NTC without the requisite amount of logistical support to sustain themselves.
2. In an attempt to provide inexpensive IEW support, units deploy without organic recovery or refueling vehicles or fail to draw them.
3. Units rely on the brigade HHC to fulfill these requirements for them.

RESULTS:

1. MI companies are employed across a large brigade battle space and burdened logistically.
2. Brigade HHCs are stretched past their ability to support.

PROBLEM 1-16: Units have difficulty establishing various responsibilities for the management of Class IV and V barrier material.

RESULTS:

1. Efforts fall short of having the right materials at the right place at the right time.
2. Engineer battalions and maneuver brigades have no accurate status of Class IV and V quantities and locations.

PROBLEMS 1-17:

1. Field artillery battalions do not normally properly plan, prepare, and execute Rearm, Refuel, Resupply, and Survey Point (R3SP) operations.
2. Battalion staffs identify R3SP requirements but do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan.
3. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.

RESULTS:

1. The lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process causes poor site selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and logistics plan.
2. Poor or untimely ammunition guidance from the S3, and the lack of an effective timeline and/or trigger impedes the S4's effort to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (Class III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC if available) at the correct time and location.
3. An R3SP often turns into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.
4. The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward to execute an R3SP.
5. Poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC causes delays and confusion during the operation.

PROBLEM 1-18:

1. Units poorly track on-hand and requisitioned chemical defense equipment (CDE), and normally arrive in theater (NTC) without any idea of what they have.
2. When units deploy, they do not consider the threat when determining exactly what to bring.
3. Most units arrive with significant CDE shortages, and the Chemical Officer/NCO, S4, and the commander are not aware of these shortages.
4. There is zero tracking of CDE during the course of the campaign. Units rarely order replacements for CDE that has been used as a result of fighting on a dirty battlefield.

RESULT: Poor guidance before deployment and poor tracking at Home Station result in units not able to sustain operations on a contaminated battlefield.

(NOTE: Units often voice "lack of funding" as the primary reason that equipment is not on hand. Although limited funding is a viable issue at Home Station, it cannot be the excuse given for casualties brought on by chemical or biological agents on the battlefield.)

PROBLEM 1-19:

1. Units often have great storage plans but execute them poorly once the ammunition begins arriving at the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP). This usually occurs because the plan, although good, is not disseminated to the soldiers who must execute it.
2. Missiles are often positioned so that the warhead is aimed at other ammunition pads instead of outside the FASP towards a hill mass.

RESULT: Increased compatibility/distance violations and ultimately more work for the unit as the ammunition must be repositioned.

PROBLEM 1-20:

1. Forward Support Battalion (FSB) support operations officer (SPOs) do not look from line of departure (LD) backwards when planning to top off maneuver tankers after LOGPAC operations.
2. SPOs do not coordinate for refuel windows with supported units.
3. SPOs fail to establish a system to receive an updated fuel on-hand report from Company A prior to LD.

RESULTS:

1. Supported units show up at their convenience.
2. FSBs are not often able to achieve a 90% (green) status in their bulk fuelers at LD.

TECHNIQUES

1. This paragraph addresses *ammunition accounting* in field artillery units.

a. Ammo management is a *battery commander* function. Platoon leaders will not manage ammo beyond platoon level. *Command emphasis* will place responsibility on *leaders* to verify the ammunition on hand will meet their *critical fire support tasks* for the upcoming mission. Commanders must translate battalion resupply ammo triggers into number of rounds *based on ammo on hand* at the start of the mission.

b. When the S3, S4 and FDO receive confirmation about the ammunition, by type and lots, that the battery ammunition officer (BAO) will draw, they should immediately develop an *initial issue plan*. This plan segregates the ammo *to be calibrated* from the unit basic loads (UBL), that batteries will receive in *their initial upload*. The (BAO) and the battalion XO confirm when the ammo has been configured to meet this initial requirement. Batteries confirm these counts when they report completion of upload. Develop a simple FM report for transmission to the S3 and the battle staff providing a status of ammo expended, received and on-hand.

c. Battery commanders should bring ammo counts to *every* OPORD and/or rehearsal, and report their status to the FSCOORD or S3. Require periodic physical inventories, by component, to confirm on-hand figures.

d. Tracking ammo should be delegated to POCs, but the battery commander should keep the POCs focused on ammo *during the battle* so the commander can relate that to resupply triggers. Keep platoon leaders involved in ammo management during mission execution; the FDO is usually too busy to manage ammo resupply.

e. Commanders must work with the battalion to know how much ammo they will receive *before it arrives*. Sections should know how much ammo they will pick up *before* their ammo carriers come to the ammo truck. Platoon sergeants should make an effort to supervise each section's draw. Commanders must stress the necessity of *combat configured loads* to the battalion XO and ammo officer.

f. Have platoon leaders issue a timeline to sections to get their ammo properly configured. Section chiefs can then report to the POC that the ammo is properly configured IAW the platoon leader's guidance. Then platoon leaders and platoon sergeants can follow up ammo guidance with pre-combat inspections at section level *prior to battle* to ensure compliance.

g. Do not waste time managing ammo by "eaches." Train TOC personnel to track ammunition expenditure *based on their unit's execution of the scheme of fires.* When cross-leveling ammo as part of a reorganization/reconstitution, manage munitions according to *standard packaging*, i.e., pallets of eight for 155mm rounds. *Leave ammunition banded until it is time to prepare it for firing.*

h. In the planning phase, the battalion S3 and Fire Direction Officer (FDO) must determine anticipated ammunition requirements and resupply triggers based upon critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) and enemy courses of action.

1) Once translated into critical field artillery tasks (CFATs), they coordinate with the battalion S4 and ammunition platoon leader to deliver the ammunition to the firing batteries in the preparation phase.

2) Doctrine requires emergency Class V resupply be available in the combat trains. The amount of ammunition here is based upon other possible enemy courses of action and expected expenditure rates. If a firing battery cannot carry all of the ammunition it will fire, the difference may be placed in the combat trains for resupply during the battle. (Another method is to position this ammunition with the firing battery on PLSs, but this increases their exposure to enemy action.)

3) Ammunition expected for future operations, from the controlled supply rate (CSR) at the ammo transfer point (ATP), is positioned at the field trains, using the emptied flat racks generated during the current battle. This ammunition is then delivered during post-battle resupply.

i. During the preparation phase, the ammunition platoon configures the flat racks for delivery to the batteries, either directly or through a rapid refuel rearm point (R3P) site.

1) Ammunition platoon drivers and leaders should recon routes to and from the combat and field trains, and the ATP.

2) The ammunition platoon leader should coordinate the resupply with the batteries and battalion staff to ensure any necessary refinements to the resupply have been made.

3) If an R3P will be used, the ammunition platoon leader should recon the site and plan for the positioning of vehicles and flat racks as necessary.

j. When using the double loop system, it creates two loops of travel for ammunition platoon vehicles: one between the combat trains and the firing batteries, and one between the combat and field trains.

1) The two loops allow ammunition platoon drivers to drive the same route and keep soft-skinned PLSs from being forward with the firing batteries unnecessarily.

2) When a battery requests resupply, or resupplies from pre-positioned flat racks near the battery, the flat rack should be emptied. This is the key to the double-loop system.

3) A trigger, expressed in volleys, is determined that will allow a battery to empty a flat rack.

4) "Pure" flat racks, (all DPICM, or smoke, etc.) work best.

5) When the battery empties a flat rack, it is picked up and returned to the combat trains by a PLS from the combat trains.

6) A PLS from the field trains will pick up that flat rack at the combat trains when it comes forward to resupply emergency Class V stocks.

k. Ammunition resupply and the double-loop system are complex operations. They require *constant staff supervision* by the S3, S4, and XO. The staff must develop and monitor checkpoints, timed status reporting, and triggers before, during and after the battle to ensure positive command and control of the battalion's ammunition assets. These must be *rehearsed and well understood* by everyone involved in their execution.

2. This paragraph addresses task forces having difficulty *reaching capacity from resupply operations* and tracking supplies.

a. The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) must train to become more flexible in the development of Class III resupply windows. These windows should be flexible enough to support maneuver operations while at the same time maintaining the maximum capacity possible within storage/transportation assets.

b. During the maneuver and CSS rehearsals, task forces must discuss their plans to conduct refueling and rearming. If additional assets are needed to reposition forward on the battlefield, the brigade S4 must know early enough to make the necessary arrangements. Task force S4s and XOs need to provide brigade a more accurate assessment of the support they need and the support they are receiving. If additional support is required, the brigade XO and/or S4 can coordinate with the FSB and MSB to provide assets.

c. Do not force the S4 to *guess* what Class III/III(P) and Class V supplies are on-hand. *Train* to ensure Orange reports are submitted to the S4, and that they contain *complete information.*

d. Ammunition tracking and storage.

1) Ammunition shipped from the FASP should be processed using a TCMD (DA Form 1348-1).

2) Ammunition Transfer Point (ATP) personnel should use the DA Form 581 to issue the ammunition to the requesting unit.

3) Make this part of the unit's SOP and train it at Home Station.

4) Convoy commanders must be clear on their exact destination and who to contact when there is a link-up problem.

5) All personnel involved in the operation, to include the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Support Operations Officer (SPO) and ATP personnel, must know when to expect the convoy to arrive.

6) Ammunition storage plans, as with all plans, must be disseminated to the lowest level responsible for its execution. Storage operations should be a part of the unit's SOP and must be familiar to all members of the unit.

e. FA Battalion rearm, refuel, resupply, and survey points (R3SPs).

1) R3SP mission: The R3SP's principle mission is rearm and refuel the battalion with secondary missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles (if possible) or required unit supplies.

2) The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's tactical plan.

- The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas to facilitate rapid execution.

- It must be tactically positioned with good concealment, as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection.

- Maximize terrain for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets.

3) The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan.

- The S4, considering battery ammunition statuses, remaining mission requirements (estimate) and the battalion's on hand ammunition, gives guidance to the Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) who in turn begins configuring ammunition.

- The BAO should focus on configuring pure PLS loads of killer ammunition with the correct powders. Special munitions (i.e. FASCAM or smoke) can be linked up with the appropriate unit at the R3SP or in the unit location.

- The BAO notifies the S3 and units what is available at the R3SP to include ammunition types.

4) The Ammunition Platoon Sergeant configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages it in a forward location.

- Crisis Action Team (CAT) assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should not be used, but if they are used they must be resupplied, reconfigured or replaced immediately.

- Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal.

5) The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.

- Establish an entry point, track plan, multiple ammunition upload lanes, by-pass lanes for vehicles not requiring ammunition, refuel points with survey control points, and a LOGPAC/supply linkup point at the exit.

- Each element within the R3SP should maintain tactical dispersion.

- The R3SP site should be set up to maximize the use of the multiple assets and be able to conduct multiple operations simultaneously.

6) The S4, CAT commander or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for site reconnaissance, conduct communications check, and establishing the R3SP prior to units arriving.

- The R3SP OIC ensures the site layout facilitates rapid execution of R3SP.

- Batteries should upload howitzers from battery ammunition vehicles prior to arrival, thus minimizing vehicles that rearm at the R3SP.

- Batteries should transload ammunition from battery ammunition resupply vehicles (PLS) to section FAASVs, again minimizing R3SP execution time. This also will reduce the ammunition burden on the R3SP assets.

7) The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point allowing simultaneous operations: refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition vehicles.

- The Recon Survey Officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel sites to facilitate simultaneous operations.

- The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to linkup with their unit as they depart the R3SP site.

8) Include the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP. The TACSOP must establish responsibilities, time lines, pre-R3SP advance party linkup checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram.

9) The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. It is, however, the most efficient method to rearm, refuel and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted.

f. Topping off maneuver tankers.

1) Establish post-LOGPAC windows that are rigidly enforced by the FSB SPO. Maneuver units must top off after LOGPAC operations and not at their convenience the next morning.

2) Main Support Battalions (MSBs) must push fuel at night, normally after units LOGPACs have returned and topped off (2200-0200 hours).

3) FSB SPOs must establish a disciplined reporting procedure with the Company A to constantly report maneuver unit top-off times to the SPO. At least one hour prior to LD, Company A should report to the support operations the current on-hand in bulk fuelers. This information should be briefed to the battalion commander at the pre-battle update.

g. Chemical defense equipment (CDE) tracking.

1) Chemical Officers/NCOs at all levels must visit their NBC rooms regularly.

2) Establish a program of quarterly inspections and reward the best NBC NCOs.

3) Have units submit their CDE reports with their unit status report (USR), and include:

- MTOE
- CTA 50-970 items
- roll-ups of scheduled services
- distinction between training and contingency stocks
- identification of shelf-life issues
- roll-ups of NBC PLL on-hand in the NBC rooms

4) Make CDE a part of the Logistics Review (LR) process. Identify:

- deadlined items
- due-in status
- funds issues
- maintenance advisory messages
- new equipment fielding

5) Before operations, issue specific guidance in the deployment order on with exactly what the units are to deploy.

6) Consider the threat with respect to all three aspects of NBC.

7) During operations, include CDE in logistics reports or create a separate report for Chemical NCOs. Bottom line - the *Chemical NCO* must actively track the CDE at all levels, ensure equipment is on order, and track the status through unit S4s.

3. This paragraph addresses *resupply of electronic warfare (EW) teams*.

- Push LOGPAC forward to a location EW teams can quickly reach to resupply and then return. If the situation has CSS elements displacing, then at least put the LOGPAC where the EW teams can pass through LOGPAC enroute to their next site.

- Try to coordinate LOGPAC to be conducted in conjunction with OPORD issuance or unit rehearsals in forward locations.

4. This paragraph addresses management of *Class IV and V barrier material*.

a. Use the already adequate SOP in order to effectively manage class IV/V supplies.

b. Per FM 20-32, mines are received by a "centralized through-put operation by Corps and Division that stops at the Battalion level...at some point the maneuver battalion turns over the control of the mines to engineers". The flow of obstacle material within the task force sector is a maneuver responsibility, but is effectively a shared responsibility between maneuver and engineer forces in order to ensure the effective planning and execution.

c. Units must be able to accurately account for Class IV and V barrier material from when it enters the brigade sector through it's emplacement in an obstacle.

d. The *maneuver brigade* should take responsibility of the Class IV and V delivery as it enters the brigade sector on echelon above brigade (EAB) transportation assets as stated in FM 71-3. *Engineers have a vested interest* in this event and should monitor the planning and execution closely.

e. The brigade should plan and coordinate for a logistics release point (LRP) vicinity of brigade rear area where EAB trucks are broken down into task force (TF) convoys.

- No materials are downloaded/ transloaded at this point.
- The engineer battalion should have a representative there who knows the brigade obstacle resourcing plan and priorities so he can quickly break the vehicles down.
- TF representatives linkup at this point to escort the EAB transportation assets forward to the TF Class IV/V point.

f. From the LRP area forward, the TF is responsible for escorting the transport assets.

- Once the trucks are guided to the TF IV/V point, they are quickly downloaded and returned to their LRP for release.
- Based on METT-T, the materials are either unbanded and uncrated at the TF Class IV/V point, or transloaded onto TF or FSB assets be placed to mine dumps supporting individual obstacle groups.

g. *Engineer/TF cooperation* is the key. The TF owns the Class IV/V point but the engineers must have a representative there to ensure the following:

- Materials are used IAW TF Commander countermobility priorities.
- Materials are accurately tracked and status forwarded to the engineer company TOC.
- TF soldiers used as labor augmentees understand the mine handling/preparation tasks.

h. The Palletized Loading System (PLS) offers units the advantage of moving flat racks directly to the mine dumps supporting obstacle groups. If this method is used, the TF uncrating/ prep details are needed there. Transportation and life support issues must be planned in advance to maximize the output of this labor force. The TF labor details have four functions at the Class IV/V point/mine dump:

- Uncrate
- Inspect/prep mines
- Organize into minefield (MF) or strip feeder packs
- Palletize/band excess materials for retrograde

i. At the obstacle group mine dumps, engineer platoons must accurately track and forward quantities used and remaining when they leave that area. This information must be reported to the company TOC and forwarded to the TF S4 so he can arrange for assets to pickup unused materials and flat racks if the PLS system is used.

5. This paragraph addresses the *lack of logistical support to MI companies when they deploy to NTC*.

a. *Follow doctrine.*

b. Use MI battalion logistic slices to support MI companies.

TA.7 Negative Trend 2: **Logistics estimates/CSS planning & integration**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	5	3	4	2	2

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: Task forces have difficulty estimating Class V requirements.

1. Task force leaders and CSS planners are not conducting accurate inventories of Class V on-hand.
2. Munitions available for draw are not being tracked.
3. Ammunition haulers are not being tracked by bumper number.
4. The task force FDO is not being consulted on the schedule of fires or expected expenditures he has determined.
5. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements for the artillery battalion's critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).
6. Units down to battery level are not being resourced to fulfill CFSTs.
7. Triggers are not being established for backup supply to the battery or to the alternate shooter.

RESULTS:

1. Units are not correctly resourced to accomplish their mission.
2. Resupply considerations are occurring too late to prevent mission interruption.
3. CSS and operations planners do not have accurate information about *where* ammo is, on *which truck,* and *how long* it will take to resupply a unit that needs the ammunition.

PROBLEM 2-2: The maintenance of accurate battle rosters is a *continual problem*. Units do not consistently use the automated strength accounting system with any degree of effectiveness.

PROBLEM 2-3: Units have difficulty developing timely forecasts of logistical requirements, including the reporting of casualties, damaged/destroyed equipment (Area Damage Control) and daily LOGSTAT reports.

RESULT: CSS units have difficulty determining, with any degree of accuracy, what will be required to support the fight.

PROBLEM 2-4: *(Repeat of Problem 2-1)* Units are not conducting Class V estimates to determine their required supply rate (RSR), then comparing it to their controlled supply rate (CSR) and schedule of fires to plan resupply operations based on priorities and resupply triggers.

1. Battalion leaders and CSS planners are not conducting accurate inventories of Class V on hand, tracking munitions available for draw, and managing ammo haulers by bumper number.
2. The battalion FDO is not being consulted on the schedule of fires or expected expenditures.
3. CSS planners are not associating specific support requirements for the battalions critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).

RESULT: The realization that units are not correctly resourced or are not being considered for resupply comes too late to rearm without mission interruption.

PROBLEM 2-5: In many task forces, the logistical requirements of the 10 HMMWV-equipped scout platoon has necessitated that the scout platoon sergeant be responsible for the planning and execution of scout CSS.

RESULT: The scout platoon sergeant does not participate in mission planning, preparation, and in many instances, mission execution, because he is at a CSS rehearsal, conducting LOGPAC operations, or evacuating casualties.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-6: *(Repeat of Problem 2-5)* Too often the CSS for the scout platoon is an *afterthought* by the task force battle staff. Scout platoon leaders are often forced to try and coordinate with internal and external elements for support, without command emphasis from the task force.

RESULT: Because scout platoon leaders do not have the time to do the planning and coordination for CSS or CS mission support, too often, the necessary support is not tasked and is unavailable when needed. This further results in mission failure.

PROBLEM 2-7: *(Repeat of Problems 2-1 and 2-4)* Task force level leaders and CSS planners are experiencing problems with Class V estimates.

1. Accurate Class V on-hand inventories are not being conducted.
2. Failure to track ammunition available to draw.
3. Poor management of ammunition haulers.
4. Planners fail to consult the battalion FDO about the scheme of fires for artillery, and the expected consumption based on the mission.
5. CSS planners are not associating *specific support requirements* with battalion critical fire support tasks (CFST).
6. Too many units are not being considered for resupply *until it is too late to rearm in time to prevent mission failure*.
7. When resupply is required, CSS and operations personnel do not have accurate information about:
   - where ammunition is located
   - which trucks are loaded with what ammunition
   - how long resupply will actually take once the appropriate trucks are finally dispatched

PROBLEM 2-8: Rotational units do not consistently develop timely forecasts of logistical requirements. Many units have difficulty reporting casualties, damaged/destroyed equipment (Area Damage Control), and submitting daily LOGSTAT reports.

RESULT: CSS units have great difficulty determining support requirements.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-9: The recovery plan for not mission capable (NMC) vehicles (specifically during task force missions) lack essential detail. Units do not plan collection points, and when they do, the collection points do not support the task force mission.

RESULTS:

1. Company teams are often confused or lack any knowledge of the recovery plan.
2. Units lose valuable time in generating combat power during the task force mission and often only begin collecting vehicles after the change of the mission.

PROBLEM 2-10: An S1 *casualty estimate* is not consistently made during the planning process.

PROBLEM 2-11: *(Repeat of Problem 2-8)* Most units experienced difficulty executing the timely development and reporting of future logistics requirements, to include reporting of casualties, damaged or destroyed equipment, and daily LOGSTAT reports.

RESULT: Units cannot determine requirements for upcoming operations with sufficient accuracy or confidence.

PROBLEM 2-12:

1. The brigade Main CP CSS planner too often prepares CSS plans based upon guidance received from the TOC, without input from the FSB SPO or even the brigade S4.
2. The CSS staffs generally need to use METT-T more frequently in developing its plans to support a task force.
3. The CSS staff still needs to work on integrating the CSS plan with the maneuver plan.
4. CSS key leaders need to be more involved in the planning process:
   - to ensure their plan is doctrinally sound
   - to ensure key leaders fully understand the plan, to include tasks and purpose of the task force
5. The S-4 and the combat trains command post (CTCP) must anticipate the task force's needs during battle in order to push supplies to the companies.
6. Task force S1 and S4 are not integrated into the planning process.

RESULTS:

1. The CSS annex developed does not contain adequate detail and is not synchronized with FSB/MSB resupply actions.
2. CSS plan is not synchronized with the maneuver plan and is not doctrinally sound.
3. Companies do not receive supplies or else receive them too late.

<u>3-4QFY96</u>

PROBLEM 2-13: S1s and S4s need to improve on forecasting Class III and V usage and resupply requirements during missions. General Support aviation battalion (GSAB) S1s and S4s seem to be lulled into a sense of complacency because most missions (at the NTC) involve two or three aircraft and they know the battalion has a large storage capacity. The S1 and S4 generally do not realize that the units supporting them need daily requirement forecasts from them so they in turn are prepared to provide supplies *when* they are needed.

PROBLEM 2-14: FA Battalions do not determine and track ammunition requirements properly.

1. Battalions experience extreme difficulties in *identifying* ammunition requirements and *tracking* expenditures.
2. The staff does not consider ammunition requirements, based on critical field artillery tasks (CFATs) during the mission analysis and wargaming processes.
3. The staff does not direct resupply triggers to adequately support the mission.
4. Staffs do not have systems in place to track ammunition consumption at the section, platoon, battery, nor battalion levels, making it extremely difficult to project ammunition requirements.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 2-15:

1. Maintenance estimates are not generally conducted or not conducted to standard.
2. Maintenance estimates are not fully integrated into the logistics estimate.
3. Task force commanders generally do not ask for nor do they receive a briefing on the maintenance status of the task force.

RESULT: The task force does not know its maintenance status or expected requirements.

PROBLEM 2-16:

1. Units do not plan for and forecast Class IV, barrier material based on anticipated requirements.
2. Units fail to include required Class IV in load plans and movement calculations.
3. Leaders do not supervise and inspect protective obstacles.

RESULTS:

1. Units do not have sufficient material to construct required protective obstacles based on METT-T or their internal tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP).
2. Obstacles are seldom constructed to standard in the required place.

TECHNIQUES

1. This paragraph addresses *logistics forecasting and synchronization of CSS planning*.

a. Use every possible Home Station training opportunity to exercise logistical forecasting and reporting procedures. CSS planners must *train to coordinate among themselves* in planning. They must know how to do predictive analysis or forecast requirements of the supported the task force.

b. Practice the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) including CSS planners during training at Home Station. CSS Planners learn and train on TDMP for their own training, to include METT-T factors.

c. Supported unit staffs must make a concerted effort to integrate CSS planners into TDMP. Have S1 and S4 assistants or NCOs take over administrative duties at Home Station while they attend this training.

d. Battalion logisticians must gather and analyze information and prepare a logistics estimate. *Participation in the wargaming process* allows CSS personnel to anticipate mission requirements and establish “triggers” for resupply.

e. Train S1 in making casualty estimates, both deliberate and combat. Rehearse S1 in integrating the casualty estimate into task force planning.

2. This paragraph addresses *Class V estimates*.

a. Leaders and staff must understand where all of the ammo is located, when and where it is expected to be pushed, and which quick adjustments, based on a changing tactical situation, are feasible.

b. Develop a worksheet that prompts answers to key questions in estimating expenditures for future operations. Use this worksheet, or checklist, or ensure key ammo information is requested, pushed and tracked accurately.

c. Convert ammo estimates to triggers for resupply. These triggers should also be included on a mission execution matrix. Publish ammunition numbers in the FASP which reflect the ammo required, by battery, to accomplish their respective critical fire support tasks (CFSTs). Also specify the ammo to be carried by the ammo platoon and/or repositioning requirements.

d. Following coordination with the BAO, publish which standard load plans, by bumper number, the ammo platoon will use.

3. This paragraph addresses *FA battalion Class V estimates and tracking.*

a. Staffs must carefully consider ammunition capabilities and requirements during mission analysis and wargaming and throughout the planning process.

1) Critical field artillery tasks (CFATs) are the key to determining requirements.

- compute ammunition quantities for expected task requirements
- wargame the "what if" (i.e., what if we shoot 60 minutes of smoke as opposed to 30 minutes)
- derive ammunition requirements for that task
- do this for each expected task

2) After determining how much and what type of munitions are required, you can *push* the required munitions to the batteries.

3) The battery commander uses the CFATs to develop well thought-out turret and FAASV loads based on quantity and type of munitions expected to be fired.

b. The staff must determine resupply triggers to allow an uninterrupted flow of ammunition for the duration of the mission.

1) Consider download and travel times as a part of the resupply trigger.

2) Establish triggers by number of rounds fired versus a percentage (i.e., 15 DPICM rounds versus 50% DPICM expended) to ensure that the trigger is clearly understood across the battalion down to platoon level.

c. The FA battalion must have a *standard system* to track ammunition.

1) Howitzer sections must rapidly update their platoon operations centers (POCs) with ammunition expended and received.

2) Batteries must develop a detailed Class V tracking chart and identify a person to be in charge of managing the platoon's or battery's ammunition.

3) The POC and gunline continually cross-check information to ensure it is accurate.

4) There should be a means to track how many battalion 1 round volleys of ammunition by type of munitions have been fired.

5) The batteries must update the staff routinely on ammunition fired. This process is time intensive but necessary to successful ammunition management.

4. This paragraph addresses *Class III estimates*.

a. Battalion executive officers (XOs) must ensure the S1 and S4 forecast all requirements, regardless how seemingly minute.

b. Training at Home Station should always emphasize future operations as well as current so that the impact of supply forecasting can be realized.

c. Participate in COA development and wargaming to gain the necessary information to forecast future requirements.

5. This paragraph addresses *scout platoon logistical planning*.

a. The task force commander, XO and S3 must become more directly involved in the CS/CSS planning process to support scout platoon operations. Incorporate commander's guidance into WARNOs. Put greater detail into FRAGOs and OPORDs to ensure scout platoon support requirements are understood and coordinated well in advance.

b. The task force XO (or S3, depending on staff organization/responsibilities) should synchronize the support for the scouts, so the scouts are free to deploy on their mission as early as possible. The scouts must be able to move with the confidence that all necessary support is in place and available when the scouts need it.

c. Technique options:

1) Give the scouts a dedicated vehicle (cargo HMMWV, 2 1/2T or 5T truck with a driver and TC out of the support platoon) that brings the scout LOGPAC forward from the field trains to a scout AA. During scout missions, this vehicle and crew can be staged in the combat trains until needed by the scouts.

2) Make the HHC XO or First Sergeant bring the LOGPAC from the LRP to the scout AA. NOTE: both options above require a dedicated ambulance to support scout CASEVAC.

3) Satellite off the closest company/team; however, this technique strains the CSS resources of the designated company.

4) The task force may decide to "trade" a scout HMMWV for a cargo HMMWV. This gives the scouts a vehicle that can carry Class I/III/V, and evacuate casualties.

6. This paragraph addresses *recovery operations planning*.

a. The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) must have an understanding of the task force mission in order to develop a recovery plan, and must plan for collection points that will support the task force during the entire mission.

b. The BMO must integrate his recovery plan with S4 CSS plan.

c. The recovery plan must be briefed during the CSS rehearsal to ensure that the company teams have a thorough understanding.

7. This paragraph addresses *maintenance estimates*.

a. In Home Station training, include:

1) the preparation of a maintenance estimate IAW FM 43-5

2) the integration of the maintenance estimate into the logistics estimate by the task force CSS planners IAW FM 71-2 Chapter 7

b. Task force logistical planners must make a concerted effort to include the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) in the planning process, specifically COA development and analysis.

8. This paragraph addresses *Class IV barrier material estimates*.

a. Routine barrier material planning should be based on requirements established in the unit TACSOP.

1) The TACSOP requirement should be developed from the type, size, and number of obstacles each unit is expected to routinely erect.

2) Adjustments to the routine TACSOP Class IV requirements be made according to METT-T and the commanders assessment.

b. FM 5-102, appendix D stipulates about one 2 ½ ton truck load of material for 300 meters of triple stand concertina.

c. Limited transportation assets and manpower for construction of obstacles may dictate that barriers be used to canalize enemy forces rather than provide perimeter security.

d. Leaders must define the standard for emplacement of obstacles, communicate the standard (TACSOP), and enforce the standard.

TA.7 Negative Trend 3: **Materiel Readiness**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	4	3	2	4

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Units experience difficulty transitioning the use of ULLS, SAMS ½ and SARSS *from garrison to a field environment*.

RESULT: Units *quickly* lose an accurate picture of what equipment is inoperative, what parts are required, and the status of the parts requisitions. This further results in units struggling to maintain readiness rates at or above 90% during intense operational periods. In this quarter the *mission capable* rating during rotations for *M1 tanks was 71%*, and for *BFVs 76%*.

PROBLEM 3-2: Forward support battalions (FSBs) have difficulty tracking the flow of high priority requisitioned parts. Manual transportation manifests are either not used or not accurate when used.

RESULT: The failure to have a system in place to track parts has a *negative impact on combat power*.

PROBLEM 3-3: Units have difficulty maintaining an accurate picture of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions.

1. The tracking of DA Form 2404 flow remains a problem.
2. The tracking of high priority requisitions via transportation manifests by the Main Support Battalions (MSB) remains inconsistent.
3. The success rate of CLass IX electronic data transfer (BLAST) declined 40% in the last quarter.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 3-4: Task force level Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) operations need to be improved. Doctrinal repair evacuation criteria are not followed, nor are METT-T factors used to produce mission specific criteria.

RESULT: UMCPs routinely become collection points for disabled vehicles, requiring large amounts of time and assets to displace them to the brigade support area (BSA).

PROBLEM 3-5: Task force DA Form 2406 reporting lacks accuracy.

1. Units habitually delay reporting combat vehicles which are not fully mission capable.
2. Units delete vehicles from report in anticipation of arrival of repair part which will restore vehicle to FMC status.
3. Circle X delegation below task force level clouds accuracy of report.

RESULTS:

1. False representation of task force's combat power.
2. Loss of accuracy and visibility of units' maintenance status.

PROBLEM 3-6: *(Repeat of Problem 3-1)* Rotational units frequently have an inaccurate picture of equipment materiel readiness and status of open repair parts requisitions. They do not transition well from garrison to the field environment and requirements in using ULLS, SAMS ½ and SARSS. Accomplishment and tracking of DA Form 2404 flow requires more emphasis.

RESULT: Units quickly lose track of inoperative equipment, parts required, and requisition status.

PROBLEM 3-7: *(Repeat of Problem 3-2)* Main Support Battalion (MSB) tracking of high priority requisitions via transportation manifests remains inconsistent. MSBs use manual transportation manifests inconsistently to maintain visibility of in transit high priority parts. They do not get manifests to Forward Support Battalions' support operations prior to each shipment's arrival in the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

RESULT: The Brigade Combat Teams too often lack time to receive, accept and install high priority dead lining parts.

<u>1-2QFY96</u>

PROBLEM 3-8: In field maintenance operations, units, leaders and individuals fail to properly complete and submit DA Form 2404 and DA Form 5988. Many unit technical SOPs do not address the *basics* of DA Forms 2404 and 5988 completion to include format, submittal and collection process/method, maintenance section form flow and actions and return of form/parts to equipment operator.

RESULTS:

1. Reduced preventive maintenance.
2. Reduced parts ordering.
3. Lower Operations Readiness (OR) rates.

PROBLEM 3-9: *(Repeat of Problems 3-1 and 3-6)* Units have difficulty maintaining an accurate picture of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions upon arrival into Theater. CSS units have difficulty transitioning their Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) (i.e., ULLS, SAMS ½ and SARSS) from garrison to a field environment because of a lack of manual tracking system while the STAMIS are off-line.

RESULT: Units quickly lose an accurate picture of what equipment is inoperable, what parts are required, the associated requisitions status, and DA Form 2404 preparation and tracking.

PROBLEM 3-10: *(Repeat of Problems 3-2 and 3-7)* Manual transportation manifests were used inconsistently by main support battalions (MSBs) to maintain visibility of in-transit high priority parts. Transportation manifests do not get to forward support battalion (FSB) support operations prior to each shipment's arrival in the brigade support area (BSA).

RESULT: The brigade combat team (BCT) has insufficient time to put into motion actions to accept and install high priority dead lining parts prior to line of departure (LD).

NOTE: The use of Class IX electronic data transfer (using the "BLAST" software program) has improved to a 68.3% success rate; an increase in effectiveness of 17.3%. The increase can be attributed to improved Home Station training and better coordination between the FSB and their signal support.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 3-11:

1. Task forces have difficulty controlling the flow of vehicles in and out of unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).
2. Task forces often have fully mission-capable vehicles remaining in the UMCP for long periods of time.
3. Once vehicles are released from the UMCP, task forces often have problems successfully linking up the vehicles with their units prior to execution.

PROBLEM 3-12: Generally, operator maintenance procedures are substandard.

1. DA Forms 2404:
   - lack signatures
   - have incomplete administrative data
   - are often illegible
   - are not forwarded IAW standard procedure
2. Identified faults have no recorded corrective action.
3. Units do not use appropriate diagnostic procedures/equipment.
4. Parts often not routed or delivered until end of campaign.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 3-13: *(Repeat of Problem 3-11)* Task forces have difficulty controlling the flow of vehicles in and out of unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs).

1. Task forces often have fully mission-capable vehicles remaining in the UMCP for long periods of time.
2. Once vehicles are released from the UMCP, task forces often have problems successfully linking up the vehicles with their units prior to execution.

PROBLEM 3-14:

1. The average unit at NTC accomplishes PMCS in 48-72 hours. The desired turn-around time on PMCS of combat systems is 24 hours. This goal is accomplished by *less than 10%* of the units that arrive at the NTC.
2. Crews do not have a system of turning in combat systems for PMCS.
3. 1SGs and Platoon SGTs, are not involved in the planning of LOGPAC synchronization.
4. The Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) and XO establish a plan during RSOI only when coached, and NCOs execute on constantly-changing guidance from the task force XO.
5. The PMCS system is not tested in garrison or during field training exercises (FTXs) prior to deployment, and are therefore setting the conditions for failure.
6. DA Forms 2404 are often submitted with signatures/administrative data missing and/or identified faults having no corrective action taken.
7. Due to a shortage of experienced mechanics, units are not using the diagnostic equipment (breakout boxes/STE-ICE) available to them to determine all vehicle faults. Consequently, installing parts does not always correct the deficiency and vehicles remain in a “C” status for extended periods of time.

PROBLEM 3-15: Units typically do not use maintenance doctrine repair timelines to evacuate equipment out of the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP).

1. Organizational maintenance drags combat systems around the battlefield until repaired.
2. In over 12 rotations, only 1 M119 Howitzer (British light gun) has been evacuated to the Bravo Company in the Brigade Support Area (BSA).
4. The Maintenance Support Teams (MSTs) repair as far forward as possible, but do not consider time a factor when repairing equipment.

RESULT:

1. The Bravo Company usually repairs only wheeled vehicles in the BSA.
2. The only workload that occurs in Bravo company from the task forces (TFs) are in radio repair.
3. The Bravo Company is never stressed from workload and manhours.

PROBLEM 3-16: Units too often do not use Simplified Test Equipment (STE) or Break-out Boxes (BOB) in their troubleshooting (TS) procedures.

1. Units usually swing-test fault diagnosis.
2. Units typically split the BOB into two parts - half forward, half back. Having the equipment in separate locations does not facilitate the use of the equipment.

TECHNIQUES

1. Units must *not* lose accuracy of the materiel readiness of equipment and status of open repair parts requisitions while transitioning from garrison to field environment.

- Unit leadership should *require* the use of automated CSS systems in both Home Station garrison and field use. Future CSS automated management software must be more user friendly and provide real-time information management products.
- Units should request or keep track of historical usage of supplies *in the theater to which they are deploying*. It is possible to develop a "factor" to use automated forecasting tools, e.g., OPLOG planner, at battalion or brigade S4 sections.
- Units should develop a *manual* system (DA Form 2404 daily turn-ins and daily maintenance meetings) to track readiness before STAMIS are fully operational after arrival into Theater.

2. The brigade combat team (BCT) *must have sufficient time* to put into motion actions to accept and install high priority deadlining parts prior to line of departure (LD).

- CSS units should develop tracking systems for high priority parts. This system should be used *on a daily basis* at Home Station.
- The automated BLAST system must continue to be trained and utilized at Home Station in order to build familiarity with MSE interface by all components of the system: Signal Company, Brigade Signal Officer, and Battalion Commo/SARRS operator.

3. *DA Forms 2404 and 5988 must be properly completed and submitted.*

- Many Home Station daily *motor pool* operations can be applied to *field maintenance* operations. Those that are not may be *refocused* to equate administrative operations to tactical/field requirements to eliminate a dual-system of operations.

- Technical SOPs can be updated/revised/written to include maintenance operations.

- Unit LOGPACs are often the collection point for DA Forms 2404 and 5988s and delivery of non-deadlining parts to platoon sergeants.

- Maintenance contact teams can accompany the LOGPAC supplies with the platoon sergeant and work on vehicle faults during LOGPAC operations or at a consolidated site.

4. DA Form 2406 reporting must be accurate. Report vehicles as not mission capable (NMC) *until all deadlining faults are repaired.* Maintain tight control and continuous reporting on circle X vehicles. Units should better train maintenance reporting procedures and operator/unit level troubleshooting procedures.

5. To prevent the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) from becoming a collection point for disabled vehicles, the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) should *conduct a maintenance estimate* to determine which vehicles could be better repaired in the more stable confines of the Brigade Support Area (BSA). This would preclude the 4-6 hour time to displace from UMCPs.

6. The UMCP should be given enough class IV material to create a "fence" with one exit/entrance. UMCP leaders should designate a "gate guard" to control traffic in and out of the UMCP. The task force leadership should take an active interest in controlling the link-up of repaired vehicles with their units. Too often, the only parties involved in the linkup are the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and the individual vehicle commanders.

7. Place the Break-out-Boxes BOB either forward in the UMCP or field trains to facilitate its use.

8. Break the cycle of weekly PMCS while at Home Station. Test the PMCS system in garrison and during FTXs before deployment. The task force leadership must place greater emphasis on the training and conduct of operator PMCS and troubleshooting IAW the appropriate -10/-20 manual. Follow doctrinal timelines in order to test the long-term campaign tempo.

TA.7 Negative Trend 4: **Medical support planning and execution**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	1	2	3	3

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 4-1:

1. The Forward Support Battalion (FSB) medical company commander is often unable to participate in the orders process because of operational responsibilities; the FSB support operations officer normally lack the experience in medical operations.

RESULT: Medical operations are not being properly synchronized into the overall operation.

2. There is a lack of consistency in how FSB medical companies establish treatment facilities. Some units use *tracked or wheeled vehicles*; others use *various shapes and sizes of tentage* for treatment space.

RESULT: This situation detracts from the smooth flow of patients through the medical company because of either a lack of space, or dysfunctional layout.

3. FSB medical company facilities are poorly marked.

RESULT: Casualty evacuation is hindered because it is overly difficult to locate medical facilities on the battlefield.

PROBLEM 4-2:

1. Combat health support planners develop combat health support plans without understanding the maneuver plan.
2. Brigades do not conduct parallel planning, i.e., combat health support planners are not present for mission analysis and course of action (COA) development.
3. Planners continue to write the combat health support plans without doing a casualty estimate, and without knowledge of medical asset status and capabilities.

PROBLEM 4-3: Casualties feeder cards are too often incorrectly filled out. Medical company personnel do not have the information necessary to complete and/or correct the cards.

RESULT: Incorrect or missing information can delay notification of next of kin.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-4: *(Repeat of Problem 4-1)* Medical units are generally deficient in the planning, management and execution of medical operations.

1. Combat Health Support (CHS) planning is not integrated into the brigade planning process.
2. Too often the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) medical company commander is unable to participate in the orders process because of operational responsibilities.
3. The FSB support operations officer is often tasked to participate in the brigade orders process, but *lacks the necessary experience in medical operations*.
4. FSB medical companies do not establish standardized treatment facilities. Various shapes and sizes of tentage are used for treatment space.
5. FSB medical companies do not exhibit standardized blood management procedures.

RESULTS:

1. Medical operations are usually not synchronized with BCT operations.
2. The set-up and layout of most treatment facilities hinder the smooth flow of patients because of either the size and/or layout of the treatment facility.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-5: The professional Filler System (PROFIS) physicians are not incorporated into medical platoon training and are not prepared to conduct tactical operations.

1. The majority of PROFIS doctors deploying to the combat training center have *never trained with the unit they are supporting*, and have been with the unit an average of about one week.
2. PROFIS physicians are too often *not trained on common soldier skills*.

PROBLEM 4-6: *(Repeat of Problem 4-3)* Units are challenged with preparing and submitting DA Form 1156 to standard.

1. Units are expected to quickly prepare and submit DA Form 1156 when they receive casualties.
2. DA Forms 1156 are frequently not completed with all pertinent information.
3. DA Forms 1156 for soldiers who are lightly wounded, treated, and immediately returned to duty (RTD), are not submitted to the task force S1 or S1 representative at the Forward Aid Station or Main Aid Station (FAS/MAS).

RESULT: Personnel & Administration Centers (PACs) located in the field trains are unable to properly execute their mission, i.e., awards, letters of condolence/sympathy, and personnel transactions are not timely or accurate.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-7: Medical companies frequently do not utilize an established layout to employ their assets when they occupy a new area of operations.

RESULT: No coordinated traffic flow of vehicles through the company area or patients through the treatment facility.

PROBLEM 4-8: Medical company commanders do not have systems in place to manage and track the brigade's medical assets.

RESULTS:

1. Medical evacuation platforms go into a non-mission capable (NMC) status and are not identified as such for up to 72 hours.
2. The medical company has ambulances available but does not react since they are unaware that evacuation platforms are NMC.
3. Task force medical platoons, company medics and unit combat lifesavers run out of medical supplies and are unable to care for casualties.
4. The medical company has additional Class VIII on hand but does not push it forward.

PROBLEM 4-9:

1. There is rarely a medical officer involved in the planning of brigade combat health support operations.
2. The medical planning and the S1 are not considering the casualty estimate when developing the CHS plan.
3. The medical planner is not integrated into the brigade's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

RESULTS:

1. The CHS plan for placement of medical assets on the battlefield
   - does not support the maneuver commander's plan
   - fails to take into consideration time/distance factors in the evacuation and treatment of casualties.
2. Insufficient evacuation platforms are at the right place and right time to support the casualties incurred.
3. Brigade's medical assets are not able to acquire, treat and evacuate casualties in time to prevent them from dying of wounds.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 4-10: *(Repeat of Problem 4-7)* Medical companies frequently do not utilize an established layout to employ their assets when they occupy a new area of operations.

RESULT: No coordinated traffic flow of vehicles through the company area or patients through the treatment facility.

PROBLEM 4-11: *(Repeat of Problem 4-8)* Medical company commanders do not have systems in place to manage and track the brigade's medical assets.

RESULTS:

1. Medical evacuation platforms go into a non-mission capable (NMC) status and are not identified as such for up to 72 hours.
2. The medical company has ambulances available but does not react since they are unaware that evacuation platforms are NMC.
3. Task force medical platoons, company medics and unit combat lifesavers run out of medical supplies and are unable to care for casualties.
4. The medical company has additional Class VIII on hand but does not push it forward.

PROBLEM 4-12: *(Repeat of Problem 4-9)*

1. There is rarely a medical officer involved in the planning of brigade combat health support operations.
2. The medical planning and the S1 are not considering the casualty estimate when developing the CHS plan.
3. The medical planner is not integrated into the brigade's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

RESULTS:

1. The CHS plan for placement of medical assets on the battlefield
   - does not support the maneuver commander's plan
   - fails to take into consideration time/distance factors in the evacuation and treatment of casualties.
2. Insufficient evacuation platforms are at the right place and right time to support the casualties incurred.
3. Brigade's medical assets are not able to acquire, treat and evacuate casualties in time to prevent them from dying of wounds.

TECHNIQUES

1. *Combat health planners must participate in the entire staff planning process.*

2. Incorporate medical planning into all Home Station training field exercises.

a. The FSB medical company must practice the set up of treatment facilities in a field environment to ensure a practical configuration based on projected treatment requirements.

b. Always incorporate the use and management of ground and air evacuation assets into field training exercises.

c. Pay particular attention to standardized blood management procedures.

3. The wounded soldier's chain of command is responsible for collecting DA Form 1156 feeder cards and ensuring they are filled out completely and correctly. *Conduct training at Home Station on <u>what a properly filled-out form should look like</u>.*

4. The task force should develop an SOP for submission of DA Form 1156 for return to duty (RTD) cases.

a. Have the company team consolidate its RTD 1156s with the First Sergeant prior to his departure to the LRP meeting.

b. The First Sergeant submits the RTD 1156s to the S1 or designated S1 representative who checks them for correctness and accountability.

c. Verified RTD 1156s are forwarded up the chain of command to the division G-1 section *with all other 1156s collected that day* at the FAS/MAS.

RESULT: The PAC in the field trains would receive all RTD 1156s within 10 to 12 hours after the injury occurs, *giving them at least 12 hours* to process required paperwork and conduct necessary personnel transactions.

5. PROFIS physicians must be identified at least *six months prior to deployment*, and *train up with the unit* at Home Station prior to deployment. This will allow him to become familiar with unit equipment and SOPs.

6. Health Services Command should develop a standard Table of Organizations and *Equipment* (TOE) for Forward Support Battalion (FSB) medical company treatment sections.

7. Develop a standard template to assist in the layout of the company area. Establish and enforce one route through the company area; adjust based on terrain, but do not change the one-route concept. Place along the established traffic route:

- the command post
- maintenance area
- Class VIII resupply point
- fuel point

8. Work out a system between the medical platoons within the brigade combat team (BCT) and the medical company in the form of a brief standard report that gives their current status on maintenance and Class VIII.

a. Design a simple report form that can be passed either by FM or ambulance messenger.

b. The form must be *easy* and *fast* to promote its use by the platoon leaders.

9. The Forward Support Medical Commander (FSMC) is currently the only technical expert available to the brigade. He must be included into the brigade's MDMP to ensure a technically sound plan that is synchronized with and integrated into the maneuver commander's plan.

a. This individual must bring to mission analysis the maintenance status of the brigades evacuation platforms and the status of Class VIII medical supplies and blood in the brigade.

b. The medical planner must have an understanding of the commander's intent and the course of action so that he/she is able to develop a medical support that supports the tactical plan.

c. The medical planner must be actively involved in the wargaming process to ensure that his/her plan ins synchronized and integrated with the rest of the BOS in the brigade.

10. The medical planner and the brigade S1 must look carefully at the casualty estimate and the S2's situational template (SITEMP) to determine the densities of casualties during the different phases of the operation.

a. They must determine the required number of evacuation platforms to move these casualties.

b. They must determine if there is a requirement for additional nonstandard platforms to assist in the evacuation process.

c. The requirement for additional assets is then integrated into the CHS Annex as a specified task to subordinate units.

TA.7 Negative Trend 5: **Religious support / UMT deficiencies**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	4	2	3

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 5-1:

1. Lack of coordination at Home Station often results in Unit Ministry Team (UMT) members not being listed with those scheduled to draw equipment at the NTC.
2. UMTs continue to deploy without adequate coverage for Catholic soldiers. This results from a lack of priority in using priests to support deployments and NTC rotational deployments.
3. Brigade UMTs do not adequately understand the importance of staff supervision and coordination and control of religious support assets on the battlefield.
4. Units continue to deploy to the NTC without their chaplains.
5. UMTs arrive at the NTC without the necessary basic soldier skills to survive in a combat environment.
6. UMTs do not know how to use communications equipment.
7. Chaplains and chaplain assistants are not being allowed to drive because of an NTC policy prohibiting officers from driving. Chaplains are also not being allowed to move to critical areas on the battlefield because commanders fear they will get lost or injured.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 5-2:

1. Commanders do not adequately understand religious support and its potential to help soldiers maximize their potential on the battlefield. Too many commanders neglect the potentially valuable support the unit ministry team provides.
2. Chaplains are not functioning adequately as staff officers in the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP). A lack of understanding about TDMP by chaplains hinders their efforts to be proactive as plans are formulated. This is another reason the problem above continues. Chaplains need to be able to produce a religious support plan, and articulate it to the supported commander.
3. Division chaplains and NCOICs are generally not involved with unit training before, during or after unit deployments.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 5-3: Brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) struggle with synchronization of religious support assets on the battlefield. The current FM 16-1 gives a cursory discussion of the religious support duties of brigade chaplains and ministry team NCOICs, but does not provide a *how-to* on synchronization of religious support assets.

PROBLEM 5-4: Units tend to omit the chaplain assistant on their Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs). The commander does not understand the importance of what the chaplain assistant does on the battlefield. Chaplain assistant NCO supervisors do not aggressively strive to get chaplain assistants to training.

RESULT: No proper division of labor to allow the chaplain to adequately address the needs of the soldiers. The chaplain assistant does not understand his/her job, or is improperly utilized, and the team becomes less effective.

PROBLEM 5-5: Units tend to have inadequate religious support for rear elements, i.e., the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) and the hospital. Units deploying to combat training centers do not configure their Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) IAW FM 16-1, and therefore, are not able to support all elements of the battlefield.

RESULT: UMTs are not trained the way they intend to fight.

PROBLEM 5-6: Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) often do not understand their role

- in reception, staging, onward movement, integration (RSOI) operations
- during Other than Military Operations (OMO)
- when relating to civilians on the battlefield
- when advising the commander
- when dealing with the media

RESULT: UMTs are too often technically *unprepared for deployment for combat*.

<u>3-4QFY96</u>

PROBLEM 5-7:

1. Brigade level chaplain assistants do not understand the breadth and depth of their position as manager of the unit ministry team. Most have a *current operations* mentality when it comes to assisting the chaplain.
2. Brigade level chaplain assistants are not skilled in battle tracking, safety/risk assessment and implementation of the religious support plan.

PROBLEM 5-8: Unit ministry teams are frequently unable to communicate with subordinate unit ministry teams on the battlefield.

1. Unit ministry teams are often unskilled in the area of radio communications.
2. Their methods for communicating in the field are often untested prior to deployments.
3. They lack depth in "battle drills" for alternative types of communication.
4. Most unit ministry teams know the basics of radio communication, but lack any fall back plans if their "plan A" does not work.

RESULT: The effectiveness of the UMT is greatly reduced.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 5-9: Chaplain assistants are not often employed to the fullest extent possible.

1. The work of the chaplain assistant covers a broad range of tasks in security, logistics, administration and, in lieu of the chaplain, ministry. Chaplain assistants frequently receive inadequate guidance from chaplains, and are therefore limited in the scope of their activities.
2. Unit Ministry Team (UMT) battle drills seldom occur, limiting the effectiveness of a chaplain assistant.
3. UMTs often arrive at the NTC with religious support plans that are not tailored specifically for current missions. This forces both chaplain and assistant to play 'catch up' rather than allowing them to immediately get into the mission planning process.

RESULT: The chaplain assistant ends up performing isolated tasks rather than assisting the chaplain in development and execution of a comprehensive religious support program.

PROBLEM 5-10: Brigade level unit ministry teams are not well integrated into the orders process.

1. Chaplains and chaplain assistants are frequently left out of the planning cycle. This is due to an inadequate understanding of the orders process as a continuous cycle that involves the integration of simultaneous staff activities towards focusing of combat power on the decisive point.

2. Chaplains do not effectively integrate religious support input into the warning order/staff estimate/OPORD annex process.

3. Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) frequently do not brief at maneuver or CSS rehearsal and do not get a religious support annex into the OPORD.

RESULTS:

1. Other staff officers get the impression that the UMT does not care about or share the same understanding of the importance of the orders process.

2. The effect that chaplains and assistants can have on the battlefield is diminished.

PROBLEM 5-11: Brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) do not fully coordinate with medical casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planners for coverage of wounded soldiers.

1. Often the relationship between the Brigade combat team (BCT) UMT, Forward Support Battalion (FSB) UMT, and CASEVAC planners and are not well defined or developed. These groups are critical in coordinating religious support to wounded soldiers.

2. BCT UMTs do not take the time to fully understand the overall concept for medical support.

3. The FSB chaplain is usually not consulted as the religious support plan for casualties is developed, resulting in a uncoordinated-integrated plan of execution.

4. CASEVAC planners do not appreciate the dimension that UMTs bring when they work with medical assets to bring religious support to casualties.

TECHNIQUES

1. Regular participation in unit field training will go far in integrating chaplains into the warfighting aspect of unit life. Inclusion of chaplains as key staff members involved in unit training and preparation for deployment will help integrate chaplaincy functions, and result in the elimination of many or all problems.

2. Battle drills help UMTs organize specific tasks into logical sequences that utilize time and resources wisely.

a. Chaplains must assist their chaplain assistants by providing them with clear, and regular, guidance.

b. Chaplains and assistants must be conversant with their supported units' METL. Periodic and pre-deployment review of the METL will assist the chaplain in formulating guidance for the chaplain assistant. The chaplain assistant then can be empowered to develop battle drills (or UMT drills) which will assist both chaplain and assistant in providing comprehensive ministry to their supported unit.

c. Chaplain and assistant represent a 'duet' not two soloists. Regular guidance from the chaplain must include an overall vision (which will reflect the commander's intent for a given mission) which is communicated to the chaplain assistant. The chaplain and assistant should review the guidance together to insure that both understand it.

3. Chaplains and assistants should develop “battle drills” for the employment of basic communication techniques in the field. These drills must include fall-back plans and be practiced to perfection at Home Station.

4. Supervisory chaplains need to be involved in the training of subordinate Unit Ministry Teams. Use the information given in the *previous version of FM 16-1* (prior to the 1995 rewrite).

5. Chaplain assistants, at all levels, must be made aware of both *current* and *future* operations. They also must be able to battle track.

a. While doctrinal lists may be helpful in broadening a chaplain assistant's perspective, it would be *better* to utilize monthly training opportunities at Home Station to develop programs whereby chaplain assistants can learn to better assist the chaplain.

b. Provide training for the chaplain assistant consistent with FM 16-1, which states "..The chaplain assistant is a combatant, carries a weapon, and is essential for the survival of the team on the battlefield."

6. Chaplains need to involve themselves in the TDMP process in their role as a contributing staff officer. This will enhance their tactical and warfighting visibility within the command. The increased visibility and credibility should generate more, and adequate, support from the command. When division chaplains were actively involved in supporting the activities of subordinate chaplains, the entire unit ministry team (UMT) process functioned more efficiently and effectively.

7. UMTs must think seriously about how religious support impacts on a given mission. This will focus them as they get involved in the staff estimate process.

a. Dramatically increase the cross-talk between UMTs and S2/S3 sections. If chaplains and assistants are more aggressive in providing input into the estimate process, then the religious support annex will take on an important dimension in the overall OPORD. With religious support included in the OPORD, chaplains and assistants would have something of substance to brief at a CSS rehearsal.

b. It is imperative for both chaplain and chaplain assistant to rehearse their involvement in these processes during train-ups for CTC rotations or other deployments.

c. Plan for the chaplain to attend LTP. If LTP attendance is not possible, chaplains and assistants can review all of the LTP material at Home Station, and gain a comprehensive understanding of the types of missions and religious support challenges they might encounter.

8. Chaplains and assistants must coordinate, early on, with medical planners to insure everyone fully understands the medical concept of support.

a. UMTs must find ways to integrate into the medical evacuation team so that when UMT members are not around, for instance, they are missed.

b. The BCT UMT should enlist the support of the FSB chaplain. The FSB chaplain has the habitual relationship with the medical assets and can provide the BCT UMT with valuable information on the concepts and personalities that are present in the FSB medical evacuation section.

c. UMTs should be conversant with MEDEVAC doctrine and its employment on the battlefield.

9. FM 16-1 should be expanded into three FMs:

- FM 16-1-1, dealing with religious support at the battalion level
- FM 16-1-2, dealing with religious support at brigade and regimental level
- FM 16-1-3, religious support at the division, installation and above level

TA.7 Negative Trend 6: **Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	5	1	2	1	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 6-1: Casualty evacuation of Stinger teams proves to be a serious problem, particularly during offensive operations. Air Defense officers tend to want to evacuate the Stinger teams through the company/team to which they were attached. Too often, however, poor planning and coordination hinder evacuation efforts.

2QFY95

PROBLEM 6-2: *(Repeat of Problem 6-1)* Casualty evacuation of Stinger teams is particularly a problem during offensive operations. Many Air Defense officers intend to evacuate Stinger teams through the company/team or troop they are supporting. Often poor planning and coordination result in less than satisfactory CASEVAC for the Stinger teams.

PROBLEM 6-3: Signal units (Retrans, RAU and relay teams) tend to be among the most forward deployed assets. They also have the highest died of wounds (DOW) rate.

PROBLEM 6-4: The engineer battalion's CASEVAC process suffers from a lack of organic medical assets, as well as a lack of engineer CASEVAC integration into the task force CASEVAC plan. The died of wounds (DOW) rate for units has increased because engineer companies do not understand the workings of the task force BAS, the AXPs, and *not knowing where to evacuate patients*. An increasing number of wounded soldiers are being incorrectly evacuated directly to C/MED in the FSB *because that is what is trained at Home Station*.

RESULT: The extended distances almost guarantee a wounded soldier will DOW from not receiving definitive care earlier.

PROBLEM 6-5: The forward evacuation of scout platoon casualties is normally not considered during the task force planning process. When evacuation is required, the lack of planning results in additional DOWs.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 6-6: There is inadequate casualty evacuation planning at brigade, task force and company/team level. This includes combat service elements as well. The assets necessary to execute CASEVAC are too often not correctly positioned for timely execution. It is apparent that too many units are inadequately trained in CASEVAC procedures, to include self/buddy aid.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 6-7: Many units do not know what to do with their chemical casualties and KIAs. During evacuation numerous field litter ambulances (FLA) are *needlessly* contaminated. Casualties are brought to the decon site or to the *clean* main aid station/forward aid station (MAS/FAS).

PROBLEM 6-8: Units, specifically the logistics planners, do not sufficiently plan for air casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) assets when they have them available.

RESULT: A unit's dead or wounded (DOW) rate is elevated relative to the *elapsed time* they are left on the battlefield.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 6-9: Maneuver units consistently evacuate their *contaminated* killed in action (KIA) casualties to clean collection points instead of the designated collection point for contaminated casualties.

RESULT: The designated clean collection point becomes contaminated.

TECHNIQUES

1. CASEVAC planning is *primarily a brigade issue*, because that is where the assets exist to adequately treat the casualties a task force is likely to sustain. The battalion/task force staff must, through the estimate process, articulate the necessity to *push brigade medical assets forward*.

2. CASEVAC must be considered as part of the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP) by the integrated battle staff. The responsibility for casualty evacuation lies with the *S1 and operations officer for planning*, and unit *1SGs and the medical platoon for execution*. The S1 must do a casualty estimate, including where the casualties will occur and in what numbers. The medical officer should then link medical assets available with the units projected to suffer casualties. [Usually, the medical assets available fall short of the requirements to adequately treat projected casualties. Two aid stations in a battalion/task force are *almost always inadequate* to support a task force's combat missions. Experience shows that 15 to 20 casualties in one hour overwhelms the treatment capabilities of an aid station, which doctrinally constitutes a MASCAL situation.]

3. Full utilization of *available air assets* in CASEVAC would significantly reduce a unit's DOW rates. Air evacuation needs to be planned in detail. Areas that need to be addressed are:

- a clear task and purpose
- enemy ADA threat
- priority to specific unit and type of casualty
- pickup zone (PZ) location and set-up responsibilities
- where the casualties should be evacuated

To help ensure their proper utilization, the aviation LNO or the Pilot-In-Charge should be available during the planning process.

4. Medical evacuation personnel, both ground and air, must be trained to stay aware of the tactical situation. This will assist in locating evacuation assets where they can best quickly respond for immediate support.

5. Take the time at Home Station to qualify as many soldiers as possible as *combat lifesavers.*

6. Leaders should check certified aid bags and/or multiple first aid kits as part of pre-combat inspection.

7. *Stinger team evacuation* in offensive operations works best when the Stinger platoon sergeant travels with the main effort *with a dedicated vehicle and personnel*, and then moves where needed to assist in the evacuation effort.

8. *Signal unit remote teams* need at least one combat lifesaver qualified soldier. PCIs for the teams should include a certified aid bag or multiple first aid kits. Leaders should *wargame* solutions for the most exposed systems and *pre-position vehicles* to support CASEVAC.

9. *The engineer battalion staff* must provide FRAGOs to the companies on any changes to the brigade combat health support plan based on brigade FRAGOs and/or changes resulting from any CSS rehearsals.

10. *Scout platoon evacuation* planning must be integral in the task force planning process for any combat operation. Assets must be available to conduct the evacuation as required.

11. *For chemical casualties,* train medics and company personnel to minimize the spread of contamination of field litter ambulances (FLAs) and clean medical facilities. Train patient decon procedures IAW FM 3-5. *Identify* clean and dirty FAS/MAS in OPORD and *reiterate* at rehearsals. Ensure unit leaders are briefed on the designated collection point for NBC casualties.

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

TA.4 Negative Trend 1: **Battle tracking and predictive analysis**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	2	2	6	7

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 1-1: During battle, the information received in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is not routinely integrated and then disseminated to all appropriate staff sections. The problem is worsened by poor reporting by maneuver units. Reports often fail to follow the "SALT" or "SALUTE" format. Subsequent reports do not report enemy battle damage assessment (BDA). In addition, S2s have not developed section SOPs covering spot report logging procedures, SITEMP refinement procedures, or overall section responsibilities.

RESULTS:

1. The S2 has an unclear picture of the overall situation and therefore is unable to do any significant predictive analysis based on critical enemy events. Poor reporting also makes it difficult to do accurate battle tracking.
2. Section operating procedures during combat operations must be developed "on the fly."

PROBLEM 1-2: Task force staffs/command posts fail to effectively battle track during the planning, preparation and execution phases of missions. Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) usually maintain two battle tracking boards/maps - the S2's and the S3's. Both boards usually have an assortment of information posted, but fail in tracking all enemy and friendly forces in the area of operations (AO).

PROBLEM 1-3: *(Repeat of Problem 1-1)* Poor battle tracking in the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) interferes with the S2's ability to conduct event analysis and predictive analysis. Information received in the TOC during battle is not integrated and then routinely disseminated. S2s too often fail to develop adequate section SOPs spelling out section members' responsibilities and specifying operating procedures during combat operations.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 1-4: Most command posts fight the battle in an inadequate Tactical Operation Center (TOC) configuration, with each staff section fighting the battle from inside its own M577. There is no adequate plan to share information with other staff elements.

RESULTS:

1. The TOC does not share situational awareness, provide predictive analysis to the commander, or aid him in synchronizing all the BOS elements on the battlefield.
2. The normal TOC configuration does not aid staff integration without a proactive executive officer (XO) and staff.

PROBLEM 1-5: The Main command post (CP) is not able to analyze information that they receive to provide the commander with a picture of what the enemy will do, and make recommendations of actions that we should take.

RESULT: The Main CP has become a reporting node with its focus on relaying to higher levels, not on tracking the battle and recommending what to do next.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 1-6: *(Repeat of Problem 1-5)* The Main command post (CP) often appears more concerned with reporting to higher headquarters than with tracking the battle and predictive analysis for the commander. The Main CP does not consistently analyze information received, provide the commander with an estimate of what the enemy will do next, or recommend future friendly actions.

RESULT: The commander does not receive predictive analysis from his CP.

PROBLEM 1-7: The Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) personnel are not cross-trained to duties such as battle tracking, map posting, combat strength analysis and situation updates.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 1-8: Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) signal battalion planning and control elements and their companies often lack adequate awareness of the tactical situation within their supported unit's area of operations. Divisional signal battalions provide area communications to the maneuver brigades and other divisional elements. Communications assets are distributed throughout the division area and into the brigade sectors. MSE systems planning for future operations and the successful execution of current operations requires that the MSE unit be aware of the supported unit's mission, intent, scheme of maneuver, and possible contingencies.

RESULT: Without constant battle tracking and situational awareness, the signal unit cannot respond effectively to sudden changes in friendly or enemy disposition.

PROBLEM 1-9: Battle tracking in brigade CP fails to provide the commander the required information before, during, and after the battle to make timely, efficient, and effective decisions. Brigades are weak in battle tracking of combat power two levels down. The brigade believes that by tracking the task force combat power (one level down) they can stay abreast of the situation enough to monitor the battle. In order for the main CP to become a proactive participant in the fight it must know what is happening at the co/tm level (two levels down). Additionally, the fighting of the deep fight, not in terms of distance, but time, requires the co/tm details.

PROBLEM 1-10: *(Repeat of Problem 1-2)* Task force staffs and command posts continually fail to effectively battletrack during plan, prepare, and execute phases of the mission.

1. The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) does not proactively track the status of the task force during all phases of the mission. The TOC *should* track:
   - company/team troop leading procedures (critical tasks only)
   - all friendly unit locations/activity in their area of interest
   - front line of own troops (FLOT) down to platoon or section level
   - combat power (vehicles and ability to adequately man those vehicles)
   - collecting, consolidating/distributing subordinate unit fire plans
   - task organization completeness
   - adherence to task force timeline and task force critical tasks
2. The TOC usually maintains two separate battletracking boards/maps, the S2's, and the S3's. Both have an assortment of information posted, but fail to adequately track all enemy and friendly forces in the area of operations (AO).

PROBLEM 1-11:

1. Aviation units in support of a division poorly track *friendly* and *enemy* situations in just one brigade sector. Aviation battalions will support operations throughout a divisions' or corps' sector/zone.
2. Field manuals reflect static flow, not a dynamic battlefield.

RESULT: Because battle tracking is weak, situational awareness on the part of individual aircrews and companies prior to mission execution is limited.

PROBLEM 1-12: Medical company commanders do not have the necessary situational awareness, both tactically and technically, to command the brigade's medical resources.

1. Medical company commanders often do not know what their CP's responsibilities are.
2. Many medical command posts are nothing more than a soldier on radio watch.

PROBLEM 1-13: In almost every case of indirect fire *fratricide* at task force and company levels, the observers failed to plot no-fire areas (NFAs) or update the forward line of own troops (FLOT) on their maps.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 1-14:

1. Most TA teams and Analysis Control Teams (ACTs), are unable to share a common picture of events on the battlefield. This lack of situational awareness makes it difficult for the TA team to keep their subordinate Electronic Warfare teams informed and synchronized with operations.
2. The TA team misses triggers for planned Electronic Attack missions and fails to trigger Electronic Support (ES) operations to answer PIRs. This condition is more pronounced in ACTs that are unsure of their role and responsibilities vice the TA team.

PROBLEM 1-15: Military Police (MP) teams are victims of an excessive number of near fratricide situations. MP teams are encountering near fratricide situations involving MP contact with other brigade combat team (BCT) units, and even MP internal situations. These encounters normally occur during low visibility conditions and are a direct result of poor information dissemination during orders issue and information updates.

PROBLEM 1-16: *(Repeat of Problem 1-9)* Battle Tracking in Brigade Command Post too often fails to function in terms of how they perform actions, make decisions, and provide recommendations to the commander.

Brigades are weak in battle tracking of combat power two levels down. The brigade believes that by tracking the task force combat power (one level down) they can stay abreast of the situation enough to monitor the battle. In order for the main CP to become a proactive participant in the fight it must know what is happening at the company/team level (two levels down). Additionally, the fighting of the deep fight, not in terms of distance, but time, requires the company/team details.

PROBLEM 1-17:

1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively battletrack during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
2. TF TOCs setup during the plan and prep for combat do not have a central nerve cell or an established tracking system to ensure critical tasks, events, or information are tracked.

RESULT:

1. Information is not shared, disseminated, and tracked by all the BOS elements.
2. Critical information concerning R&S effort and "hard" intelligence passed from brigade often never reached the hands of the S3, Battle Captain or other BOS elements.
3. Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) items are not proactively tracked inhibiting the staffs ability to accurately visualize the status of the TF to the commander in their preparation.

PROBLEM 1-18: *(Repeat of Problem 1-12)* Medical company commanders do not have the necessary situational awareness, both tactically and technically, to command the brigade's medical resources.

1. Medical company commanders often do not know what their CP's responsibilities are.
2. Many medical command posts are nothing more than a soldier on radio watch.

PROBLEM 1-19: *(Repeat of Problem 1-13)* In almost every case of indirect fire *fratricide* at task force and company levels, the observers failed to plot no-fire areas (NFAs) or update the forward line of own troops (FLOT) on their maps.

PROBLEM 1-20: The main CP is often not able to provide the TF commander with a predictive analysis during the fight. The main CP does not consistently:

1. Analyze information received.
2. Provide the commander with an estimate of what the enemy will do next.
3. Recommend future friendly actions.

RESULT: The commander does not receive predictive analysis from his CP.

TECHNIQUES

1. Task force TOC battle tracking.

a. Develop and exercise a task force (TF) SOP at Home Station to ensure information dissemination system functions properly, including a means of verifying receipt of information by various battle staff members. Implement or modify these tracking requirements based on METT-T Refer to CALL Newsletter 95-7, May 95, *Tactical Operations Center (TOC)*, which contains excellent techniques and procedures covering the full spectrum of TOC operations, as well as an example TOC exercise. Effective battle tracking begins with the establishment of the TF timeline prior to mission analysis and the development of CCIR that must be tracked.

b. The chief of staff must identify what information to track, establish how it will be tracked, and monitor his staff sections. The commander should be able to go to one source inside the TOC and quickly visualize the status of his TF in preparation for combat operations.

c. *One* battle tracking board/map in the TOC is the standard. Appoint *one battle captain* to update *the main* battle board/map. All battle staff officers provide input to the battle captain.

d. The TOC should track at least the following information:

- company/team troop-leading procedures (critical tasks only)
- all friendly unit locations/activity within the AOI
- FLOT, down to platoon level, or section level for scouts
- combat power, both vehicles and the manning capability
- collection, consolidation, and distribution of subordinate unit fire plans
- timeline
- TF critical tasks list identified prior to or during the planning process

e. The S2 must develop an adequate section SOP that spells out section members' responsibilities and specifies operating procedures during combat operations. The S2 section SOP should, at a minimum, address the following:

- SPOTREP logging procedures
- SITEMP refinement procedures
- individual section responsibilities

f. Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) personnel need to be trained and competent in battle tracking skills in the event they must serve as an *alternate tactical operations center (TOC)*.

2. Brigade Main CP battle tracking.

a. The brigade main CP must know the situation at the front

- who is in contact
- how much combat power remains
- status of ammunition
- who needs to come out of the fight to refuel, etc.
- who gets priority of fires
- where to commit the reserve
- where to put CAS
- what critical CSS assets need to be moving and where

b. FM 71-3 identifies 11 task for the brigade main CP to perform. Seven of these require detailed level of information.

- Assist the brigade and task force commanders
- Plan future operations
- Coordinate operations throughout the depth of the AO
- Synchronize CS and CSS assets
- Monitor the close fight
- Maintain continuous operations for extended periods
- Assume command and control if the TAC is destroyed.

c. The building and tracking of combat power must be a units SOP for training as well as for deployment.

d. JANIS exercises must stress brigade main CP to track this level of detail and demand that they become an active player in employment of CAS, artillery, reserve forces, to include tracking and informing the commander of impending decision points, critical friendly and enemy events and the movement and priority of CS and CSS support throughout the brigade sector.

e. Brigade mains need standard tracking charts and SOP reports that include subordinate leaders using proper spot reports, commander SITREPs, BDA, and current combat power. With an established SOP for use of the Command and O/I frequencies, this level of information can be passed quickly without tying up the nets during the fight.

f. Predictive analysis. At the Main CP, the battle staff XO, S2, S3, S3 Air, and FSE need to track the battle at the map board and "think one step ahead of friendly/enemy forces". Battle staff regularly provides the commander with predictive analysis products and recommendation(s) based upon the event matrix, updated SITEMP and decision support matrix. Delegate routine administrative duties to others in their sections as much as possible. Eliminate unnecessary functions from their sections and even the CP itself.

3. Fire Support battle tracking. Ensure that accurate battle tracking is maintained before and during the battle.

a. Implement an all-station net call prior to execution to exchange information and verify NFAs.

b. During the battle, company/team fire support teams (FISTs) need to come up on the net to update the FSO so everyone else can hear what is going on and track unit locations.

4. Military Police battle tracking. Platoon leaders must provide detailed information to subordinates on friendly unit locations.

a. MP Squad and Team Leaders must seek information and report unit locations/movements when conducting patrol operations.

b. Train these techniques to standard at Home Station to increase situational awareness and improve force protection:

- Ensure subordinate leaders maintain updated graphics on overlays.
- Ensure that MP teams are aware of all missions that the platoon is conducting.
- Follow/establish far and near recognition (commo, visual) signals to be used when approaching units.
- When appropriate, use established challenging procedures.
- Establish engagement criteria for hostile situations.
- Know the Air Defense Warning and Weapons Control Status.
- Ensure soldiers are trained on threat vehicle and aircraft recognition.
- When feasible, use pre-announcement procedures when making contact with units.

5. Signal units battle tracking. Signal units must employ S2 or S3 personnel to maintain close contact with brigade and division intelligence and operations cells in order to receive periodic situational updates.

a. Maneuver force's Command or O/I nets should be monitored.

b. A current operations map should be maintained at the signal battalion and company command posts which depicts the

- maneuver plan
- disposition of friendly and enemy forces
- projected communications asset movements

6. Electronic Warfare team battle tracking. The ACT and the TA team need to get together and develop a *thorough SOP* that clearly identifies roles and responsibilities of each element.

a. Identify what type of information the TA team requires and how often information is required to keep EW teams adequately informed.

b. Use a battle tracking checklist as a guide in this process.

c. Include the exchange of battle tracking information as part of staff battle drills in CPXs at Home Station. This will require that *the TA team participate in exercises with the ACT* and the Brigade that it supports at Home Station.

7. Medical company battle tracking. The medical company commander should develop a system to capture the critical information that needs to be available to him regularly.

a. The information to track may include:

- maintenance status of the company's vehicles, and those of supported units
- critical medical equipment readiness
- on-hand balance of critical Class VIII items, for the company and for supported units
- status of critical general supplies, and orders for supplies that are due in
- current tactical situation

b. Place the information on boards that are hung along the walls of the CP to facilitate quick visual reference.

c. Tracking the medical company's resources and the tactical situation are essential for situational awareness and accurate decisions on the placement of medical assets in the brigade area.

8. Aviation unit battle tracking. Include examples in aviation FMs on the art and science of battle tracking. What information is required up-front, prior to launch, and during execution.

TA.4 Negative Trend 2: **Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	2	1	8	4

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 2-1: Too many engineer battalion staffs do not begin their planning until *after* the brigade issues its OPORD. Task force engineers miss a window of opportunity to impact the maneuver task force planning process. By not having critical information, such as enemy and friendly engineer capabilities and terrain analysis, available before the task force commander issues his guidance and course of action development begins, the task force engineer is often too late in the military decision making process (MDMP) to influence task organization, scheme of maneuver and the planning of combined arms rehearsals.

PROBLEM 2-2: Too many task force commanders go through the military decision making process (MDMP) and then into battle without knowing what fire support assets are available to support their missions. Fire Support Officers (FSOs) and Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) *do not identify critical information*, usually provided by brigade, such as specified and implied tasks, as well as assets available.

PROBLEM 2-3: CSS units seldom use the military decision making process (MDMP) during the formulation of their OPORDs. Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) rarely conduct a full and complete orders process during the development of their OPORDs because of both time constrains and an apparent *unfamiliarity* with the doctrinal orders process.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 2-4: Battle staffs lack the training required to conduct the military decision making process (MDMP) to standard.

1. Task force commanders too often begin to dominate the staff planning process so it becomes the commander's process instead of a staff process.
2. Task force commanders too often spend most of their time at the Main CP supervising the staff.
3. Task force commanders are unable to supervise the critical events that ensure their intent is understood through subordinate unit OPORDS and rehearsals.
4. Task force commanders cannot assess the task force preparation first-hand.

PROBLEM 2-5: The brigade staff conduct of the military decision making process (MDMP) does not generally follow the guidance outlined in Chapter 1 of FM 71-123.

1. The brigade targeting team *does not synchronize* between the battlefield operating systems, and fails to develop:
   - a meaningful high payoff target list
   - a wargame-derived scheme of fires
   - a target list that support the scheme of maneuver
2. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan does not focus on generating targetable information for engagement by lethal and non-lethal means.

RESULTS:

1. The various staff elements develop their plans *in relative isolation*.
2. There is no plan to link lookers with shooters to synchronize fires with maneuver.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 2-7: The brigade NBC NCO rarely participates in all phases of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).

1. While brigade chemical officers are involved in all phases of MDMP, they generally do not possess the knowledge to plan for chemical assets to support the maneuver plan.
2. Brigades attach chemical assets to TFs with little or no guidance to TF chemical officers or NCOs on how to use them.
3. Chemical NCOs do not receive training in MDMP.

RESULTS:

1. The chemical staff often fails to synchronize the efforts of the smoke and decontamination platoons and the chemical reconnaissance squad.
2. Templating of chemical strikes and effects of smoke on the battlefield are not adequately completed or planned during MDMP.
3. Chemical assets do not support the brigade maneuver plan.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 2-8: Brigade chaplains normally do *very well* at providing direct religious support. However, they often are not included in the mission analysis or orders development process.

RESULTS:

1. Limited situational awareness.
2. Unable to impact the overall brigade plan.
3. Unable to develop a religious support plan that is both comprehensive and flexible.

PROBLEM 2-9: Military Police (MP) Platoon Leaders are not integrated well into the brigade staff planning process.

1. Military Police are frequently given vague missions which do not make full use of the platoon's capabilities in supporting offensive and defensive operations.
2. Platoon leaders are sometimes not aware of their staff responsibility in the planning process and have a tendency to present themselves primarily at the orders issue.
3. Key staff members, such as the S2 or S3, are often not aware of what MPs do on the battlefield; many associate MPs exclusively with Enemy Prisoner of War and traffic control operations.
4. Many commanders see rear area combat operations as the primary domain of MPs and further limit their flexibility by assigning MPs to static defense duties within the Brigade Support Area.

PROBLEM 2-10: The Brigade XO is a dysfunctional participant of the brigade battle staff.

1. Before deployment to NTC: During train-up at Home Station, brigade commanders fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the brigade XO and how he is to work with the brigade S3.

- Brigade XOs tend not to be involved in the training of the orders process until a major training event occurs (FCX, JANIS).
- The orders process train-up does not stress synchronization and execution of all BOS elements.
- No Chief-of-Staff is required to track brigade execution from the initiation of mission analysis to mission completion.
- Although the S3 assumes some of this function, he is never required to truly synchronize logistics with fire and maneuver during most JANIS and FCX training events.

RESULT: The unit deploys without a clear picture of the roles and requirements of the brigade XO.

2. After deployment to NTC: The XO begins to execute his responsibility as Chief-of-Staff for the commander without a clear working relationship with the S3 and no clear areas of responsibility other than "the XO keeps the time clock and worries about CSS".

- As the orders process progresses, the S3 and commander get involved with the maneuver and wargaming and do not sufficiently integrate the BOS elements into a cohesive and functional plan.
- The XO is caught up with:
  -- moving and sustaining a real force in a hostile environment
  -- working with TOC personnel who mostly work for the S3
  -- trying to observe and integrate what he can of the BOS into an order that the S3 and commander are doing, on their own, in the plans tent.
- Any attempt by the XO to maintain a time clock is seen as abrasive and resisted by both S3 and commander.

RESULT: The order fails to synchronize the BOS, fails to consider any sort of TLP timeline for the task forces, and is executed from the brigade main CP by an XO that knows very little about the plan.

3. Around the time of the third orders process: The commander finally understands that somebody has to be the Chief-of-Staff for the orders process.

- The commander is too busy and the S3 is only focused on maneuver and cannot step back to see the big picture.
- The XO begins to find his niche. With all the staff reporting to him as the center of the brigade operations, he can begin to integrate all BOS elements into the plan.
- The S3 is now free to concentrate on his parts of the operation and the commander can get out of the TOC and see his troops.

RESULT: This is a slow learning process for the XO, but with practice, the brigade's orders process gets on the right track.

4. Response to lower operational readiness (OR) rate: Unfortunately, as the learning curve for the brigade XO and the battle staff begins a steady climb, the brigade OR rate heads in the other direction.

- Right at the time when the orders process has a chance to jell, the brigade XO is pulled out and sent to the BSA to become an over-grown BMO.

- The battle staff, now under control of the S3, drops all concepts of integration and logistical synchronization.

- The commander, feeling the pressure of maintenance, increased tempo of the rotation, and the lack of a Chief-of-Staff, turns off any growth in the orders process and conducts self preservation. The commander says, "No new ideas on how to do orders. We do just what we trained at home station - S3 get me an order out as fast as possible - we will work the details at the rehearsal".

- The XO is now living in the BSA. Whatever growth the maintenance management system has been through over the last few days is terminated. The XO says, "No new ideas on how we do maintenance. We do just what we trained at home station - task force XOs give me your deadline report; we are going to start cross leveling, circle-xing, and scrounging parts".

RESULTS:

1. Any systems established, developed, or grown during the rotation do not get a chance to mature.
2. The unit leaves at the end of the rotation with a lot of knowledge and ideas of how to do things better, but no ideas or experience on how to make it work.
3. The orders process and maintenance system are broken and stay broken.
4. The brigade returns home to pass on to the next rotational unit "how to win at the NTC", and *nothing* to do with:

- learning the orders process
- developing and training a maintenance system that works
- using the XO as the executive officer to the commander and performing his Chief-of-Staff function.

5. The XO is depicted as the commander's personal troubleshooter. He is in the way as a player in the orders process, and best kept at the BSA.

PROBLEM 2-11: Ground maneuver brigade commanders and staffs seldom integrate the aviation liaison officer (ALO) in the decision making process.

RESULTS:

1. Brigades fail to realize the capabilities and limitations of limited aviation assets.
2. Either *no* plan for aviation support, or hasty and ill conceived plans for the employment of aviation.

PROBLEM 2-12: Engineer planning and planning products are not in accordance with FM 5-71-3.

1. Engineer staffs are prepared to conduct horizontal planning to a certain degree. However, the vertical planning process remains unstructured, leading to publication of engineer orders which lack sufficient detail and specificity to conduct successful operations.

2. The engineer battalion XO too often fails to establish any type of battalion planning timeline.

3. The Bn S3, S2 and the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) participate together in brigade mission analysis, receive the brigade commander's guidance and participate in the brigade wargaming process. However, critical steps in the development of the engineer estimate, which supports the brigade's MDMP, are usually missing, because the engineer battalion is not planning concurrently.

4. The brigade engineer (battalion commander) with his staff, seldom develops a detailed Scheme of Engineer Operations (SOEO) to support each maneuver course of action (COA) or then integrates the SOEO for the selected COA into brigade wargaming.

5. Since the engineer battalion is not following an established timeline and conducting its own wargame to identify critical vertical tasks, these tasks are usually *not identified* until after the brigade plan is completed and are *not integrated* or *coordinated*.

RESULTS:

1. If the battalion XO does not closely coordinate with the battalion S3, as both work through their respective processes, key engineer tasks are *left out* of both the brigade SOEO and the engineer battalion plan.

2. The resulting products from a non-synchronized planning process are very poor. The brigade engineer annex is incomplete. The annex does not include all information critical to the brigade engineer plan or required for subordinate engineer planning.

3. Since the engineer battalion fails to conduct a structured planning process, the battalion order is merely a plagiarized version of the engineer annex. The order does not provide detailed subunit orders and service support instructions to units remaining under battalion control.

PROBLEM 2-13:

1. Within the staff structure of a Forward Support Battalion (FSB), a separate intelligence officer is not authorized.

2. The staff function is intended to be executed by the S2/S3, supported by a 96B.

a. Generally, the officer assigned to the S2/S3 position identifies with the *S3* responsibilities but is not trained in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and does not recognize S2 responsibilities.

b. The staff 96B is not normally brought to the Leader Training Program (LTP), consequently the training opportunity for this skill is lost.

3. Frequently, the FSB borrows an officer from the MI Battalion, but the officer they are provided is an equally inexperienced officer, generally a 2d Lieutenant, loaned to the FSB to be trained.

RESULTS:

1. The IPB process, and its implications in both anticipating the support mission and security for BSA forces, are neglected or glossed over.

2. The S2/S3 of the FSB is dependent on both the Brigade S2 and the DISCOM S2 to develop the FSB's understanding of the battleifeld. Unforturnately, the DISCOM does not participate in this capacity during either LTP or a unit's NTC rotation, and brigade S2s tend to stay focused forward and neglect the brigade rear area.

3. Without an intelligence voice in the FSB, the brigade S2's priorities do not alter.

PROBLEM 2-14: The battle staff often conducts the planning process without input from NCOs who are subject matter experts (SMEs).

RESULT: Plans that do not integrate all BOS or provide complete/accurate information.

PROBLEM 2-15: Task force FSOs fail to integrate their observation plan with the task force scheme of maneuver plan. Observation Posts (OPs) locations and occupation times are not synchronized with the task force or company/team locations, or their movement on the battlefield.

RESULTS:

1. Failure of the fire support plan to support the scheme of maneuver as it progresses through the sector.
2. Lack of forward observers on the battlefield at the critical place to support the destruction of the enemy.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 2-16: Brigade Combat Team (BCT) target analysis and synchronization meetings are often not linked to the entire planning process.

RESULT: Brigade is unable to determine the High Payoff Targets (HPTs) and how and when to best attack them.

PROBLEM 2-17: *(Repeat of Problem 2-10)* The Brigade XO is often a dysfunctional participant of the brigade battle staff.

1. Before deployment to NTC: During train-up at Home Station, brigade commanders fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the brigade XO and how he is to work with the Bde S3.

- Brigade XOs tends not to be involved in the training of the orders process until a major training event occurs (FCX, JANIS).
- The orders process train-up does not stress synchronization and execution of all BOS elements.
- No Chief-of-Staff is required to track brigade execution from the initiation of mission analysis to mission completion.
- Although the S3 assumes some of this function, he is never required to truly synchronize logistics with fire and maneuver during most JANIS and FCX training events.

RESULT: The unit deploys to the NTC without a clear picture of the roles and requirements of the brigade XO.

2. After deployment to NTC: The XO begins to execute his responsibility as Chief-of-Staff for the commander without a clear working relationship with the S3 and no clear areas of responsibility other than "the XO keeps the time clock and worries about CSS."

- As the orders process progresses, the S3 and Cdr. get involved with the maneuver and wargaming and do not sufficiency integrate the BOS elements into a cohesive and functional plan.
- The XO is caught up with:
  -- moving and sustaining a real force in a hostile environment
  -- working with TOC personnel who mostly work for the S3
  -- trying to observe and integrate what he can of the BOS into an order that the S3 and commander are doing, on their own, in the plans tent.
- Any attempt by the XO to maintain a time clock is seen as abrasive, and is resisted by both S3 and commander.

RESULT: The order fails to synchronize the BOS, fails to consider any sort of TLP timeline for the task forces, and is executed from the brigade main CP by an XO that knows very little about the plan.

3. Around the time of the third orders process: The commander finally understands that somebody has to be the Chief-of-Staff for the orders process.

- The commander is too busy and the S3 is only focused on maneuver and cannot step back to see the big picture.
- The XO begins to find his niche. With all the staff reporting to him as the center of the brigade operations, he can begin to integrate all BOS elements into the plan.
- The S3 is now free to concentrate on his parts of the operation and the commander can get out of the TOC and see his troops.

RESULT: This is a slow learning process for the XO, but with practice, the brigade’s orders process gets on the right track.

4. Response to lower operational readiness (OR) rate: Unfortunately, as the learning curve for the brigade XO and the battle staff begins a steady climb, the brigade OR rate heads in the other direction.

- Right at the time when the orders process has a chance to jell, the brigade XO is pulled out and sent to the BSA to become an over-grown BMO.

- The battle staff, now under control of the S3, drops all concepts of integration and logistical synchronization.

- The commander, feeling the pressure of maintenance, increased tempo of the rotation, and the lack of a Chief-of-Staff, turns off any growth in the orders process and conducts self preservation. The commander says, "No new ideas on how to do orders. We do just what we trained at home station - S3 get me an order out as fast as possible - we will work the details at the rehearsal".

- The XO is now living in the BSA. Whatever growth the maintenance management system has been through over the last few days is terminated. The XO says, "No new ideas on how we do maintenance. We do just what we trained at home station - task force XOs give me your deadline report; we are going to start cross leveling, circle-xing, and scrounging parts".

RESULTS:

1. Any systems established, developed, or grown during the rotation do not get a chance to mature.

2. The unit leaves at the end of the rotation with a lot of knowledge and ideas of how to do things better, but no ideas or experience on how to make it work.
3. The orders process and maintenance system are broken and stay broken.
4. The brigade returns home to pass on to the next rotational unit "how to win at the NTC", and *nothing* to do with:

- learning the orders process
- developing and training a maintenance system that works
- using the XO as the executive officer to the commander and performing his Chief-of-Staff function.

5. The XO is depicted as the commander's personal troubleshooter. He is in the way as a player in the orders process, and best kept at the BSA.

PROBLEM 2-18: Task Forces often rush mission analysis, not giving the S2 time to complete his products.

RESULTS:

1. Task Force S2s normally brief only one enemy Course of Action (COA).
2. S2s often do not assist the rest of the battle staff in visualizing how the enemy will fight using all the combat multipliers and the terrain.

PROBLEM 2-19: FSB XOs do not fully understand or properly implement the MDMP.

1. Many FSB XOs are not aware that there are three methods of the MDMP, based on available planning time.

2. They have difficulty with the orders process because they do not fully understand the components of that process; the least understood area is the estimate of the situation.

3. Mission analysis is not conducted properly.

4. COA development and COA analysis is not conducted properly.

RESULTS:

1. Published orders are not coordinated and synchronized.

2. Typically, orders are published without a clear intent, no risk assessment, no BOS annexes, and no BOS overlays.

TECHNIQUES

1. Train the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) at Home Station. Use CALL Newsletter 95-12 Update, *Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning"* as training reference. Involve battalion commanders and S3s to guide and review MDMP process and products.

2. Mission analysis. Battle staffs must understand that mission analysis is one of the most important steps in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).

a. S2s must practice SITEMP drills at Home Station so the process can be completed in a timely fashion.

b. The Brigade S2 must produce and disseminate products to the Task Force early to allow parallel planning.

3. Fires synchronization with scheme of maneuver.

a. In Home Station training, use the methodology for the brigade planning process in Chapter 1 of FM 71-123. Focus targeting team members on following the decide, detect, deliver methodology outlined in FM 6-20-10 to develop a plan that will link lookers to shooters and result in a scheme of fires that is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

b. During wargaming, the task force FSO and the battle staff must consider OP locations in relation to time and space, and identify who has primary and alternate responsibility for the OPs. Together, the FSO and the battle staff must ensure the OPs provide the task force the necessary "eyes" on the critical targets at the required critical time during the battle.

c. Task force commanders *must know what fire support assets are available* to support their mission as they go through the military decision making process (MDMP). Good digital communications during planning and coordination greatly assists efforts to obtain assets- available information. When the Fire Support Officer (FSO) receives this information, he needs to *translate it into meaningful information* the maneuver commander can use.

d. Detailed planning considerations, such as actions on contact and actions on the objective must not be short-circuited. Successful time analysis will allow the inclusion of critical decisionmaking and planning tasks that will result in a more synchronized operation.

4. Target analysis. S2s begin the process *before* mission analysis and use Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and Target Value Analysis (TVA) to identify HPTs within the enemy formation and why they are important to that formation. In other words, *identify enemy vulnerabilities*.

a. The Fire Support Officer (FSO), Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE), and other battlefield operating systems must assist the S2 in this process.

b. The Brigade Commander provides additional guidance and focuses the effort as he gives his intent for fires and maneuver.

c. The FSO must then sequence available assets to find and attack the HPTs to meet the Commander's guidance - the Concept of Fires.

d. The concept of fires is then included into each course of action (COA) and is developed into a detailed scheme of fires during wargaming.

5. Brigade XO roles. The brigade XO must be the right hand man to the commander with all the authority and responsibilities that position requires to execute. The brigade commander must clearly make the brigade XO the Chief-of-Staff for the brigade.

a. The S3 must work *for the XO in garrison as well as the field*.

b. During train-up, all elements of BOS must be stressed and integrated into every level of training.

- FCXs designed to stress and exercise logistical consideration must be trained.
- Logistics exercises must be executed by the full battle staff, to include S3.

c. The XO needs to be drilled by the brigade commander in the role of Chief-of-Staff to include heading up the orders process.

d. The FSB commander, task force XOs, and task force BMOs need to be held responsible for their jobs and should *not* have the brigade XO as their safety valve. (Part of the task force BMO's responsibility is developing and drilling a system of keeping the task force Chief-of-Staff informed of maintenance issues.)

e. Task force XO needs to maintain a system that keeps the brigade XO informed.

f. The BMOs needs to be trained not to make every meeting with the XO a decision meeting.

g. When maintenance becomes an issue at the NTC, *do not strip the Chief-of-Staff out of the task force and brigade* to try and put a bandage on the problem.

- Give the O/Cs a chance to work with the maintenance staff to get them through the problem areas.
- If the brigade is having that many problems in maintenance that the O/Cs cannot help, the FSB commander needs to be brought forward.
  -- The FSB and additional maintenance assets can surge on a task force to get operational readiness (OR) up.
  -- Do not strip the front lines to fix the support elements.

h. Battalion XOs should also fill the role of battalion "Chief of Staff". They should:

- direct and control battalion OPORD timeline
- involve entire staff
- prevent delays
- ensure timely OPORD issue

6. Engineer battalion staffs must train and practice the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) at Home Station with the brigade staff so they are familiar with their orders process and able to parallel plan in conjunction with it. Insure all staff members understand their roles and responsibilities in battalion OPORD process and their necessary input to the Assistant Brigade Engineer (ABE) for brigade OPORD process.

7. Military police integration. Conduct training events, such as CPXs and STAFFEXs, which allow the MP platoon leader to interact with the brigade staff during MDMP and assert his capabilities and recommendations in a systemic manner. This interaction will cause brigade planners to analyze MP employment as a response to a specific threat or a solution to a particular mission need instead of an after-thought tasking. MPs should conduct training at Home Station with engineers, chemical units, scouts, etc., so that commanders may *see* the way MPs can be integrated into the full spectrum of brigade operations.

8. Aviation Liaison Officer (ALO) integration. The ALO is a critical staff member who can have a decisive impact on the ground maneuver unit's success or failure. Commanders and staffs must involve the ALO during the decision making process to ensure the planned employment is within aviation capabilities with the assets available.

9. NCO integration. NCO subject matter experts must be integrated into the decision-making process. NCOs must assert their expertise during planning.

10. Chemical staff and NCO integration. Train the chemical staff to conduct the detailed planning and participation in MDMP to support the maneuver plan. Train chemical NCOs in the MDMP; moreover, have them attend the Battle Staff course. Do not overburden the chemical staff with additional duties that distract them from their primary duties.

11. Forward Support Battalions.

a. During Home Station training, both in the field and in garrison, the FSB S2/S3 should seek opportunities to train in the intelligence officer's staff functions with the DISCOM S2.

b. During Home Station training, the FSB S2/S3 must clearly define the FSB's intelligence requirements to the brigade S2.

c. Train the FSB staff with its authorized 96B, *not* a borrowed asset from another organization that will not be available when the FSB deploys.

d. XOs must become knowledgeable of the MDMP using the following guides:

- ST 101-5
- FM 101-5
- CALL Newsletter 95-12.

e. XOs should inculcate the MDMP process in all training events to include CPX, FTX, and battle simulation exercises. Only by religiously using the MDMP will they develop the proficiency and expertise required to successfully execute this portion of their duties as an XO.

12. Chaplain integration. FM 16-1 is very clear that the chaplain is to be part of the orders process and submit an annex. What is missing is a more complete discussion and possible timeline for mission analysis and product development. Recommend a vignette in FM 16-1 that walks a chaplain through the orders process.

TA.4 Negative Trend 3: **Course of Action development and wargaming**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	4	5	3	2	4

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-1: Integration of the task force staff is a problem for wargaming and course of action (COA) development.

1. Staffs do not organize *efficiently* at the outset of wargaming.
2. Staffs use the belt technique, which takes a long time
3. COAs are not developed in *sufficient detail*.
4. COAs are usually developed *during the wargame process*.
5. Critical events and *known* decision points are not initially identified and briefed to the staff.
6. The selected COA is never wargamed *sufficiently* to achieve effective synchronization.

RESULT: The lack of sufficient detail resulting from the staff's integrated efforts results in subsequent refinement being done in relative isolation by individual staff members. This negatively impacts on synchronization during mission execution.

PROBLEM 3-2: Task force staffs wargaming either gets too detailed and never finished, or is extremely superficial.

RESULTS: Products derived from wargaming are rarely usable, doing little to synchronize the plan or to key the commander to critical tactical decisions during mission execution.

2QFY95

PROBLEM 3-3: Units routinely experience significant problems with both COA development and then wargaming of COAs.

1. Brigade staffs seldom use the five step methodology to develop COAs described in FM 101-5, ST 101-5, or CALL Newsletter 93-3, *The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff*.
2. Commanders either dictate most COAs, or one or two key staff officers develop them without other staff input.
3. In short-cutting the five step process, most staffs do not examine force ratios by arraying the forces available.
4. Most staffs fail also to develop all parts of the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear).
5. By not using a doctrinal COA development methodology, staffs fail to develop a critical events list because they have not fully developed a scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEM 3-4: Task force staffs are not well trained in wargaming, frequently getting bogged down in small details, or just doing a superficial job. Too often, staffs do not list critical enemy and friendly events. In some cases, units fail to wargame COAs at all and begin OPORD development. Some commanders see no use in decision support templates/matrix products, and rely on their "feel" of the battle to make their tactical decisions.

RESULT: Execution matrices and decision support products developed during the planning process are generally inadequate and not integrated with the higher headquarters concept of operations/scheme of maneuver.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 3-5: Task force S-3s and commanders struggle through course of action development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S-3s *do not know where or how to start* COA development.
2. Task forces normally develop a movement formation and general actions on contact or actions on the objective, but *never get to the details* of what it is they want their company/teams to really accomplish.
3. Task and purpose are rarely assigned to company/teams.

PROBLEM 3-6: Most brigade staffs do not understand course of action development.

1. Courses of action are not fully developed prior to starting wargaming.
2. The five-step methodology for developing COAs described in CALL Newsletter 95-12, *Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning*, and CGSC ST 100-9, *Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decisionmaking*, are not followed.
3. Most COAs are dictated by the commander or developed by one or two officers without staff input.
4. Staffs often get in such a hurry to begin wargaming that they do not fully formulate each BOSs role in the approved COA.

RESULT: BOS reps are still trying to figure out what their role in the COA is during the wargame.

PROBLEM 3-7: Task force commanders and staffs do not understand how to develop a Course of Action (COA).

1. COAs are not developed based on the commanders's decisive point.
2. COAs do not define in doctrinal terms what the company/teams are to do.
3. COAs are not in enough detail.
4. COAs are frequently not developed with the S-2's SITEMP.
5. COAs are frequently not developed on a map when the terrain can be taken into account.

RESULTS:

1. Lack of optimum synchronization in the scheme of maneuver.
2. Broad concepts of operation rather than detailed, fully-developed COAs.
3. Wargaming tends to be COA development rather than an exercise to synchronize the operation.

PROBLEM 3-8: Fire support integration during the wargame is still not to standard.

1. Fire support integration during wargaming of branch plans is usually not done.
2. The S-3 usually focuses strictly on maneuver.
3. Fire Support Officers (FSOs) and Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) are expected to participate in the wargame *only as observers*.
4. Integration of radar zones with the maneuver plan is forgotten.
5. Integration of mortar priority targets and mortar positioning is seldom accomplished.
6. Integration of the reconnaissance and surveillance plan with the fire support plan is never done.
7. Prioritising or focusing fires for different phases of the operation is not done.
8. Integrating CAS targets into the plan is not done.

RESULT: The lack of fire support integration into the wargaming process leads to a disjointed use of fire support assets with an end result being a loss in ability to mass on the enemy and an overall inability to protect the force.

PROBLEM 3-9: Wargaming is not focused and does not synchronize the task force plan.

1. During the wargame, the task force Executive Officer (XO) does not facilitate the process and the battle staff *loses its focus on the critical events that need to be wargamed* and the relationship between events and the decisive point.

2. The wargame ends up taking all day or night with only the *most aggressive participants providing input* and the rest of the staff writing their annex without fully synchronizing their BOS.

3. Task forces routinely conduct wargaming without:
   - refined SITEMP
   - Event Template
   - fully-developed and integrated COA
   - having identified enemy and friendly critical events.

RESULTS:

1. The lack of a refined SITEMP and Event Template makes it hard for the commander and staff to visualize the enemy. *Plans are not focused* on killing the enemy and protecting the force.

2. We do not understand the enemy's use of combat multipliers. This prevents us from anticipating their use and developing our actions for the various forms of contact.

3. The lack of a developed and integrated COA before the wargame results in the *wargaming process becoming a COA development session*.

4. Without having identified both the enemy and friendly critical events, we cannot properly scope our wargaming process, make assumptions about events that will *not* be wargamed, or identify contingencies/branch plans that must be developed.

<u>1-2QFY96</u>

PROBLEM 3-10: COA development often fails to produce plans with sufficient detail and precision for successful execution.

1. Most brigades fail to conduct a COA development session as part of their Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP).

2. While most brigades use an abbreviated form of TDMP in which the commander dictates a course of action, staffs fail to develop the COA fully into a draft plan with sufficient detail to synchronize the BOS. Not until wargaming is the COA developed, thus failing to produce synchronization, precision, and detail needed for successful execution.

RESULTS:

1. Brigades either fail to have a COA development session or wargaming or both.
2. The plan lacks details and precision necessary for successful execution.

PROBLEM 3-11: *(Repeat of Problem 3-9)* Wargaming rarely synchronizes the Task Force plan. Task force Executive Officers (XOs) do not facilitate the process. The staff loses focus on *critical events* and the relationship between events wargamed and decisive point.

RESULTS:

1. The wargame takes too long.
2. Only the most aggressive participants provide input.
3. Other participants write annexes without synchronizing their BOS.

PROBLEM 3-12: *(Repeat of Problem 3-5)* Most task force S-3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S-3s do not know where or how to start COA development.
2. Task forces normally develop a movement formation and general actions on contact. They rarely provide details on what they want company/teams to accomplish and rarely assign task(s) and/or purpose to company/teams.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 3-13: *(Repeat of Problems 3-5 and 3-12)* Task force S3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S3's do not know how to start COA development.
2. Task forces normally develop COA's that only provide an axis, a formation and a simple plan for actions on the objective.
3. COAs normally do not include branches that provide flexibility to the plan based upon various possible situations.
4. COAs normally do not address details for actions on contact, actions on the objective nor continuous reconnaissance.
5. Clear tasks and purposes for subordinate units are not usually provided.
6. COAs are seldom refined during wargaming.

PROBLEM 3-14: Wargaming at task force level rarely results in a synchronized plan at the conclusion of the wargaming process.

1. Task force planners habitually arrive at the wargaming table unprepared to use the wargaming process as a synchronization tool. Rather, the wargame usually degenerates into an additional course of action (COA) development session for task force planners.
2. Planners often do not know what must be accomplished during COA development to facilitate wargaming.
3. Planners do not understand what the results of a wargaming session should be.

RESULT: The efforts put into wargaming are generally wasted and the task force crosses the line of departure (LD) without a synchronized plan.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 3-15: *(Repeat of Problems 3-5, 3-12 and 3-13)* Task force S3s and commanders struggle through COA development and refining the COA into a scheme of maneuver.

1. Most S3's do not know how to start COA development.
2. Task forces normally develop COA's that only provide an axis, a formation and a simple plan for actions on the objective.
3. COAs normally do not include branches that provide flexibility to the plan based upon various possible situations.
4. COAs normally do not address details for actions on contact, actions on the objective nor continuous reconnaissance.
5. Clear tasks and purposes for subordinate units are not usually provided.
6. COAs are seldom refined during wargaming.

PROBLEM 3-16:

1. Task force S3s often do not develop COAs based on the commanders decisive point and are not able to define in doctrinal terms what they want the company/teams to do.
2. COA are frequently not developed with the S2's SITEMP or on a map where the terrain can be visualized.

PROBLEM 3-17: The CSS concept of support most often focuses on maneuver unit COAs that begin with actions beyond the LD and culminate with action on objective. It seldom addresses support requirements for before and after the battle.

PROBLEMS:

1. During preparation for combat, the CSS concept of support seldom addresses such things as:
   - where the aid stations are located
   - how much fuel/ammo will be consumed during rehearsals
   - a description of replenishment or services for operations before the LD if the brigade combat team (BCT) is moving.
2. As the brigade enters the after-combat phase, the CSS annex once again does not outline a concept of support.

RESULTS:

1. With regard to the after-combat phase, specific replenishment and services tasks are not addressed in respect to transitioning to future operations.
2. The brigade's ability to identify a culminating point is diminished. For example, if the future planners determine a minimum of 80% combat power in order to defend against a counter attack, specific criteria must be addressed in the CSS annex to ensure rapid regeneration as well as keeping the commander informed if the combat team begins to approach 80%.

PROBLEM 18: *(Repeat of Problem 3-9 and 3-11)* Wargaming rarely synchronizes the task force (TF) plan.

1. Task force executive officers (TF XOs) do not facilitate the process:
   - staff loses focus on *critical events*
   - relationship between events wargamed and *decisive point*
2. Wargame takes too long

RESULTS:

1. Only most aggressive participants provide input.
2. Other participants write annexes without synchronizing their BOS.

TECHNIQUES

1. Task forces must *train the planning process at Home Station*. Through this training each staff officer must identify the products needed to conduct each step of the decision making process and the end products that each step generates. *The Commander's Battle Staff Handbook*, dated 15 May 93, is a good reference. The end product of this training will be a staff SOP with incorporated drills that will allow the task force staff to produce a quality order in a timely manner.

2. Chapter 2 of FM 7-20 and Chapter 2 of FM 7-10 provide excellent information on developing a COA and scheme of maneuver. Include their techniques into unit SOP if necessary.

3. Focus on COA development by task force in training at Home Station:
   - detailed and precise for task force and by event
   - details, task, and purpose for company/teams

4. Brigade staffs must read and use the five step COA development process in FM 101-5, ST 101-5, or CALL Newsletter 93-3, *The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff*. The five steps:
   1) analyze relative combat power
   2) array initial forces
   3) develop the scheme of maneuver
   4) determine C2 means and maneuver control measures
   5) prepare COA statement and sketch

5. Fully develop a COA into a draft plan with enough detail to wargame effectively:
   - do battle calculus
   - check battlefield geometry
   - develop a detailed concept of operations
     -- clear tasks and purpose for each BOS
     -- based upon commander's guidance

6. FM 101-5-1 provides the correct *doctrinal definitions* that should be used when assigning company/team task and purpose.

7. Use the box method, when time is limited, and when alternative courses of action are being compared.

8. Identify critical events and known decision points *prior* to the wargame.

9. Staffs should take 30 to 40 minutes prior to initiating the wargame (while plans CPTs are gathering tools for the wargame) to ensure each BOS rep understands the concept for his piece of the fight.

10. Wargaming should *refine* and *synchronize* the plan and *determine triggers for execution.* Units need to use a synchronization matrix to help facilitate and record events that are being wargamed by phase and synchronized by BOS.

11. *The task force XO or S3 needs to take charge* of the wargaming process and needs to ensure that the battle staff stays focused on the critical events and the decisive point.

12. Create wargaming kits (micro armor, or other items to replicate units; synchronization matrices; large scale maps, etc.) to expedite the set-up and conduct of wargames.

13 Develop adequate teaching tools which describe the expected results of the wargaming process in terms of both products and information. These teaching tools must demonstrate an *effective* wargaming session.

14. Use two phases of wargaming:

- The initial wargaming occurs after the commander gives his planning guidance, and if he directs that more than one COA be developed. This initial wargaming is done to the level of detail necessary to provide a sound COA recommendation to the commander.
- The second wargaming occurs after COA approval, when the commander also refines his planning guidance and intent. This session is a synchronization session and is done to the level of detail that time allows. *This should be the most time consuming step in the planning process*.
- Wargaming products include details for final plans and orders:
  - -- event template
  - -- decision tools (decision support template, decision support matrix)
  - -- high priority target lists
  - -- very detailed synchronization matrix
  - -- branch plans

15. Fire Support Officers (FSOs) and Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) are key players and they must be fully integrated in the wargame for fire support to be properly integrated into the plan. Targeting/scheme of fire is developing during the wargame. The ALO must be present and plan CAS even if brigade has not allocated any CAS to the task force. Usually task forces are allocated CAS in the middle of execution, so if the ALO is not ready to use it in a moment's notice, it will be wasted.

16. While the maneuver BOS focuses and wargames actions after the LD, the CSS community (planners) must wargame actions through all phases. CSS wargaming cannot wait until the planning process formally addresses wargaming; rather, in the case of before operations, the CSS wargame must occur timely enough for the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) to react.

TA.4 Negative Trend 4: **Troop leading and discipline**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	4	3	1	6	4

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 4-1: Commanders and company/team leaders are not issuing specific guidance during warning orders and OPORDs that establish a standard for pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCI), and a time inspection by the chain of command.

RESULTS:

1. Poor gunnery execution and inaccurate boresighting because of no PCC.
2. Breaching kits not functional at breach sites.
3. Vehicle breakdown due to poor operator-level maintenance.
4. M-8 Chemical alarms in non-mission capable status.
5. M26 boresight device in non-mission capable status.

PROBLEM 4-2:

1. Most engineers cannot properly arm/disarm a M15 or M21 mine.
2. Engineer platoons are taking three to four times the doctrinal standard to install a (live) fixing minefield.
3. Engineer platoons are taking two to three times the doctrinal standard to install an (inert) fixing/turning minefield.
4. Poor MICLIC drill execution.
5. Poor employment of the AVLB/CEV/DOZER.
6. SOPs that outline the necessary battle drills but a failure tp practice the battle drills.
7. Tactical assembly areas:
   - personnel, ammo, fuel status reporting
   - use of M8 alarms
   - range cards/sector sketches
   - platoon/company fire plans
   - PCCs/PCIs
   - weapon zeroing
   - graphic control measure disseminations
   - load plans

PROBLEM 4-3: FA battery SOPs do not provide the basic information to make the process organized and efficient. Additionally, the eight step procedures must be modified for battery operations.

1. Units have no checklists for conducting pre-combat checks for routine, recurring METL-based tasks.
2. Too often commanders do not develop timelines for critical events, i.e., PCI times, rehearsal times, movement times, resupply times, etc.
3. Battery commanders too often include information in the OPORDs that is either not relevant to the operation, or sufficiently refined to be useful to subordinates.
4. Supervision is still the weakest step in the procedures: failure to conduct PCIs; no spot checks for standard adherence; not checking range cards, weapon positioning, etc.

PROBLEM 4-4:

1. During engineer company tactical assembly area procedures, leaders are not submitting personnel, ammunition and fuel status reports; M8 alarms are not employed; range cards, sector sketches and fire plans are not developed or submitted.
2. During engineer company and platoon troop leading procedures, leaders are not conducting pre-combat checks and inspections.
3. Company and platoon OPORDs lack significant details. Leaders do not use graphic control measures, sketches to portray the scheme of maneuver/fires. Scheme of engineer operations are not fully developed, usually including only LD time, formation, generic route and the TF's objective name and location.
4. Too often engineer leaders do not understand how the enemy will use engineers and the amount of breaching operations a maneuver task force may be required to execute.
5. MICLIC reload plans lack detail; MICLIC reload sites not designated; number of MICLICs required not accurately estimated.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 4-5: Engineer battalion HHC commanders have not regularly used troop leading procedures after receiving the engineer battalion operations order(s).

RESULTS:

1. His tactical plans are not prepared systematically
2. HHC commanders less effectively command and control their companies.

PROBLEM 4-6: Engineer companies must improve their tactical as opposed to their technical planning.

1. Tactical assembly area (TAA) operations
   - not submitting personnel/supply status reports
   - not deploying M8 alarms
   - not planning local defense properly or in sufficient depth
2. Company/platoon troop leading procedures (TLPs)
   - not conducting pre-command checks/pre-command inspections (PCC/PCIs)
   - OPORDs lacked significant details: graphics; TF scheme of maneuver; CSS plan support to company scheme of maneuver
   -Scheme of maneuver/scheme of engineer operations not fully developed; usually only contained: unit LD time; formation; general route; TF objective name/location.
   - enemy use of engineers
   - amount and type of breaching operations for TF to accomplish

RESULTS:

1. Important tactical measures and procedures neglected.
2. Even some technical matters slighted, such as MICLIC reload plan.

PROBLEM 4-7:

1. Basic functions of military intelligence units were generally not being executed to standard by MI company teams:
   - getting to places on time
   - staying at a duty location
   - uniform and protective gear worn
   - guard duty not being executed
2. MI unit leaders apparently enforcing execution selectively or allowing questions or complaints and not identifying problem personnel and dealing with them as appropriate.

RESULT: Significantly affects units' (MI and supported) ability to accomplish their tactical mission.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 4-8: Company/team leaders are not regularly conducting pre-combat checks (PCCs), and platoon sergeants and leaders are not conducting pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Most units have SOPs on the conduct of PCCs and PCIs, but they are not often followed.

RESULT: Units are often unable to perform their missions to standard because they do not have the right equipment or enough of the right batteries, etc. These are small mistakes that cause major problems when the team cannot accomplish its mission.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 4-9:

1. Leaders have difficulty complying with the 1/3 - 2/3 planning rule.
2. Leaders often do not follow troop leading procedures.
3. Leaders often wait to be told what to do rather than using time available to conduct necessary checks, rehearsals, etc.
4. NCOs usually waste valuable training rehearsal time while waiting for OPORD or return of the leader.

PROBLEM 4-10: Medical leaders seldom use established troop leading procedures and field orders to ensure timely execution of their plans.

RESULT: On numerous occasions the ambulance platoon deploys to an Ambulance Exchange Point (AXP) in the *dark,* and *after* the brigade has started its reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance battle.

PROBLEM 4-11:

1. Battalion Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) do not establish a specified crew drill for the battalion Fire DirectionCenter (FDC). RESULT: Their tactical fire control is inefficient, leading to excessive mission processing time.
2. FDCs do not issue doctrinal fire commands.
3. FDCs do not effectively battle track and therefore lose situational awareness during the battle.
4. FDCs develop and assign responsibilities to crew members during the rotation, but not to *all* crew members.

PROBLEM 4-12:

1. When time available is limited, it is critical at the battery level to issue an OPORD to section chiefs and above that focuses on the accomplishment of the unit's critical field artillery tasks (CFATs.) Battery commanders and platoon leaders fail to focus their unit's efforts on the tasks required to accomplish the mission.
2. Battery commenders offten issue unclear orders and make poor use of available time.
3. In most cases, battery commanders use battalion-directed pre-combat checks (PCCs), but often fail to identify their own pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and rehearsals.
4. When the commander does specify PCCs/PCIs, leaders often do not adequately check to see if they have been accomplished.

PROBLEM 4-13: Company fire support teams (FISTs) generally conduct inadequate PCCs/PCIs.

1. Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLD) batteries fail when dismounted.
2. Protective masks do not seal during a chemical attack.
3. Machine guns do not fire because they are dirty.
4. Radios will not hold a crypto fill.

PROBLEM 4-14:

PROBLEMS:

1. Small arms weapons are not properly maintained and cleaned.
2. Sleep plans are not enforced; SGMs and NCO are biggest offenders.
3. Noise and light discipline is not maintained:
   - white and chem lights used in tactical operating centers (TOCs)
   - hatches slamming
4. Field sanitation standards not enforced:
   - wire left on roads
   - trash bags falling out of trucks
   - trash being burned or buried in the field
5. No Pre-combat inspections (PCIs) at Home Station to ensure MOPP gear is packed:
   - soldiers without gloves, masks
   - soldiers without MOPP uniform
6. Load plans not enforced.
7. Unit discipline regarding soldier hygiene, uniforms, vehicles, and equipment not enforced.
8. Speed limits in the Brigade Support Area (BSA) and along the main supply route (MSR) not enforced.
9. Proper use of ground guides not enforced.
10. Use of proper eye protection not enforced.

RESULTS: Lack of safety discipline and failure to properly use protective equipment constitutes the majority of accidents and injuries.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 4-15: *(Repeat of Problem 4-10)* Medical leaders seldom use established troop leading procedures and field orders to ensure timely execution of their plans.

RESULT: On numerous occasions the ambulance platoon deploys to an Ambulance Exchange Point (AXP) in the *dark,* and *after* the brigade has started its reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance battle.

PROBLEM 4-16: Troop leading procedures are not used effectively in the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).

1. No mission analysis conducted.
2. No effective or timely OPORDs issued.
3. No timelines established.

PROBLEM 4-17:

1. Typically, no one in command knows the location of the BSA commander during battle days because that information was lacking in the OPORD.
2. The BSA commander does not understand where the critical logistical points on the battlefield are where his presence is needed.

RESULT: The BSA commander lacks first-hand knowledge of critical problems, which usually leads to failure in meeting his higher intent.

PROBLEM 4-18: *(Repeat of Problem 4-13)* Company fire support teams (FISTs) generally conduct inadequate Pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs).

1. Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designators (G/VLLD) batteries fail when dismounted.
2. Protective masks do not seal during a chemical attack.
3. M-60 machine guns do not fire because they are dirty.
4. Radios will not hold a crypto fill.
5. Cables are missing.

TECHNIQUES

1. Pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCS/PCIs). Units should review their pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) SOPs to ensure they are *adequate*, and leaders should ensure these SOPs are *used*.

   a. Company/team leaders should perform thorough PCCs *with a checklist* before every mission.

   b. Platoon sergeants or leaders should then follow-up by conducting PCI spot-checks.

2. Time management. Supervising and inspecting are almost exclusively an NCO function. NCOs must be trained to proficiency in their leadership and time management skills.

3. Unit discipline. NCOs must ensure 100% accountability of soldiers at all times. During convoy operations, reduce speeds to appropriate for conditions. Maintain unit discipline.

4. Engineer tactical discipline. Engineer individual tasks and tactical discipline problems can all be solved with disciplined adherence to existing SOPs and standards. Engineer units must work during Home Station training to develop and refine their collective skill in basic tasks and procedures.

   a. Engineer battalion HHC commanders must use TLPs, with estimate of situation, METT-T, and IPB, to coordinate, plan, direct, and control the execution of CSS missions for every battalion mission.

   b. HHC commanders should formally issue an OPORD, even orally and abbreviated, to his subordinate elements.

   c. Engineer companies should develop and train SOPs that address normal tactical operations and planning in the field in addition to technical training and planning.

   d. Train/prove/refine in local training area or even next to unit motor pool.

5. FA battery troop leading.

a. Create standard pre-combat check lists to support routine, recurring, METL-based collective tasks.

b. Create an orders checklist to help focus information gathering and dissemination to section chiefs and soldiers.

c. Use a fill-in-the-blank OPORD, but add a timeline of ritical events.

d. Focus on leader supervision of critical tasks.

e. Conduct rehearsals to standard every time.

f. The battalion fire direction center (FDC) must develop a crew drill that clearly fixes responsibility to each member for critical tasks during the conduct of operations. The end result will yield standardized mission processing in a lock-step fashion with minimum processing times. This crew drill must be clearly established in the TACSOP. Sample crew drill for a voice call for fire executed digitally:

RTO	- Announce the call for fire and record it on the mission log.
FDO/FDNCO	- Plots the target on the situation map and announces any FSCM violations. - Analyze units and ammunition available, commander's criteria/attack guidance. - Announces fire order.
Computer Operator	- Inputs the mission data and generates the appropriate FM;CFF and back the target number, grid, altitude, units and method of fire
FDO/FDNCO	- Verifies the fire commands and authorizes transmission to the firing unit.
Computer Operator	- Transmits the fire commands to the platoon FDCs and verifies acknowledgment.
RTO	- Transmits voice fire commands to any platoon not receiving the data digitally.
RTO	- Records ready, shot, rounds complete on the mission log.

g. Leaders must focus on accomplishment of their CFATs by executing troop leading procedures (TLPs) to standard. FM 71-123 provides TTPs, in detail, to address this issue. The TLPs provide a mental framework to ensure complete preparation, dissemination and execution of both the battery and platoon mission. The steps are not sequential and can occur either out of order or simultaneously after the receipt of the mission.

1) Receive the mission.
   - The commander must analyze the mission to define his battery's restated mission and CFATs.
   - He must define the task, purpose method and endstate for each critical task to determine logistics and Class V requirements.
   - He must also identify PCCs for the sections.
2) Issue a warning order.
   - The commander issues as much information and detail as he can based upon METT-T. He may do this by FM, or if time is available, issue a WARNO in written form.
   - There is no doctrinal format for the WARNO. However, a five paragraph field order works best.
3) Make a tentative plan.
   - The commander must focus on battery/platoon IPB and METT-T.
   - He must be concerned with positioning, movement, logistics, rehearsals and defense as he develops his plan.
4) Initiate movement. If the mission requires and the time is available, initiate movement or repositioning as soon as possible.
5) Conduct reconnaissance.
   - This recon can be a map recon or ground as time available allows.
   - The commander should coordinate with adjacent units, survey, engineer support, and route security as needed.
6) Complete the plan.
   - The commander must now take all the information and produce a coherent order.
   - The plan must be executable by the unit based on METT-T and satisfy all CFATs.
7) Issue the order.
   - The audience for the order is METT-T driven; however, down to section chief level is best since there is less room for individual interpretation of the plan and intent. The key players must be present.
   - A terrain board or cartoon sketch of the battery's area of operations is a technique that is clear and easily understood by the audience.
   - Clear delivery of the order is critical to the TLP process.
   - Once complete, use a backbrief to ensure complete understanding of the OPORD and commander's intent.
8) Supervise.
   - This is the most important, yet most neglected step of the TLP.
   - Leaders must conduct the PCCs/PCIs that the commander established. The requirements for effective PCCs/PCIs are outlined in FM 71-123, pages 2-33 through 2-35.

h. Company fire support teams (FISTs) must develop detailed PCC/PCI checklists prior to execution. Make checklists mission specific, e.g.:

- dismounted operations
- copperhead shoots
- offensive operations, etc.

6. Medical company troop leading. Use FM 71-1 and FM 7-8 as references to train and implement established procedures at Home Station. This will improve leaders' ability to manage their time and provide subordinates with the information needed prior to start of mission. Use of established procedures will facilitate the early movement of ambulance platoons when the company commanders have not completed their orders.

7. MI company discipline. MI company/team leaders must demand and expect that soldiers perform basic soldier functions to standard without questions, complaints, or selective enforcement. Identify problem personnel and take appropriate action.

8. Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) troop leading. The BMO must consciously train himself and subordinate leaders in the application of the troop leading procedures. Focus Home Station training on what happens in the UMCP when the mission is received, when and how OPORDs are issued, and how time is managed.

9. Location of Brigade Support Area (BSA) commander.

a. If the brigade commander's intent is to have 90% of combat power at LD, a critical point for the BSA commander should be the UMCPs prior to battle. Then the commander may move to the TOC once the brigade commander's intent has been met or update the brigade commander from the action point on why his intent was not met.

b. FSB commanders must map out the critical points prior to conducting the mission:

- list them by time, phase, or event
- incorporate the critical points into the order, thus reinforcing to subordinate commanders what is critical to the FSB commander.

TA.4 Negative Trend 5: **Task force rehearsals**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	2	5	4	3

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 5-1: Too often company level "rehearsals" are no more than backbriefs. The rehearsal allows participants to become familiar with the concept of operations and the scheme of maneuver and fires.

PROBLEM 5-2: Task force rehearsals too often do not focus on critical events, i.e., actions on the objective. Units routinely fail to plan offensive missions in sufficient detail, and then rehearsals for those missions also lack detail.

PROBLEM 5-3: Medical personnel are not pinpointing medical asset locations (forward aid stations and main aid stations (FAS/MAS)) by the time the CSS rehearsal begins. The eventual location of the aid stations is not adequately disseminated to brigade elements.

RESULT: Unnecessary died of wounds (DOW) casualties, particularly soldiers from elements such as COLTs, GSR teams and scouts. Further problems are caused by units not understanding their respective CASEVAC responsibilities.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 5-4: Brigade fire support rehearsals are frequently not conducted to standard.

1. They generally consist of verification of brigade consolidated target list and overall discussion of scheme of fires.
2. There is no cooperative effort within the brigade staff:
   - poor or no scheme of fires developed in initial part of planning process
   - scheme of fires not published with brigade order

RESULTS:

1. Subordinate units do not know overall scheme of fires until brigade rehearsal:
   - rehearsal becomes explanation of scheme of fires, not a rehearsal
   - rehearsals lack structure and do not include all key players.
2. Rehearsals do not:
   - establish responsibilities
   - reinforce synchronization of fires with maneuver actions and triggers

PROBLEM 5-5: Rehearsals of integrated Air Defense (AD) battery plan are not taking place or are not to standard. They are not conducted with all participants present, and they tend to be FM rehearsals rather than sand table rehearsals.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 5-6: MI companies are conducting map rehearsals or ineffective FM rehearsals rather than conducting thorough terrain model rehearsals. Rehearsals using a terrain model is the only way to enable leaders to visualize the battle by seeing how the BLUFOR and OPFOR are expected to maneuver across the battlefield.

PROBLEM 5-7: Task forces and company/teams do not place emphasis on conducting company/team combined arms breach rehearsals.

RESULT: An uncoordinated breach effort at the objective.

PROBLEM 5-8: Battalion/task forces rarely rehearse assaults and action on the objective. SOPs usually fail to properly address the actions necessary and/or the units fail to follow their SOPs for these operations.

RESULTS:

1. Units become extremely disorganized on the objective.
2. The infantry is not prepared to dismount and is unaware of the plan.
3. Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) are not prepared to provide support.

PROBLEM 5-9: Fire support rehearsals have generally not significantly contributed to a better understanding or synchronization of the fire support plan.

1. Rehearsals usually consist of a target list scrub and a brigade recital or briefing of the fire support plan, and do not address specific observer responsibilities with the executor announcing his trigger, his engagement criteria, his observation post location and his call for fire.
2. The artillery Fire Direction Center (FDC) does not identify the specific units and volumes of fire that will fire.
3. By merely briefing but not rehearsing, the brigade Fire Support Element (FSE) has not ensured each player can execute his part of the fire support plan unprompted and fully understands the desired end state of each event.

PROBLEM 5-10: The integration of CSS into the tactical plan continues to be a problem area. Although brigades routinely conduct lengthy combined arms rehearsals, little or no emphasis is placed on integrating CSS into the process. On those occasions when CSS is addressed it is done at the end of the rehearsal process without any attempts to integrate it into the overall plan by brigade leaders.

<u>3-4QFY96</u>

PROBLEM 5-11: Company/teams and platoons often fail to adequately use the time available after receiving the warning order (WARNO) to identify critical tasks to rehearse and to conduct those rehearsals.

1. Company/teams plan for rehearsals, but fail to execute them due to poor or undisciplined *time management*.
2. WARNOs and company/team OPORDs lack sufficient guidance on type of rehearsals that must be conducted by each platoon during troop leading procedures.
3. Units do not appreciate the value of rehearsing both routine and critical tasks when the time is available prior to execution.
4. Units tend to ‘hand wave’ the task or rely on the standard ‘its SOP’ reply without reinforcing unit performance through a rehearsal.

RESULTS:

1. Commanders fail to fully visualize how the enemy will use his combat multipliers to shape the battlefield or predict when the enemy will use his combat multipliers against platoon, company/team positions.
2. Once engaged with the enemy, units find out they are not as well prepared to execute routine and critical tasks and therefore experience considerable command and control difficulties.

PROBLEM 5-12: Units often fail to effectively rehearse missions.

1. Units spend too much time and energy building rock drills or sand tables for rehearsals instead of using the terrain.
2. Units spend too much time discussing every BOS for every phase during rehearsals.
3. Units usually run out of time prior to getting to the objective, thereby, *never rehearsing actions on the objective*.
4. Units rarely rehearse direct fire plan and its synchronization with indirect fires and the breach force in depth.

PROBLEM 5-13: Engineer rehearsals with company/team commanders at task force level and below are poorly conducted, if conducted at all.

1. Too often engineers do not plan for or properly allocate time for well defined and specific rehearsals with the maneuver compant/teams. Poor time management is to blame.
2. Units consistently fail to have clearly defined pre-combat check/pre-combat inspection (PCC/PCI) SOPs or checklists for the type of mission at hand. Engineer platoon leaders and commanders spend too much time ensuring these common tasks are completed properly at the expense of allocating time for rehearsals.

PROBLEM 5-14: CSS rehearsals are inadequate.

1. S1 and S4 seldom conduct CSS rehearsals.
2. 1SGs and specialty platoon sergeants:
   - rarely get involved in CSS rehearsals
   - seldom come to CSS rehearsals well versed on the task force and company/team maneuver plan.
   - seldom have graphics
3. Rehearsals lack detail and direction.
4. Rehearsal aids are inadequate.

RESULT: CSS rehearsals do not adequately prepare logisticians for effective support in execution.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 5-15: There is seldom a rehearsal to synchronize the NBC force protection plan.

1. Brigade and Battalion Chemical Officers and the supporting Chemical Company seldom rehearse their scheme of support.
2. Chemical Officers are one of the few staff officers that do not have their own radio in the TOC. Most Chemical Officers can never use a radio during a battle.
3. Chemical Officers at all levels are not included as a briefer during OPORDs and rehearsals.

RESULTS:

1. Chemical Officers have difficulty communicating with other NBC staffs without a radio.
2. Without a briefing from the Chemical Officer, commanders are not informed on key issues that must be communicated such as MOPP level, operational exposure guides (OEG), auto-masking, and concept of support of the NBC slice.

PROBLEM 5-16:Military Police too often do not conduct effective rehearsals when preparing to execute operations.

1. While MP leaders generally conduct good troop leading procedures, they normally do not understand the different methods available for conducting rehearsals.

2. When confronted with time constraints, MP leaders do not know how to prioritize rehearsal efforts.

RESULT: The lack of effective rehearsals normally leads to poorly executed operations, especially when in contact with enemy forces.

PROBLEM 5-17: The BSA leadership often fails to plan rehearsals for the save plan at any level.

RESULT: The save plan is seldom executed, and when it does, it seldom reaches the end state the FSB commander required in saving critical assets.

TECHNIQUES

1. Rehearse *how to rehearse* at Home Station. Reference FM 71-123.

2. CALL Newsletter 91-1, *Rehearsals*, addresses the rehearsal sequence, types of rehearsals, and rehearsal techniques.

3. Units should integrate platoon and squad battle drills into internal battle drill books. These should be understood at every level and rehearsed extensively at Home Station.

4. Units need to rehearse all critical events in a battle including actions on the objective, not just actions on contact and breaching. Both planning and preparation for offensive operations should begin with actions on the objective and then work back to the tasks preceding crossing the line of departure. Rehearsals are extremely important in validating a detailed plan, and uncovering aspects of the plan which might have to be changed to be successful.

5. FM 71-2, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion/Task Force*, and FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company/team*, provide excellent checklists for task for and company/team planning, as well as actions to be rehearsed.

6. Maneuver unit rehearsals.

a. Units concentrate on the critical plans of the mission (i.e., during an attack, action, on contact from direct fire or indirect fire range through the assault, SOSR, actions on the objective).

b. Emphasize the shifting of fires and setting the conditions for the breach.

c. Discuss the use of dismounts.

d. Have the S3 and S2 drive through the engagement area (EA) while company/team commanders give their fire commands on FM.

e. S2 discusses what the enemy looks like at certain positions on the ground.

f. Company/team commanders must direct the type of rehearsal to be conducted at platoon level to ensure complete understanding of the mission.

g. Reinforce and aggressively train at Home Station in all training events leading to deployment.

h. Train junior leaders how to conduct a rehearsal and practice as often as possible during any training event.

i. Review CALL publication 91-1, *Rehearsals*, Apr 91, and incorporate rehearsal techniques in all leader training programs and publications.

j. Establish platoon and company rehearsal kits to assist units when full-up rehearsals are impractical.

k. Develop a small unit rehearsal checklist which assists junior leaders in developing rehearsal skills.

7. Engineer unit rehearsals.

a. Doctrinal references for rehearsals and how PCC/PCIs fit into planning are FM 5-10 and FM 90-13-1.

b. Engineer commanders need to develop better SOPs defining minimum events to allow for maximum time management and best supervision techniques. For example:

- situation
- attachments and detachments
- earliest time of movement
- nature and time of operation
- time and place of OPORD issuance
- administrative and logistics information
- solid timeline

8. CSS rehearsals.

- The brigade leadership must ensure that the CSS plan is integrated in the brigade overall tactical scheme of maneuver. Incorporation of the Fire Support Battalion (FSB) commander and brigade primary CSS staff member into the combined arms rehearsal process will lead to *better integration and synchronization of CSS* in the brigade's operation.

- Medical treatment facility locations and CASEVAC procedures must be totally understood by all elements within the brigade (combat, combat support and CSS personnel) before the rehearsal begins, and then reiterated during rehearsal. These procedures must be exercised *during Home Station training* so that timely treatment minimizes the died of wounds (DOW) rate.

9. Fire support (FS) rehearsals.

- Revise unit fire rehearsal SOPs to require all primary and alternate executors to participate.

- Subordinate units should have a clear understanding of brigade scheme of fires before conducting fire support rehearsal. Each subordinate element must rehearse independently prior to the brigade fire support rehearsal. Use the brigade fire support execution matrix to detail responsibilities for subordinate units and observers.

- Ensure task force level plans coordinate with the brigade plan and players have rehearsed their parts before brigade rehearsal.

- Ensure all key participants are on net prior to rehearsal.

- FSCOORD gives his guidance.

- After a target list verification and scheme of fires review (if needed), have the S2 address the enemy actions that will trigger FS events, followed by each executor making the appropriate radio calls to complete the event.

- The Fire Support Officer (FSO) and observers fight the plan as they envision it unfolding during execution. The FSO can make on-the-spot corrections, and also build in flexibility by adding "curves", such as the enemy formation goes north instead of south, or is 500 meters off the planned target to practice branches or hasty adjustments to the plan.

10. Air defense (AD) battery rehearsals. During the brigade rehearsal, the AD battery participants conduct AD rehearsals. When task force commanders and S3s *return* from brigade rehearsal, *then* make any adjustments to the AD plan. Conduct sand table rehearsals, as a minimum.

11. MI Company rehearsals. Each unit should construct a *package of terrain model supplies*, then use the supplies to build a terrain model for each mission. The rehearsal should discuss the BLUFOR and OPFOR scheme of maneuver and fires.

12. Combined arms breaching rehearsals. Review Appendix D, *Breaching Rehearsals*, to FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, for information on conducting a successful rehearsal. Also review CALL Newsletter 91-1, *Rehearsals*.

13. NBC rehearsals.

a. Have Chemical Officers and the Chemical Company Commander and Platoons Leaders conduct a FM rehearsal. Just as in any other BOS, a rehearsal is the key to success, not only to talk over the plan but to deconflict any issues.

b. Communication is the key to success during combat operations for Chemical Officers. Give him a radio, even if it is in a vehicle.

c. Have the FM rehearsal on the Chemical Company command frequency.

d. The brigade Chemical Officer should include this rehearsal in his NBC portion of the Brigade TACSOP with a standard agenda and time.

e. Publish this rehearsal time in the brigade timeline along with the maneuver, FS, and CSS rehearsals.

f. Ensure the Chemical Officers are active participants in the presentation of the OPORD and at the rehearsal.

14. MP rehearsals.

a. Well-resourced and controlled rehearsals are crucial to successful mission accomplishment.

b. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 91-1, *Rehearsals*, dated April 91, is an excellent guide on rehearsals.

c. Leaders should consider the following rehearsal techniques:

- FM radio rehearsals
- map rehearsals
- sand table/terrain rehearsals
- rock/stick drills (Rock drills are useful in synchronizing movement and immediate action/reaction)
- backbriefs

d. Walk-through and full-speed exercises further increase synchronization.

e. Rehearsals should be done over similar terrain and under similar light/weather conditions as the impending mission.

f. When prioritizing tasks in rehearsals, missions leaders should consider the following:

- actions on the objective
- reaction to enemy contact
- maneuver drills
- movement
- contingencies
- special teams

15. BSA Save Plan rehearsals.

a. The unit must conduct save plan rehearsals at all levels.

b. Times should be stated in the operations order.

c. The rehearsals should be conducted in the basic form then in the degraded mode, i.e., MOPP Level 4, at night, etc.

d. A more detailed time-distance analysis should be conducted to ensure that the prepare and save triggers allow enough time to clear the BSA prior to the arrival of the enemy.

e. Routes out of the BSA and priority of unit movement to support a hasty displacement also need to be developed in more detail.

f. Site selection for an alternate site must include constant coordination with brigade and ensure the site selected is not in view from the old site.

TA.4 Negative Trend 6: **Communication and signal operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	3	3	3	1	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 6-1: Too often Administration-Logistics Operations Center/Brigade Support Operations Center (ALOC/BSOC) personnel work in a cramped, unorganized shelter in the back of a 5-ton truck which is inadequate space for the equipment employed, i.e., computers, MSE phone, radio systems and possible a switchboard.

PROBLEM 6-2: Signal units display poor situational (friendly and enemy) awareness at the node center and remote sites. Soldiers too often do not know what is going on in their sector, and are not aware of the current threat, i.e., ground, air, artillery or NBC. Battle tracking and information flow stops at the SYSCON, node management facility or the company operations tent.

PROBLEM 6-3: Brigade signal officers too often do not adequately plan to provide communications support to brigade COLTs inserted deep beyond the line of departure/line of contact.

1. COLTs do not have adequate commo equipment to maintain constant commo with the command post.
2. Brigade signal section often do not have the resources to provide an FM retrans to support the COLTs commo net to the field artillery unit.
3. Units generally fail to coordinate early in the planning process.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 6-4: *(Repeat of Problem 6-3)* The brigade signal officer often does not adequately plan to provide communications support to brigade COLT teams inserted deep behind the line of departure/line of contact (LD/LC).

1. COLT teams assigned to brigade do not possess adequate communications equipment to maintain constant communications with the commander.
2. Brigade signal sections often do not have the resources to provide FM retrans to support communications from COLT team to the field artillery unit.
3. Units seldom coordinate with or involve the direct support field artillery battalion signal officer early in planning and wargaming process.

PROBLEM 6-5: *(Repeat of Problem 6-2)* Signal units continue to have difficulty disseminating information down to the level of the individual soldier.

1. They regularly display poor situational awareness (friendly and enemy) at the node center and remote sites.
2. Battle tracking and information flow stop at the SYSCON, node management facility, or company operations tent.

RESULT: Soldiers often do not know what is going on in their sectors and are not aware of the current threat (i.e., air, ground, artillery, or NBC).

PROBLEM 6-6: Task force commanders dominate task force nets during the fight. There is a lack of cross talk among subordinates and specialty platoon leaders on the command net. Too often in the OPORD, paragraph 5 fails to establish who has priority on the net during certain events or phases of the battle.

RESULT: Subordinate commanders and specialty platoon leaders do not coordinate on the command net during the fight.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 6-7: *(Repeat of Problem 6-6)* Units at all levels *fail to "cross talk"* adequately during battles.

1. Units do not keep adjacent elements informed of their tactical situation during missions.
2. Little or no mention of "cross talking" in manuals.

RESULTS:

1. Increased probability of *fratricide*, maneuvering into enemy fire sacks, and *overestimation of battle damage assessments* (BDA).
2. Commanders do not receive clear picture of battle until after-action review (AAR).

PROBLEM 6-8: Task force Battalion Signal Officers (BSOs) are not generally integrated into the task force military decision making process (MDMP).

1. BSO's relationship with task force battle staff tends to be better when BSO is a captain (CPT) rather than a lieutenant (LT); LTs may be *intimidated* or fear rejection.
2. There is insufficient integration to consider communications adequately or timely.
3. While there are attempts to consider communications under paragraph 5, *Command and Signal*, of the OPORD, there is rarely a communications annex written.

RESULTS:

1. Lieutenants do not offer communications advice or recommendations as well in task force staff work as captains.
2. No clear picture of communications support is available to task force members.
3. Communications support is not integrated into the task force plan.

PROBLEM 6-9: Retransmit (RETRANS) teams are too often looking for the high ground, with no sense of where the enemy is and no clear mission.

1. Brigade Signal Officers (BSO) tend to give RETRANS teams a brief warning with no route and little guidance.
2. RETRANS teams deploy with a lesson statement, but seldom a detailed OPORD.
3. RETRANS teams have no familiarization with the task force plan.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 6-10: Communications plans at the brigade level often lack the flexibility required to support the fluid nature of maneuver operations. Command and control within the maneuver brigade must be reliable and continuous throughout all phases of tactical operations. Brigade Signal Officers (BSOs) have difficulty designing plans which foresee and provide for all potential disruptions of communications. Factors which influence communications effectiveness include:

- distance between elements
- terrain obstacles
- enemy electronic warfare activity
- loss of communications assets

TECHNIQUES

1. Battalion Signal Officer (BSO) integration.

a. BSO's must be fully integrated into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) in order to discern the variables and contingencies which could affect command, control, and communication (C3).

b. Plan and coordinate to use all available means of tactical communications; FM radio, Improved High Frequency Radio (IHFR), tactical satellite (TACSAT), and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE).

c. Back-up systems should be pre-positioned forward so that they are available for instant use if required. Back up retrans or Radio Access Units (RAU's) are of little use if they are held in the rear during fast-paced combat operations.

d. Assets should be moved forward behind combat forces or with security escort to minimize the danger of destruction by enemy forces.

e. Communications plans should be published and briefed in a clear, concise format to ensure that all elements understand the plan and how contingency communications will support the maneuver.

f. Prepare written/graphical communications annexes for task force OPORDs using examples found in FM 11-43.

g. *Integrate the task force BSOs* into the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Use him as the task force communications subject matter expert (SME).

h. Make BSOs CPTs where possible.

2. Deployment of RETRANS Teams.

a. Battalion Signal Officers (BSOs) must take time to provide the RETRANS team with a *clear* OPORD. Reference FM 11-43 for a sample RETRANS OPORD.

b. The RETRANS team chief must provide input in the development of the RETRANS mission so that any experiences he/she has is integrated. The RETRANS team chief should also attend the orders brief or rehearsal to get an understanding of the mission they are supporting.

c. The BSO should insure the mission is understood by the team by having them backbrief their mission.

3. Signal unit situation awareness.

a. Signal units should prepare some graphical portrayal of the scheme of maneuver/maneuver graphics in their sector and keep this product updated. Conduct daily briefings at the node centers on current situation with maneuver graphics.

b. Leaders should check to ensure soldiers understand the current situation before departing to remote sites. They will need copies of the maneuver graphics, the OPORD, as well as receive updates during mission preparation and execution.

c. This emphasis on situational awareness will result in fewer personnel casualties from enemy contact. The rate of CSS fratricide from minefields, artillery and direct fire will also decrease.

4. Unit cross talk during battle.

a. Include cross talk as sub-task for all missions in ARTEP 71-1-MTP. Include techniques and guidelines for cross-talk in doctrinal literature.

b. Units must practice and train information exchange during all training exercises.

c. Establish priority for cross talk on the net by event or phase during development of the OPORD or rehearsal.

d. Include guidance on the use of nets in paragraph 5 of the OPORD.

5. Communication support of brigade COLTs.

a. Coordinate fully and early with the artillery signal officer so he can adequately plan FM retrans team support to brigade COLTs. Early coordination could result, for example, in the decision for the retrans team to be OPCON to the brigade signal officer with the mission to establish and maintain the FM link from the COLTs to the artillery unit.

b. Provide timely and accurate information and current enemy SITREPs.

c. Arrange for artillery retrans teams to be OPCON to the Battalion Signal Officer (BSO) to establish and maintain the FM link to artillery units supporting brigade COLTs.

6. ALOC/BSOC work environment. Rebuild the back of the truck with a shelter of the approximate dimensions of the old M-109 van.

a. Build in shelves for the communications systems.

b. Use filing cabinets (or drawers) for the Personnel and Administration Center (PAC) and the S4 shop to use for day-to-day field operations.

c. Use cabinets/drawers to store office supplies.

d. Establish some work space for radio telephone operators (RTOs) and officers in charge (OICs) to function.

TA.4 Negative Trend 7: **Employ tactical C^2W**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	4	2	4	0

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 7-1: Electronic surveillance team/platoon leaders are not conducting thorough Pre-combat checks (PCCs) or Pre-combat inspections (PCIs). Relying on memory rather than using a written checklist.

RESULTS:

1. EA system inoperable due to missing ground strap.
2. EW system runs out of fuel.
3. Two backup EW systems inoperable due to missing parts.
4. Weapons will not fire due to lack of maintenance.
5. Backup manpackable EW systems run out of batteries.

PROBLEM 7-2: The traffic analysis cell does not maintain a current data base of historical analytical observations, reconstruct radio nets, plot manual direction finding results, or provide feedback to the collection/jamming teams.

RESULT: The traffic analysis cell was essentially a glorified radio-relay facility.

PROBLEM 7-3: Timely and accurate Jamming Effectiveness Reports (JERs) are not reaching the Platoon Operations Center (POC) during the conduct of an EA mission to have the desired effect.

PROBLEM 7-4: The Platoon Operations Center (POC) is unable to adequately track the tasking of its EW systems and utilize the collection/jamming assets to their fullest potential. The POC relies heavily on the EW teams to coordinate among themselves with little or no guidance from the POC to accomplish the mission. POCs show lack of knowledge on both the capabilities and limitations of its EW systems and how to effectively run either a collection or jamming mission.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 7-5: *(Repeat of Problem 7-2)* As a whole, the traffic analysis cells did not maintain a current data-base of historical analytical observations, consistently plot manual direction finding results, or provide meaningful feedback to the collection/jamming teams. These problems are the result of lack of time management, apathy or ignorance by traffic cell members, and lack of emphasis or concern by company team leadership.

RESULTS:

1. Ineffective traffic analysis for leadership and collection teams.
2. Ineffective platoon operations center (POC).

PROBLEM 7-6: Company commanders and platoon leaders make decisions from their command post with little understanding of the environment in which Electronic Warfare (EW) teams are operating.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 7-7: PROBLEM: Too often, the Analysis Control Team (ACT) does not plan any specific EW force protection missions to support the insertion of the scouts and COLTs during the recon/counterrecon phases of the battle. While brigade scouts/COLTs are conducting their mission or are being inserted, brigade electronic surveillance/electronic attack (ES/EA) Teams are the *only* assets that can provide early warning/protection. ES/EA teams do this by listening to and locating via radio direction finding, and consequently jamming enemy recon commo nets or Combat Security Observation Posts out forward on the battlefield. Once intercepted, these nets are exploited to see if any brigade scout assets have been compromised.

PROBLEM 7-8: Traffic analysis cells are often not planning for, nor adequately employing, jump nodes to ensure mission continuity. When forced to jump locations, TA cells tend to transfer control of the entire electronic surveillance/electronic attack (ES/EA) mission to outlying intercept sites rather than dispatch a jump node.

RESULT: Transferring control to an EW team that is not equipped with maps, situational templates, current situational awareness, dedicated comms links to higher, files, mission continuity logs etc., or possibly not even able to communicate with the ACT, degrades both the asset management and reporting of the entire ES/EA mission, as well as the EW team, which must then run both its own mission as well as that of the TA cell.

PROBLEM 7-9: *(Repeat of Problem 7-3)* Timely and accurate jamming effectiveness reports (JERs) are not reaching the traffic analysis (TA) cell during the conduct of an electronic attack (EA) mission to have the desired effect.

PROBLEM 7-10: Traffic analysis (TA) cells generally do not set the proper tone for the rest of the deployed ES/EA assets under their purview.

1. Frequently, the TA cells will put out taskings and then passively wait for the ES/EA teams to report, rather than being pro-active by providing feedback to the teams, showing an interest in the mission, and reminding the teams, periodically, of the current tasking.
2. TA cells are displaying a “check the block” mindset and are not following-up to ensure taskings are understood or being followed.

TECHNIQUES

1. The Platoon Operations Center (POC) crew should receive initial/refresher training at Home Station on the capabilities and limitations of its electronic warfare (EW) systems to enable them to properly plan for coordination and synchronization of their EW assets. Both the POC and EW teams should develop SOPs that present a clearer definition of each other's role and responsibilities.

2. The Electronic Warfare (EW) platoon leaders and sergeant must take a more active role and interest in the traffic analysis cell function. Hold the cell accountable for what is does and does not accomplish, ensuring basic standards taught at the schoolhouse are maintained. NOTE: A motivated TA cell that shows an active interest in the mission will be reflected by the ES/EA teams. Likewise, an apathetic TA cell will be reflected in kind by the ES/EA teams.

3. Electronic Surveillance (ES) teams need to include thorough, written Pre-Combat Check/Pre-Combat Inspection (PCC/PCI) checklists in their SOPs, and team leaders should *use these before every mission*. Company commanders and platoon leaders must *go forward on the battlefield* on a regular basis to see the terrain, conduct pre-combat inspections, and to gauge the morale and performance of their soldiers.

4. Jamming Effectiveness Reports (JERs) *must* be timely and accurate to have the desired effect. The electronic support (ES) system tasked with monitoring the enemy frequency to determine the effectiveness of the jamming mission against it must be *sitting* on that frequency during the conduct of the EA mission, and must provide timely and accurate jamming effectiveness reports (JERs) to the TA cell.

a. Provide JERs frequently to the TA cell, especially if:

- The jamming *is not* effective. The TA cell must then direct the subordinate EA team to take immediate action to correct the problem. Among the steps to be taken are:

(1) increase the jammer's power output,

(2) reorient its antenna, or

(3) switch this particular EA mission over to another EA system, if available.

- The jamming *is* effective. If the targeted net jumps frequencies, the TA cell can then direct re-acquisition efforts as quickly as possible.

b. Place an EW system with hearability to the target area, not colocated with the EA system or between it and the target area. Task it to monitor the target net to determine the effectiveness of the mission. The monitoring system should assign an approximate *effectiveness rating* to provide timely and well understood input to the TA cell. One method follows:

EFFORT	JAMMING EFFECTIVENESS RATING
No interference heard on net.	0
Weak interference, no garbled or repeated traffic.	1
Interference, garbled or repeated traffic being worked through.	2
Interference, garbled or repeated traffic not being heard by some stations/callsigns.	3
Strong interference, no ability to work through.	4

c. *Standardize* the issuing of JERs, A two to three minutes interval during a jamming mission would help enforce the timeliness and importance of these reports, and ultimately lead to a more effective EA mission.

5. The ACT must plan detailed force protection missions in their EW execution matrix during the recon/counterrecon phases of the battle. The ACT should work closely with the Fire Support Officer (FSO) to coordinate force protection missions during the insertion of the scouts/COLTs. The FSO must provide specifics of where and when these scout/COLTs are being inserted. This information can then be given to the ES/EA teams listening to the targeted nets to see if the teams were compromised while being inserted. If so, the FSO can warn these teams and take appropriate action. Concurrently, per the EW execution matrix, the recon net(s) would be exploited to protect the rest of the force by reporting any compromised OPs, assembly areas, TOC sites, etc.

6. When the TA cell is forced to jump, either to maintain communications with deployed EW teams or prevent itself from being overrun, it should dispatch a jump vehicle with adequate files, maps, secure communications etc., to maintain control of the battle.

a. Once the jump vehicle is in position, with good comms to all outlying sites and the ACT, it should then assume control of the tasking and reporting net.

b. The main TA cell body then tears down and redeploys to the jump vehicle's location. Once reunited, and operational, the main TA cell body will resume control of the net and the jump vehicle will be absorbed back into the TA cell.

c. If the TA cell does not possess a jump vehicle or it gets destroyed, an EW team should be designated as the net control until the TA cell relocates or gets reconstituted. However, this is the least favorite option, because mission continuity is lost, and it deters from the EW team's mission.

TA.4 Negative Trend 8: **OPORD and FRAGO preparation**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	1	2	4	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 8-1: Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) are required to produce numerous OPORDs in support the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) operations. FSBs rarely conduct a full and complete orders process because of a failure to manage time and a lack of familiarity with the doctrinal orders process.

RESULT: FSB OPORDs lack sufficient detail, which then leads to rehearsals that lack detail and are not well coordinated. In turn, these deficiencies lead to avoidable mission execution failures.

PROBLEM 8-2: Units lack a disciplined process to produce timely, complete OPORDs and FRAGOs. Overall, battle staff training levels are low, and the roles and responsibilities of each staff officer/NCO are not clearly defined. Although task force staffs have a good understanding of the doctrinal planning process, it is evident that these same staffs are not well drilled and therefore cannot produce detailed plans quickly.

RESULT: Plans lack adequate detail, are not well integrated and therefore have little chance of success.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 8-3: CSS units seldom conduct the elements of the doctrinal orders process during the formulation of operations orders (OPORDs). The *FSB rarely conducts a full and complete orders process* during the development of its OPORDs.

- failure to properly manage time
- lack of familiarity with the doctrinal orders process

RESULT: FSB's orders lack detail and fail to integrate the Battlefield Operating System (BOS). The outgrowth of this is the lack of detailed and coordinated BCT CSS rehearsals for each other during rotations.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 8-4: The commander's intent is frequently not reflected or embraced in subordinate unit's plans and orders.

1. Subordinate commanders do not understand the commander's intent. Their own orders, graphics, and intent do not reflect the intent of next two higher levels. Plans differ from what the higher commander envisioned.
2. There is no system to ensure subordinates build concepts and plans that will accomplish mission in accordance with higher commanders' intent. Staffs rarely check compliance. The higher commander often learns of discrepancies late in the military decision making process (MDMP).

RESULTS:

1. Higher commanders' intent is not accomplished.
2. Higher commander cannot change subordinates' plans in time to reflect intent.

PROBLEM 8-5: Company/teams do not produce operations orders (OPORDs) in sufficient detail to allow them to accomplish their mission.

1. Situation Template (SITEMP) refinement, terrain analysis, and threat analysis are not conducted in sufficient detail to portray how the enemy will fight and shape the battlefield.
2. Commanders are weak in articulating how they envision the battle will flow.
3. Paragraph II: Poor understanding of task force/brigade scheme of maneuver.
4. paragraph III: Often scheme of movement and not a *scheme of fire and maneuver* to KILL the enemy.
5. Task forces give unclear task and purposes to company/teams which result in confusion on how the company/team fits into the task force's scheme of maneuver.
6. Paragraph IV: Not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver for the company/team.
7. Paragraph V: No "JUMP" plan or signals discussed.

<u>3-4QFY96</u>

PROBLEM 8-6: Current fire support annexes are inadequate as planning, prep, and execution tools. Fire support annexes contain target lists, controlled supply rates, a location for close air support, organization for combat, high payoff target list, execution matrices, and a variety of other information. All of this data is valuable and necessary, but there is no document that outlines the scheme of fire support for the operation, i.e., *what* and *who* will trigger an event, and what is the *desired outcome* for the event. It does not provide "one-stop shopping" to assist in planning, preparation, rehearsal, and execution of the fire support plan.

a. The execution matrix does not give the detail required to execute a given fire support event. Execution matrices may only give groups or events that take place during a time period, not specific events that take place at a specific time.

b. Target lists tell us target description, and the high payoff target list tell us targets, and attack guidance matrices tell us when and how.

PROBLEM 8-7: Company/team commanders do not refine the enemy situation or conduct sufficient terrain analysis to give platoon leaders and vehicle commanders the level of detail required to adequately see the enemy and see the terrain.

1. Frequently, because of inadequate time management at higher levels or at company level, company/team commanders are pressed for time in the preparation of their OPORDs.
2. In order to get a decent order out in a reasonable amount of time, commanders "gloss" over portions of the order, primarily Paragraph 1A (Enemy Forces), by simply presenting this paragraph word for word out of the Task force order.
3. The lack of a clear and detailed Paragraph 1A can be attributed directly to company/team commanders not conducting a detailed IPB at their level during the development of the company/team OPORD.

RESULT: A maneuver plan which is:

- *unrealistic* in terms of the scope of assigned responsibilities, as compared with the destruction of the enemy, and
- *unexecutable* when attempted on terrain which has not been properly analyzed for the military aspects of terrain.

PROBLEM 8-8:

1. Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) at both task force and company/team level do not address changes in the current situation (friendly and enemy).
2. Most FRAGOs only address one unit and are not synchronized across the task force.

PROBLEM 8-9: *(Repeat of Problem 8-5)* Company/teams do not produce OPORDs in sufficient detail to allow them to accomplish their mission.

1. Situation Template (SITEMP) refinement, terrain analysis, and threat analysis are not conducted in sufficient detail to portray how the *enemy* will fight and shape the battlefield.
2. Commanders are weak in articulating to subordinates how they envision the battle will flow.
3. OPORD Para II: Poor understanding of task force or brigade scheme of maneuver.
4. OPORD Para III: Often scheme of movement and not a scheme of fire and maneuver to kill the enemy.
5. Task forces gives unclear task and purpose to company/teams which results in confusion on how the company/team fits into the task force's scheme of maneuver.
6. OPORD Para IV: Not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver for company/teams.
7. Commanders often do not consider the capabilities and limitations of their attachments.

TECHNIQUES

1. OPORDs must be produced in sufficient detail to allow company/teams to accomplish their mission. Commanders must *read and understand* the OPORD example outlined in FM 71-1, Appendix A. Commanders must *practice writing* and issuing orders. Incorporate and practice OPORD writing and issuing *training* in all facets of garrison operations and periodic field exercises.
2. Units need a *disciplined process* to produce timely, complete OPORDs and FRAGOs. Establish a solid doctrinal foundation for an abbreviated, time-constrained military decisionmaking process applicable to task force level.
3. Task force commanders must develop and implement rigorous Home Station battle staff training programs. These programs must first establish proficiency in the deliberate process, and then progress to more time constrained execution of the military decision making process (MDMP).
4. Commander's intent must be reflected in subordinates' orders. Establish systems for ensuring *understanding* and *compliance* with commander's intent early the MDMP.
   - confirmation briefs immediately following issue of orders for understanding
   - back briefs later for compliance and inclusion in subordinates' plans
   - staff visits and direct communication with counterparts on use of BOS by subordinates
5. Future versions of FM 71-1/2 should better address the format for fragmentary orders.

6. The initial brigade scheme of fires must be developed and published with the brigade OPORD. The scheme of fires can either be written in paragraph format or outlined on a worksheet.

a. The scheme of fires should be initiated during the course of action development. A list of critical fire support tasks (CFST) must be identified.

- Each CFST must be defined by task, purpose, method, and end state.
- Normally every maneuver critical task will require a CFST.

b. Initially the fire support events determined during course of action development will be very general.

EXAMPLE: When the combined arms reserve (CAR) is committed, the brigade will employ close air support (CAS) in engagement area (EA) RED to destroy one MRP consisting of 1XT80 and 2XBMPs to allow task force 3/75 30 additional minutes to defeat the MRC on OBJ COWBOYS to establish attack by fire positions north of Granite Pass (an additional CFST for employing CAS will be suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).

c. The bulk of the scheme of fires should be developed during the wargaming session.

- The FSO and the targeting team should wargame the effects desired and the timing of each event to include a refined trigger, grid, target number, task, purpose, method, munitions, observer plan, implementation of fire support control measures, IEW jamming, priority of fires, movement plan for the artillery, and radar cueing/radar zones.
- This process continues until the entire plan, all fire support events, with branches and sequels have been wargamed.
- The end result is a scheme of fires which is ready for "bottom-up" refinement for the task forces to refine the plan to meet subordinate task force plans.
- Remember, this is a brigade fight, not an assortment of task force fire plans. Each task force FSO will refine his part of the scheme of fires to support his task force commander. This refinement will refine the brigade's scheme of fires that will be briefed by the FSCOORD or brigade FSO at the combined arms rehearsal.

d. Immediately upon receipt of the brigade's OPORD, the DS battalion will conduct a technical rehearsal to determine gunnery solutions for each target in the scheme of fires and determine what type of munitions and quantity to achieve the desired effects. The ES battalion S3 will brief the brigade FSO on the result of the technical rehearsal.

e. After the combined arms rehearsal, the FM rehearsal should be conducted. The end result is a rehearsed and refined scheme of fires with technical gunnery solutions to support the brigade's scheme of maneuver.

f. At a minimum, each event must list the following:

- Event. The actual fire support event that will be executed. Examples include "fire AE0001", activate close air support target box 1, activate critical friendly zone (CFZ) 1, or change priority of fires.
- Observer/Executor. The individual or unit charged with executing the fire support event.
- Task. Specify the formation of the enemy we want to attack, the function of that formation that we want to influence and the targeting effects.
- Purpose. Focused on friendly maneuver and sets parameters of when and how long we must delay in terms of friendly maneuver, what we must destroy, and where we must limit.
- Attack means/Method. The weapon system attacking the target.
- End State/Effects. Quantifiable in terms that allow the fire support team to determine volume of fires, munition, and duration.

7. For Para 1A of the company/team OPORD (Enemy Forces):

a. Get the most detailed terrain products available for the assigned AOs (not a 1:50,000 map), maps of 1:24,000 scale or larger. Satellite or recon photos may be available through the S2 and should be requested.

b. A completed MCOO done at Home Station or the night prior to the prep day of a battle will save much time during the orders preparation.

c. Have enemy doctrinal manuals and orders of battle on hand, tabbed and broken down to what a doctrinal enemy would do given the anticipated mission.

d. Place responsibility on company XO or platoon leaders to assist in developing blown up sketches of enemy positions and key terrain in the AO.

e. Do not wait unit the Task force order has been issued to begin the IPB process. All things mentioned above can be done the evening/night prior to the preparation for the anticipated mission if the information is aggressively sought out and used to refine pre-existing products brought from Home Station.

f. Drill subordinates during Home Station training on what their responsibilities are in the IPB process.

TA.4 Negative Trend 9: **Development and use of tactical SOPs**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	1	1	3	2

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 9-1: Most mortar platoons do not have a workable SOP or adhere to the one they have.

RESULT: In the absence of key leaders, ie, platoon leaders and platoon sergeant, subordinate leaders could not execute the leaders' intent.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 9-2: Most units deploy with a brigade TACSOP, but most of the TACSOPs are recently written documents that have not been distributed and have rarely been used. Most TACSOPs adequately cover standard brigade operations but *few have a copy, and few have read it or use it.*

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 9-3

1. Many Air Cavalry Troops (ACTs) do not have sound tactical SOPs.
2. Troops that *do* have sound SOPs do not often utilize them, adhere to them, or understand them.
3. SOPs generally do not have sufficient detail for combat operations, or when the level of detail is sufficient, crews are not utilizing these procedures.
4. Observed weaknesses in most aviation unit SOPs:
   - standard reporting
   - actions on contact
   - target handover
   - air/ground integration
   - direct fire planning
   - engagement area development
   - fratricide prevention measures
   - planning cells
   - reconnaissance techniques
   - fire support
   - Pre-combat checks/inspections
   - Forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations
   - assembly area operations

RESULT: Requires much discussion during the planning and preparation phases of the operation on basic procedures and techniques that should already be in the SOP and understood by each of the individual aircrews.

PROBLEM 9-4: Units are often not familiar with their TACSOPs.

1. TACSOPs are not getting down to user level.
2. Too many units have never seen and do not use their TACSOP.

PROBLEM 9-5: Over 90 percent of the medical companies deploying to the NTC do not have a company TACSOP.

RESULTS:

1. Company leadership does not clearly understand their role and responsibilities in a field environment.

2. Leaders duplicate work and critical leader tasks do not get accomplished effectively, if at all.

3. Critical tasks are done differently each time, and take longer, since no one knows the standards for completion.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 9-6:

1. Units do not have SOPs that establish priority of work during setup and tear down.

2. Main Command Posts (CPs) seldom have a REDCON system that helps posture the CP for movement based on mission requirements or increased enemy threat. The Main CP consists of two major functional areas:

- the CP and operational support assets
- the Life Support Area (LSA)

RESULT: Units are often ham-strung when it comes time to move.

PROBLEM 9-7: *(Repeat of Problem 9-5)* Over 90 percent of the medical companies deploying to the NTC do not have a company TACSOP.

RESULTS:

1. Company leadership does not clearly understand their role and responsibilities in a field environment.

2. Leaders duplicate work and critical leader tasks do not get accomplished effectively, if at all.

3. Critical tasks are done differently each time, and take longer, since no one knows the standards for completion.

TECHNIQUES

1. Brigades must develop and *use* their TACSOPs well before deploying to theater. If the procedures do not work well at Home Station, refine them until they *do* work.

a. Ensure the unit TACSOP is distributed down to user level.

b. Leaders must ensure the units are familiar with and *use* their TACSOP. Issue them to each squad leader, and ensure every soldier knows their SOP.

2. Air Cavalry Troops (ACTs) SOPs.

a.. Add SOP development and examples to the Aviation Officers Advance Course.

b. Units should *develop, test* and *refine* sound SOPs at Home Station. These SOPs should be developed to reduce the workload during battle planning, preparation and execution.

c. Standardize battle drills or plays, and *practice*.

3. Main Command Posts (CP) setup and tear down.

a. Units should establish a simple REDCON level associated with the level and priority of work required based on the current METT-T of the situation.

EXAMPLE:

REDCON 1 - Ready to move /TOC broken down / march columns lined up.

REDCON 2 - TOC ready to move in 15 Mins / RED TOC configuration / working off vehicle antennas / M-8 alarms out /

REDCON 3 - TOC ready to move in 1 hr / Green TOC / antennas up / Life Support Area packed up / M8 Alarms out / no camouflage up / Quartering party departed to new site.

REDCON 4 - TOC ready to move in 2 hrs / Green TOC / antennas up / LSA up / camouflage up / M8 Alarms out.

b. This system will help establish priority of work when the unit pulls into a new site. The TOC goes from REDCON 1 to REDCON 3 and then based on duration of stay drops to a REDCON 4 status with full LSA up.

c. When the situation requires the main to move:

- The first break is the LSA, which brings you to REDCON 3 and the Quartering Party is ready to or is kicked out to new site. A modification to this is when you drop the Main's camouflage net.

- REDCON 2 is a HOT TOC configuration with all major work completed but TOC is still functional. A course of action could be to kick the LSA vehicles out to the new site and link up with the Q-party.

- Go to REDCON 1 would mean break and march column. Ready to move.

NOTE: This system was used during Desert Storm and was very effective. The Main CP was able to manage their personnel assets to remain functional until the last minute before jumping, and all personnel understood their priority of work once at the new site. When the division jumped into Iraq the D-Main never left the REDCON 3 configuration, and was ready to move in one hour notice. With the command "Go to REDCON 2", every section had developed their own drills to achieve that level of readiness. With every jump, there was very little decision- making required by key leaders as to what needed to be done. Soldiers did not stand around waiting to be told what to do.

4. Medical companies. Develop and distribute a TACSOP that clearly articulates the roles and responsibilities for each leader within the company. Use established medical doctrine and mission training plans as sources for identification of these tasks.

a. Write to the job, not to the personality of the person in the job.

b. Identify each critical task the company must accomplish to be combat ready.

c. Describe how the task is done, and include an established time standard for completion.

TA.4 Negative Trend 10: **Battle staff mission analysis**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	1	2	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 10-1: Task force staffs do not give their commanders sufficient information during mission analysis briefs about the task force's current and projected status, particularly information useful in planning.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 10-2: Mission analysis is not conducted as an integrated battle staff function.

1. The battle staff does not:
   - meet at the Main CP
   - receive an overall brief of upcoming operations by the task force XO or S3 Air
   - conduct a mission analysis of their proponent BOS while the task force commander, S3 and Fire Support Officer (FSO) are at brigade receiving the brigade order.
2. Frequently, the Air Defense Officer (ADO) and logisticians *are not informed* that the Main CP has received the order, or given the time that the mission analysis is going to be conducted.

RESULT: Without a fully integrated mission analysis, the S2 and S3 will not be able to conduct a mission analysis brief to the commander with all specified, implied, mission essential tasks identified.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 10-3: *(Repeat of Problem 10-2)* Mission analysis is rarely conducted as an integrated battle staff function.

1. The battle staff does not conduct parallel planning:
   - battle staff assembles at task force command post while task force commander, S3 and Fire Support Officer (FSO) receive brigade order at brigade.
   - battle staff does not conduct mission analysis of respective BOSs
2. Frequently, some members (CSS-related) are not even informed of receipt of the order and mission analysis.

RESULT: Task force planning does not identify fully specified, implied, and essential tasks for brief to commander.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 10-4:

1. Mission analysis often does not include accurate planning estimates.
   - Brigade staffs do not include current on-hand/assigned data when conducting mission analysis.
   - The rear CP normally has the information posted, however, the planners at the main CP are unaware of limitations based on current status.
2. Planning estimates used during COA development (such as casualty estimate) are not provided by the planners to the executors (such as the forward medical company commander).

RESULT: The lack of information reconciliation results in shortfalls in mission attainability as well as shortened troop leading procedure time for the support structure.

PROBLEM 10-5: Brigade Engineers routinely allow habitual associations, not engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) and mission analysis, to drive task organization.

1. Brigade Engineers too often do not recommend organization of engineers with clear task and purpose and delineate clearly command/support relationships to best support the brigade combat team (BCT) mission.

- no detailed analysis of engineer actions throughout the depth of the BCT battlefield using some type of standard methodology.

- no methodology for analysis, for example, reverse breach planning for offensive operations.

- no identication of all engineer tasks required to accomplish the mission.

2. Engineer battalions do not fully analyze the "why" when deciding upon the command/ support relationship, nor do they clearly specify this relationship in orders once decided upon.

3. Units often significantly deviate from doctrinal command/support relationships by performing non-standard CSS roles during execution.

4. Engineer battalions routinely "attach" sapper companies to habitually associated task forces without regard to mission analysis. This appears to provide the "easy" answer by shifting C2 and CSS responsibility to the supported task force.

RESULTS:

1. Engineer battalions typically assume a very detached relationship with task-organized sapper companies for planning and support requirements, displaying a distinct lack of ownership.

2. Engineer battalion commanders direct the shifting of engineer assets not under their control, without regard for the published command/support relationship.

3. Task forces, engineer battalions and sapper companies are confused with:

- non-standard combat service support requirements

- degrading CSS responsiveness, logistics reporting and accountability

4. The engineer battalion is best suited with expertise and resources to provide support in Class III, V, IX and maintenance.

5. Forces are not adequately allocated.

6. Command/support relationships are not effectively established.

7. The main effort is not weighed.

8. The impact of the engineer force is not maximized at the decisive point on the battlefield.

<u>1-2QFY97</u>

PROBLEM 10-6: *(Repeat of Problems 10-2 and 10-3)* Mission analysis is *rarely conducted as an integrated Battle Staff function.*

1. Battle Staff does not conduct parallel planning

-Battle Staff assembles at task force (TF) command post (CP) while TF Commander, S3, and FSO receive brigade order at brigade

-Battle Staff does not conduct mission analysis of *respective BOSs*

2. Frequently, some members (CSS-related) are not even informed of receipt of the order and mission analysis.

RESULT: TF planning *does not fully identify specified, implied, and essential tasks* for brief to commander.

TECHNIQUES

1. The battle staff needs to conduct mission analysis integrating all of the key players as outlined in CGSC ST 101-5, *Command and Staff Decision Process*. See also CALL Newsletter 95-12 Update, *Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning"*. Conduct mission analysis while others are at brigade CP; refine analysis upon their return.

2. In order to provide the commander the most useful information (i.e., number and type of obstacles that can be built, rather than mine and wire quantities), units should follow a *standard agenda* for mission analysis briefs and situation updates.

EXAMPLE:

- higher HQ situation
- enemy situation
- mission
- task organization/forces available
- operations/maneuver
  - -- tasks (specified, implied, essential)
  - -- significant events
  - -- scheme of maneuver
- other BOS
- commander's guidance

3. The receipt of a division order by brigade staffs should *trigger* transmission of status updates to the main CP. Estimates used during COA development must be reviewed by support LNOs early to assure attainability.

4. Engineer commanders, who also support maneuver commanders and have special staff responsibility, should heed doctrinal guidance of Chapter 2, FM 5-100, *Engineer Operations*, with regard to organizing engineer forces and recommending command and support relationships. Engineer leaders should check themselves by asking:

- Why was a particular engineer force task organized to a maneuver commander?
- How did he wargame employment and what were the results?
- Is the command and support relationship *proper* for the envisioned employment?

TA.4 Negative Trend 11: **Timelines and time management**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	2	0	0	2	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 11-1: Task force timelines normally contain basic items and are not effectively disseminated; frequently they are *not even posted*.

PROBLEM 11-2: Most units do not effectively manage time, and often produce inadequate timelines. Despite unit commanders and staffs acknowledging the importance of time management and adherence to the *1/3 - 2/3 rule*, the majority of units fail to properly manage their time.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 11-3:

1. Company commanders usually use 90% to 100% of available planning time.
2. Platoon/Team level briefs are rarely attempted and even more rarely completed to standard.
3. Most companies/troops start detailed mission planning after receipt of a battalion OPORD.

PROBLEM 11-4: Platoon Leaders are not issuing OPORDS or disseminating critical information in a timely manner. Platoon leaders are waiting unnecessarily to give OPORDs to subordinates. Many times finds himself too deeply involved in the planning and coordinating process for multiple operations.
EXAMPLE: MP elements have been placed OPCON to the different task forces for specific missions. In his zeal to get the most up-to-date information possible, the platoon leader will wait extremely long periods of time in order to provide a detailed OPORD to the platoon. This hampers subordinate leaders in the time available to conduct reconnaissance, develop their own OPORDs, and in rehearsing/preparing for the operation.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 11-5:

1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively manage a TF timeline.
2. The inability to manage a written timeline combined with staff sections completing required products in a timely manner.

RESULTS:

1. Critical events fail to take place, and TF actions hinder troop leading procedures at subordinate levels and ultimately prevents the TF from seeing itself in preparation for combat.
2. The TF staff does not have enough time to adequately wargame the selected COA.
3. This caused the orders to lack focus on killing the enemy at the decisive point and often lead to an unclear tasks and purpose to subordinate leaders.

TECHNIQUES

1. The development of realistic timelines for critical events in the planning process is a skill that *must be developed and practiced at Home Station*. The numerous tasks which must concurrently occur during the planning phase of an operation require significant practice in order for a battle staff to be able to proficiently execute the military decision making process. Effective time management is a logical byproduct of decision-making proficiency.

2. The TF timeline should be developed early in the planning process and then continually updated throughout the process.

a. The initial timeline should include the staff's planning cycle, critical R&S activities, and company/team troop leading procedures (e.g., boresighting, initial movement times etc.).

b. As the planning process continues, additional operational critical events are also added to the timeline and continued throughout the wargame process.

c. Key events off of the synchronization matrix should also be incorporated into the timeline. This allows critical tasks to be tracked throughout the battle and provides a valuable tool.

d. Upon completion of the planning process the staff should collate the data onto a butcher board and briefed as part of the TF OPORD.

e. The timeline the staff should include critical TLPs to be conducted at the company/team level. These should include company/team OPORD times, rehearsals, boresight, and LOGPAC.

f. These requirements are not intended to micro-manage co/tms but rather to provide them a common base to begin their planning and preparation. If changes are required at the TF level the TF commander can then make an informed decision on what events he will impact.

3. Time available should be analyzed to determine how much is *available*, how it should be *allocated*, and how it will *affect* the battle command cycle.

4. The commander, using reverse planning, constructs a timeline to accomplish troop-leading tasks. Plan conservatively. Produce a schedule of activities that *must occur*; events scheduled by higher headquarters (backbriefs, rehearsals, etc.) must be included. Prepared shells that include expected events are useful.

5. The approved schedule is incorporated into staff battle drill. Establish a tracking system to ensure critical task accomplishment IAW the schedule. Include the following events, at a minimum:

- HHQ commitments by the command group
- OPORD times
- rehearsal times
- CSS events

Schedule development should always be done in the context of the 4 "S"s, i.e., *sunlight, subordinates, supervise, simplicity*.

6. Timelines must be included in WARNOs and FRAGOs, and must be updated continuously.

7. Post timelines in CPs and annotate them as events occur or change.

8. At Home Station, company planning cells should be centered around subject matter experts (intelligence, fire support, maneuver, EW, logistics etc) who routinely coordinate with their counterparts on the battalion staff during battalion level planning. Close coordination of this nature will provide the company early access to battalion staff products and allow concurrent planning on the company's part.

a. Companies should develop rigorous planning time lines that include platoon/team briefs and practice them regularly in garrison and in the field.

b. Crucial products such as the SITEMP, target list, and course of action sketch, narrative and base graphics should be provided to the companies *as soon as they are completed* by the battalion. Early receipt of these products allows company commanders to plan concurrently, thus ensuring an earlier company OPORD and leaving sufficient time for platoon/team leaders to plan their segment of the mission in detail.

c. Individual crews and small unit leaders must be given the opportunity to analyze their segment of the company mission. This must be *trained and practiced at Home Station*. Planning at this level must include:

- detailed analysis of the terrain and how to maneuver over it
- potential enemy positions and how to deal with them
- when and how reliefs on station will occur
- how to engage anticipated targets (direct or indirect fires) etc.

9. Platoon leaders can provide maximum time to their subordinates if they use WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs to transmit critical information. The key is to use backwards planning and then stick to the timeline.

a. Transmit changes and updates by FRAGOs or supplementary combat battle instructions.

b. Delegate to subordinate mission leaders the authority to coordinate with the different task forces. Most missions at the NTC are physically led by squad leaders, and they, therefore, must be empowered to make the decisions needed to get the mission accomplished.

c. Platoon leaders can maintain C2 by getting back briefs and confirmation briefs by their squad leaders as coordination develops.

TA.4 Negative Trend 12: **Enemy COA development**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	1	1	1

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 12-1: Brigade staffs have not been developing and synchronizing viable plans against multiple enemy courses of action (COAs) during the planning process.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 12-2: Most task forces develop and wargame *one* course of action (COA) to defeat the enemy most likely COA. As part of mission analysis, task force S-2s develop and brief *the* enemy most-likely and most-dangerous COAs. The commander and staff then develop the task force plan to defeat *the* enemy most-like COA. During wargaming, the S-2 fights *the* enemy most-likely COA against the task force plan. Because of limited time, *the wargame ends* without fighting other possible enemy COAs.

RESULTS:

1. Task forces are typically unprepared to adjust/react to another enemy COA during the battle:
   - no adequate contingency plans or decision support products to react to other possible enemy COAs.
   - inadequate graphic control measures to maneuver their company/teams
2. Piecemeal commitment of the task force.
3. Confusion on the battlefield.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 12-3: S2s do not regularly receive enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy courses of action (ECOAs).

1. Units attempt to conduct military decision making process (MDMP) rapidly and limit time devoted to mission analysis.
2. S2 does not complete realistic, detailed ECOAs until COA analysis/wargaming or even until rehearsal.

RESULTS:

1. S2 cannot develop detailed, realistic ECOAs during mission analysis phase; does not influence friendly COA development.
2. Unit staff is *surprised* by ECOAs late in MDMP and *must rework plan and orders*.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 12-4: Brigade plans are normally based on a single anticipated enemy COA.

1. Brigade staffs often plan their scheme of maneuver against a single anticipated enemy rather than branch planning to develop a flexible scheme that would be effective against a range of enemy options.
2. Brigades that do some branch planning often do not include the same staff as for the base plan.

RESULTS:

1. Inflexible execution when the enemy reacts differently than anticipated.
2. Does not provide the maneuver commander the necessary flexibility to adjust the brigade's plan; we often fight the plan, not the enemy.
3. Synchronization of the force is often unhinged when required to react to unplanned "push-to-talk" operations.
4. Uncoordinated effort.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 12-5: *(Repeat of Problem 12-4)* Brigade plans are normally based on a single anticipated enemy COA.

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4. Uncoordinated effort.

TECHNIQUES

1. S2s must have enough time during mission analysis to develop and present detailed enemy COAs. Brief mission analysis only when S2 has *completed* enemy COA development.

2. Task force S2s must develop at least two possible enemy COAs and identify the most likely. The S2 should identify the possible enemy branches from the most likely COA and include those on the task force SITEMP. Task forces should develop a *primary plan* to defeat the enemy a most likely COA but also *have built-in contingency plans* to defeat other possible enemy branches. As many possible enemy branches as feasible must be wargamed and a decision support template (DST) developed to assist the commander with decision making during the battle. Wargaming must be focused, with product outcomes of the wargame clearly identified.

3. The staff must consider multiple options available to the enemy commander when developing the brigade's scheme of maneuver and the branch plans to defeat the enemy regardless of the enemy COA. Potential enemy options include:

- variations in the type of formation
- the axis or axes of advance
- location of the enemy's main effort

Staffs must become proficient in wargaming in order to be able to quickly wargame the most likely enemy COA and leave sufficient time to adequately wargame contingencies.

4. Address multiple enemy COAs early in the planning process to allow each BOS to synchronize and plan to support the development of decision points and triggers to defeat an uncooperative enemy.

a. Although the result of branch planning is not often a written product (CONPLAN), it should result in graphic control measures to facilitate its rapid execution based on the commander's decision.

b. Brigade plans must be flexible and address multiple enemy COAs.

c. Develop standard "plays" at Home Station that are well rehearsed by subordinate units to provide a foundation for execution of *base plans*. Time during the planning process can then be spent on development of branches and sequels of the base plan.

d. Develop decision points, including friendly and enemy criteria, for execution that support against multiple enemy options, and refine them during Home Station training. Use the analogy of a quarterback looking over the defense. Either he (the commander) executes the called play (base plan) or he calls an audible (branch plan) against a varied defense.

TA.4 Negative Trend 13: **Employment and integration of a reserve**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	1	1	1	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 13-1: Brigades often do not designate a reserve.

RESULT: At critical points in the close fight, brigade commanders have no options as the battle progresses. In those instances where a reserve is designated, the reserve commander either does not get a copy of the brigade OPORD, or gets it late. Seldom does the reserve element participate in brigade rehearsals, and too often the reserve commander has little or no idea of his specific task, purpose or commitment trigger.

3-4QFY95

PROBLEM 13-2: Brigades often do not designate a reserve in COAs, and when one is designated, it often has *no clear mission* or commitment criteria.

1. Reserve is not designated especially on operations where there is sufficient combat power to do so.
2. When reserves are designated, they often are given little or no guidance.
3. Reserve positions and route of probable deployment are not reconned.
4. Specific criteria tied to a clear trigger and designated in a decision support template (DST) are not formulated.

RESULT: Reserve commanders are often confused as to their task and purpose.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 13-3: Reserve operations need refinement in planning and integration.

1. There is a lack of positioning guidance and triggers for commitment for reserve during planning.
   - reserve commander does not participate fully in planning.
   - positioning guidance, priority for commitment, and clear communication procedures not given to reserve.
2. Reserve commander seldom gives brigade commander briefback
   - does not participate in brigade rehearsal
   - must deduce mission

RESULTS:

1. Independent action by reserve rather than integrated with commander's intent.
   - reserve commander does not understand his role in brigade plan
   - reserve follows designated task force.
2. Many offensive maneuver opportunities for decision lost.
   - reserve reinforces failure or a dilemma rather than success
   - reserve attached to main effort or task force in contact

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 13-4: Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) continually exercise poor planning in the development/employment of reserve forces in operations.

1. BCT staffs do not fully consider the criteria involved in planning for and committing the reserve into the current operation.

2. Decision points for commitment of the force are not fully developed, and therefore, are difficult to track.

3. Once the reserve *is* committed, there is usually no thought as to *re-designation of another* reserve force.

RESULTS:

1. The reserve is not committed at the decisive point and time in order to achieve its task and purpose, which directly impacts on the missions actually given to the reserve force.

2. The mission is unclear, and as such, does not link into the commander's intent.

TECHNIQUES

1. FM 71-3 states that a reserve gives the commander the flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies. In future operations, *brigades should plan for and designate a reserve*, ensuring that reserve missions are sufficiently detailed to provide the reserve commander a clear understanding of the brigade commander's intent and commitment criteria for its employment. Plan and execute commitment of a reserve for decisive action to achieve a goal rather than to prevent failure or solve a problem.

2. The brigade staff must establish commitment criteria, and then rehearse time/distance factors to ensure the reserve can maneuver to be at the right place at the right time to positively influence the battle

3. Treat the reserve commander as separate maneuver commander in planning.
   - include him in rehearsals
   - require him to briefback brigade commander on plan(s)

4. Give reserve a mission, to include:
   - positioning guidance
   - priority of commitment
   - communications procedures

5. Develop, designate, and plan for the commitment of the reserve force *early* in the beginning of course of action development, not as an afterthought in the process of arraying forces. This will avoid the tendency to reinforce failure versus reinforcing success.

   a. Once the force is completely integrated in the scheme of maneuver with a clear task, purpose, and commitment criteria, consider the positioning and command and control structure.

   b. In the wargaming session, determine the criteria to commit the reserve, synchronize its commitment with the scheme of maneuver, and show the need for reconstituting a reserve force.

TA.4 Negative Trend 14: **Parallell planning**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97	3-4QFY95
	0	2	1	1	0	

PROBLEM 14-1: Military Intelligence (MI) company teams do not use parallel planning procedures to assist in conducting continuous operations.

RESULT: Units that do not plan and execute simultaneously are *not ready to collect against new targets* when the current mission ends or changes.

PROBLEM 14-2: Engineer battalion staffs are not prepared to conduct a *structured* parallel planning process.

1. The battalion staff's wealth of *knowledge and experience is not integrated* into the Assistant Brigade Engineer's participation in the brigade planning process.
2. Lack of integration precludes commander's guidance and decisions being received by the Assistant Brigade Engineer.
3. Battalion staffs lack understanding that their planning cannot begin *after* the brigade issues its order.
4. Task force engineers are unable to integrate enemy and friendly engineer capabilities and terrain analysis prior to the task force commander's guidance and course of action development.

RESULTS:

1. Assistant Brigade Engineer's input to brigade planning process may not be in line with commander's guidance.
2. Brigade planning process has no depth.
3. Battalion OPORD not produced in a timely manner.
4. Subordinate units do not receive their staff/commander analysis and guidance *early enough* to integrate, early on, in the task force planning processes.
5. Task force engineers miss the window of opportunity to best effect task organization, scheme of maneuver and combined arms rehearsals.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 14-3: Engineer battalion staffs do not regularly plan in parallel with brigade staffs.

1. Engineer battalion staffs do not use their *proximity to the brigade staff*:
   - to expedite their own planing
   - to influence the brigade staff through immediate input to the assistant brigade engineer (ABE).
2. Engineer staffs do not seek out *information/OPORDs received by brigade*.
3. Reduced *engineer input* to brigade military decision making process (MDMP).
   - terrain analysis
   - enemy abilities templating
   - friendly capabilities input
   - minimal resourcing and timelining of assets
4. Engineer OPORD does not give *staff information to TF engineers* to allow use in TF MDMP.
   - parallel planning with TF
   - engineer company OPORD not synchronized with TF plan

RESULTS: Unsynchronized plans and/or delayed engineer battalion OPORDs.

1. Engineer battalions are delayed in beginning their own mission analysis process.
2. Once behind the brigade staff, engineer battalion staffs become *non-players in the MDMP*.
3. ABE becomes only engineer in brigade MDMP.
4. Engineer battalion OPORD
   - incomplete, delayed, not synchronized with brigade plan
   - needs FRAGOs to correct
5. TF engineers' OPORD not synchronized with TF plan.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 14-4:

1. Task force and brigade S3s have no formal system that dictates what and when products will be available throughout the brigade orders process.
2. Most units have established WARNO systems; however, they often lack critical information that will assist the task force planning process.
3. Parallel planning is a must for the entire staff; but, is especially critical for the S2 because 80% of his products are needed for COA development.
4. Task force LNOs are usually newly assigned 2LTs or 1LTs waiting to attend the advanced course and lack the experience/training required to make significant contributions to the unit by way of LNO responsibilities. This shortfall is not due to lack of effort; rather a lack of training and understanding of task and purpose.

TECHNIQUES

1. MI company teams should use the electronic warfare (EW) platoon leader as a planner, leaving the POC chief as executor. The EW PL can then track on the supported unit planning process and develop the company order and graphics while the current battle is being fought. The IEWSO should ensure he is providing constant updates during the brigade's planning process to facilitate parallel planning.

2. Engineer battalion staffs must practice the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) at Home Station with the brigade staff so they are familiar with their orders process and able to parallel plan in conjunction with it.

a. Train engineer battalion staffs in MDMP and procedures of their supported brigade and practice OPORD processes in field training at Home Station.

- insure all staff members understand their roles and responsibilities in the battalion OPORD process
- staff members understand their input to the ABE for brigade OPORD process.

b. Battalion XOs fill role of "Chief of Staff":

- direct and control battalion OPORD timeline
- involve entire staff
- prevent delays
- ensure timely OPORD issue

c. Involve battalion commanders and S-3s to guide and review MDMP process and products.

3. Liaison Officers (LNOs) can be especially effective in producing a timely conduit for information. Information that can assist the battle staff throughout the planning process may include a list of facts and assumptions made by the HHQ staff during their planning. This information, provided by the LNO, might assist the task force in understanding why a certain COA was chosen by the HHQ.

a. The task force LNO should be an integrated staff officer who aggressively pursues needed information for all BOS elements within the task force to facilitate parallel planning.

b. Task force commanders must ensure the LNO clearly understands his duties and responsibilities and has a clear understanding of the planning and orders process.

c. Task force and brigade S3s should establish a *formal* planning process.

d. Establish a commo network that allows quick dissemination of information to the task force as the brigade executes its orders process. These products, coupled with detailed WARNOs, will greatly assist the task force in their effort to parallel plan.

TA.4 Negative Trend 15: **Decision-point development**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	0	0	1	3

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 15-1: Decision points often lack specific details and are ineffective in aiding the different command and control nodes from assisting the commander in making the critical decisions at the appropriate time. Because they are poorly developed, they are often confused with triggers.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 15-2:

1. S2s do not depict decision points or target areas of interest keyed to significant events forward and to the rear of the BSA.
2. There is no established time/space relationship to prepare the commander to make tactical decisions relative to battlefield events.
3. S2s do not correlate the enemy operational timetable and friendly operational timetable while identifying decision points, target areas of interest, and time phase lines.
4. Commanders are not making tactical decisions when required relative to battlefield events in and around the BSA.
5. Commanders have not established a decision to time/space relationship which correlates the enemy's operational timetable or friendly timetable.

RESULT: The BSA gets overrun by the enemy or does not execute its save plan in time as the enemy strikes the BSA, destroying all the key logistics that are required to support the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in its fight.

PROBLEM 15-3: Engineer commanders and staffs do not consistently develop decision points with supporting criteria to ensure continued support to the brigade in a fluid environment. In nearly every brigade mission there are both opportunities and requirements to change the task and purpose of engineer units with a corresponding change in task organization and/or change in priorities. While commanders and staffs cannot anticipate all these situations, the tendency is to issue an incomplete and inadequately synchronized fragmentary order during execution vice addressing the most likely contingencies during the initial planning process.

RESULT: The fragmentary order method usually results in a loss of momentum at the brigade level and difficulties in command, control, and support to the executing unit.

PROBLEM 15-4:

1. Development of decision point criteria (e.g. PIR, NAI, event) is too often not a function of the wargame.

2. Decision point development:

- lacks specific detail
- is often ineffective in providing timely execution of critical decisions during the fight
- are often made after line of departure (LD)
- criteria based on a single anticipated enemy COA

RESULTS:

1. *Late or ineffective key decisions* are made to maneuver and fight a flexible enemy with multiple COAs.

2. Trigger point development is done while forces are maneuvering on the battlefield.

3. Commanders are forced to *react* to enemy actions, hampered in executing timely decisions, developing hasty COAs, and issuing FRAGOs.

4. With only one anticipated enemy COA, the flexibility of the brigade plan in hindered.

TECHNIQUES

1. Specific criteria must be developed that includes both friendly and enemy considerations. Once the criteria is established it must be disseminated to subordinate units. This dissemination focuses the reporting process to include the criteria necessary to make the decision.

a. The criteria for decision points is developed *during the wargaming process* and not after the order has been issued. This will ensure all BOS elements are integrated and the DPs are disseminated to subordinate leaders.

b. As critical points in the battle are determined, thought must be put into whether a decision must be made. If a *decision* must be made it must pass the *yes/no question*. If the question is *when*, then it is a *trigger*, because it will happen without a decision being made.

c. Decision points must be clearly articulated in the order, the orders brief, and all rehearsals.

d. When considering the commitment of the reserve, shifting of the main effort, repositioning forces, or the location for employing special munitions, decision points and triggers must be thought out as part of the wargaming session.

2. The FSB S2/S3 should produce decision support matrix annexes for all possible events, i.e., save plan, dismounted enemy, NBC attacks, artillery, mine fields, etc.

a. These matrixes would enhance decision making while the unit is under immense pressure during an attack.

b. Development of a Decision Support Template (DST) uses products developed throughout the entire planning process. It is not something that is exclusively done after the plan is developed. The goal is to use products that were previously developed during the planning process and create a useful tool that can help the commander make decisions at critical points on the battlefield.

c. The decision support matrix supplements the DST (FM 34-3, page 4-32).

3. Commanders and staffs must develop clear decision points with a pre-established plan to accomplish the identified task as part of the brigade decision-making process to allow subordinate units to plan, prepare and execute the mission to standard.

a. Identify the requirement during planning.

b. Tie the required adjustment to a decision point with both friendly and enemy criteria.

c. Establish a command and control framework to execute.

d. Addressing the following potential situations during brigade level course of action development and synchronize the adjustment with required command and control plan during wargaming:

- Transition from task force to brigade deliberate breach operations.
- Culmination of lead task force with follow and assume/support task force becoming the main effort.
- Loss of engineers in the breach force.
- Success of lead task force in breaching main defensive belt causing future mobility requirements at the existing breach site to be in support of brigade level maneuver.
- Adjusting the SCATMINE system allocation based upon success or failure of the conventional effort.
- Transferring blade assets and platoons from one unit sector to another.
- Ending brigade level CM/S effort to initiate task force level effort.
- Disengaging engineer units and assets.
- Changing type of survivability positions based on progress.

4. Staffs must develop decision point criteria for multiple enemy COAs. This process should be ongoing during the refinement and supervision phases of the planning process. Decision points must be a result of the wargame and based on a comparison of multiple enemy COAs.

TA.4 Negative Trend 16: **Planning for deep operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	1	0	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 16-1: Brigades rarely plan or execute a deep fight designed to set a specific condition or set of conditions to allow the close fight to be successfully fought.

1. Brigade staffs do not view missions within the battlefield framework - deep, close, rear, security and reserve. Thus the fire support plan is not designed around the deep, close, rear concept.

2. Plans which do incorporate deep fires, usually executed by COLTs, are written with no specific task, purpose or end state.

1-2QFY96

PROBLEM 16-2: *(Repeat of Problem 16-1)* The brigades rarely plan or execute a deep fight designed to set a *specific condition or set of conditions* to allow the close fight to be fought with success.

1. Brigade staffs are not viewing the planning and execution of the mission according to the battlefield framework (deep, close, rear, security, and reserve).

2. The fire support plan is *not designed around the concept of deep, close, rear*. Routinely, the plans contain some amount of deep fires, usually executed by the Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs), but with no specific task, purpose, and end state determined.

RESULT: It is *impossible to determine success or failure* of the deep fight because the end state, the conditions to be set, are not determined by the brigades.

TECHNIQUES

1. During course of action (COA) development, the brigade staff must array the forces, both friendly and enemy, as they should be *at the decisive point*. This is the planned end state for the deep fight. The fire support officer (FSO), S2 and S3 must develop a series of fire support events for each particular COA that will get the brigade to the desired end state. Wargame each COA and define *detailed* tasks and purposes in the deep fire support plan.

2. One result of wargaming should be a *specific, measurable end state* for deep operations.

EXAMPLE:

TOO GENERAL: "the COLTs will acquire targets and call for fire on them."

SPECIFIC: "As the enemy occupies its fighting positions, COLT 4 will execute Target AJ 0016 in order to destroy two BMPs from the southern MRP which will allow task force 1-16 IN to have a 5:1 force ratio at the point of penetration and successfully breach."

This SPECIFIC example would be the product of wargaming. It gives a task and purpose to the deep fire support. This is an example of the level of detail we must achieve during wargaming.

TA.4 Negative Trend 17: **Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2)**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	1	0	0	1	0

1-2QFY95

PROBLEM 17-1: Brigades have no A2C2 procedures established, resulting in ineffective airspace coordination and hazardous situations for rotary wing aircraft.

1. Efforts to execute A2C2 are minimal to nonexistent.
2. Brigade staffs do not have a formal A2C2 cell.
3. Brigade staffs are not well versed in A2C2 procedures.
4. Brigade staffs make little or no effort to coordinate the use of airspace.
5. A2C2 planning and coordination routinely falls to the aviation LNO with poor results.

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 17-2: A2C2 is often neither practiced nor fully understood.

1. Too often, the brigade combat team (BCT) staff relies on the aviation LNO for airspace management. Airspace management in the BCT sector is the responsibility of the *brigade commander*. The S3 air manages A2C2 at the brigade level; the G3 air manages A2C2 at the division level. Airspace management applies to all uses of airspace in the BCT sector, to include Air Force fixed wing, Army rotary wing, UAV, indirect fires, and air defense assets.
2. A2C2 plans are often not disseminated to maneuver task forces, FA, ADA, and Air Force elements to synchronize the brigade's efforts.

TECHNIQUES

1. Begin staff planning concurrent with identification of the need for Army airspace.
   a. Once identified, the S3 allocates initial airspace for the insertion (air corridors, LZs, PZs, etc.)
   b. Aviation LNO: Works with the S3 developing air corridors based on the mission, aircraft type, enemy situation, etc.
   c. S2: Identifies threats to the aircraft and recommends, as necessary, modifications to the air corridors.
   d. FSO: Identifies airspace control measures' effect on fire support, and then recommends necessary changes.
   e. ADA LNO: Plans changes to WCS based on the insertion.
   f. ALO: Plans for coordinating altitude and separation distances.
2. S3 Air finalizes coordination with the A2C2 team and ensures all graphic control measures are included on the brigade graphics and the necessary coordinating instructions are in the brigade OPORD. S3 Air coordinates with higher headquarters and adjacent units for A2C2. S3 Air continues to coordinate airspace throughout the preparation phase for the mission. Coordinates with the A2C2 team as changes or refinements occur.
3. A2C2 is rehearsed during the combined arms rehearsal. A2C2 is also rehearsed at all subordinate rehearsals, as required.

4. Open and close air corridors only while aircraft are transiting the corridor. Leaving the corridor in effect continuously needlessly restricts fire support.

a. Plan aerial OPs and air BPs off of the air corridor.

b. Only open section (between aerial check points) of air corridors as the aircraft transit that section.

c. Plan air corridors behind or to the flanks of artillery batteries and mortar platoons/sections.

d. Consider TF mortar platoons/sections when planning A2C2.

e. Include air corridors on brigade graphics.

f. Ensure indirect fire support elements are aware of the coordinating altitude in air corridors.

g. Establish NFAs on aerial OPs.

h. Require aircraft to report aerial checkpoints (ACPs) when transiting air corridors.

5. Read and review FM 100-103.

6. Develop Home Station training to enhance techniques for unit airspace management and incorporate A2C2 procedures in unit TACSOPs.

7. Ground maneuver units must assume responsibility for and take ownership of their airspace. Fixed wing, rotary wing, UAV, artillery, and air defense are merely *temporary* users of airspace.

TA.4 Negative Trend 18: **Planning for COLT operations**

Observation frequency:	1-2QFY95	3-4QFY95	1-2QFY96	3-4QFY96	1-2QFY97
	0	0	0	1	1

3-4QFY96

PROBLEM 18-1: Planning for COLT operations at the brigade level remains an overall weakness.

1. While the brigade assigns COLTs R&S responsibilities, the brigade planning does not address in detail their mission, infiltration, and extraction.

2. Instead of a staff effort, the planning for COLT operations to plan these critical areas are left to the COLT platoon leader and the R&S planner to plan, prepare, and execute.

NOTE: Individual skills of Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs) have *improved* during this quarter. Teams continue to improve their *survival* skills (fieldcraft) and *tactical knowledge* in movement techniques, *camouflage*, *reporting*, and knowledge of the *enemy*.

1-2QFY97

PROBLEM 18-2: *(Repeat of Problem 18-1)* Planning for COLT operations at the brigade level remains an overall weakness.

1. While the brigade assigns COLTs R&S responsibilities, the brigade planning does not address in detail their mission, infiltration, and extraction.

2. Instead of a staff effort, the planning for COLT operations to plan these critical areas are left to the COLT platoon leader and the R&S planner to plan, prepare, and execute.

NOTE: Individual skills of Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTs) have *improved* during this quarter. Teams continue to improve their *survival* skills (fieldcraft) and *tactical knowledge* in movement techniques, *camouflage*, *reporting*, and knowledge of the *enemy*.

TECHNIQUES

1. Brigade staff planning must include:
   - how the COLTs will conduct a forward passage of lines
   - routes
   - resupply operations
   - communication requirements for retrans operations
   - insertion operations by ground and air
   - casualty evacuation

2. The COLTs exist to support the brigade's fight and their employment requires the integrated and synchronized planning efforts of the entire brigade staff.

3. Planning for COLT operations begins as early as high value targets are identified and refined as course of action is developed and finalized during the wargaming. Suggested areas for staff planning:

- S2. Determine the requirements for COLTs. Identify target areas of interest and named areas of interest for the purpose of providing intel and destroying high payoff targets.

- S2/Engineer. Conduct a terrain analysis to identify possible observation posts by using Terrabase and the expertise of the staff.

- S3. Allocate resources for the mission (Air Force ETACs/SAPPERs/IEW personnel/aircraft/scout augmentees for security/additional communications equipment/UAV. etc.). Plan for the insertion/extraction. Plan like any other operation to include determining infiltration methods, plan routes, checkpoints, pickup, landing zones, false insertions, forward and rearward passage of lines, and emergency resupply. Make coordination for aircraft, retrans vehicles, and terrain management.

- S4. Support the infiltration/extraction. Plan resupply, casualty evacuation, and if applicable caches.

- FSO/COLT platoon leader. Prepare order, backbriefs to the commander, conduct PCCs/PCIs, and rehearsals.

- S2/S3/FSO. Execution - provide staff supervision until the mission is complete.